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Summary 
Economic or white-collar crime is on the rise, making the study of possible means 
of both deterrence and detection of such crime ever more relevant. Accounting 
fraud is among the fastest growing categories of economic crime, and is also the 
category of white-collar crime most naturally linked to auditor detection. Part of 
the rationale for this piece of research is the fact that the number of Norwegian 
cases of white-collar crime only recently has become large enough to allow this 
type of multiple case study. Another part of the rationale for this thesis is the 
heavily conflicting views on auditor ability to detect fraud found during a 
mapping of existing research on the topic. The role of auditing in the detection of 
white-collar crime is therefore a topic which, due to rapidly changing 
circumstances and social relevance, is deemed to be in great need of updated 
description.  
 This thesis seeks to improve on one of the areas now made researchable: 
What is the role of the auditing function in the detection of white-collar crime in 
Norway today? The concrete research questions thought to answer this query 
satisfactorily are:  
1) What are the responsibilities of the auditing function regarding the 
detection of white-collar crime?  
2) What are the most common means of white-collar crime detection?  
3) Are these findings in accordance with the views presented in extant 
literature and research on the matter?  
4) If not, what are the implications for the auditing function of these 
findings?  
 
This thesis will seek to clarify further the role of auditing in detection within the 
Norwegian context, based on a convenience sample of Norwegian cases to date. 
By providing indications about this role this research may also provide valuable 
input for further investigation of the topic. Concrete suggestions for further 
research are given in the last chapter of the thesis.  
 Structured as a descriptive multiple case study including 44 instrumental 
cases, it is hoped that this thesis will allow a better understanding and increased 
ability to theorize about the broader context of white-collar crime. A multiple or 
comparative case study is chosen over other alternatives for the range of 
characteristics inherent in it. It allows the description of a multitude of different 
Norwegian cases from the recent past, mapping the auditor role in more detail 
than a strictly quantitative approach would allow. At the same time, the number of 
cases lets us count and categorize instances in a way that would not be possible if 
one or two cases received all our attention. Also, such a design implies the added 
benefit that evidence from multiple cases is considered more compelling. 
The first part of the analysis involves a description and subsequent 
quantification of various means of detection of white-collar crime. The second 
maps and judges auditor involvement by phase of the detection process by use of 
three external and independent raters.  
 Main findings include an interesting connection between various means of 
detection, illustrating what seems to be a synergy effect between whistle-blowers 
and the media. Also, the included cases indicate a lower auditor detection rate 
than what has previously been shown to be the case in other countries, a finding 
which may warrant further investigation of country specific conditions that may 
influence auditor willingness or ability to engage in detection. 
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1. Introduction and background 
1.1.  Economic crime in Norway today 
―The interest of scholars and practitioners in transnational crime took off in 
earnest during the 1990s, amid significant political and economic developments in 
the international system‖ (Reichel 2005, 3). The same can be said of Norway. Up 
until the early 1990s the popular opinion was that organized crime was a non-
issue in Norway. The concept was in use, but seldom, and often referring to other 
phenomena than today. Then emerged the case of Hells Angels in 1992, and the 
media were ablaze. (Larsson 2008)  
Only in the last few years has white-collar crime received the same 
extensive attention in Norway as it has long received elsewhere. Although the 
history of white-collar crime in Norway is much older, the extent and severeness 
of the cases uncovered here have only lately begun to match what is experienced 
internationally. Perhaps this is partly due to Norway being a newly rich nation 
(Larsson 2006, xiii). Larsson (2008) mentions other reasons as well, such as 
increasing pressure from international conventions, demands about harmonizing 
legislature and increasing political bonds with Europe. All we know is what we 
observe from the cases unravelled, some of which are the basis for this thesis.  
This does not mean, of course, that crime in various organized forms did 
not exist in Norway prior to the end of the last century. Smuggling, for instance, 
goes way back in Norwegian tradition (Johansen 2004). However, these groups 
were not referred to in the same jargon as today, neither were they perceived in 
the same way as organized crime is now (Larsson 2008).  
 From being a virtually non-existent issue in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
1990s saw the emergence of governmental action plans against economic crime, 
and a newfound focus on organized crime signalled a ―shift in attention in the 
public and political sphere‖ from the late 1990s and onwards (Larsson 2006, 69). 
Since the 1990s the amount of cases uncovered and tried has grown exponentially, 
particularly in the public sector. According to Statistics Norway white-collar 
crime constitutes only two percent of total, known crime in the country (Gedde-
Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008, 43). Historically the lack of cases is not 
thought to be due to the nonexistence of white-collar crime prior to the year 2000, 
but rather that perpetrations have become more visible. Also, offences that 
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previously slipped through the fingers of the law due to insufficient statutes on the 
subject are now prosecuted with ever more detailed and internationally inspired 
paragraphs. ―The cost of being caught in corrupt practice may have increased as a 
result of the new international regulations. However, unless the probability of 
being caught in the crime also increases, the impact of these regulations may not 
be very significant‖ (Søreide 2006, 381). On the other hand, former National 
Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental 
Crime (Økokrim) deputy director Erling Grimstad believes that the publicity 
surrounding cases of corruption (and white-collar crime in general) in itself will 
lead to more cases being revealed. People learn what corruption means in a 
Norwegian context and are able to recognize mechanisms such as overbilling and 
the use of subcontractors. Still, the cases prosecuted are merely the tip of the 
iceberg. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008, 55)  
Økokrim has grown more than fourfold in size (Larsson 2006, 71) to 
accommodate the rise in cases needing their attention. This increase in cases is 
thought to be the result of a large number of new laws and regulations in the area 
of economic and organized crime for the past two decades (Larsson 2006) rather 
than an actual increase in crimes committed (Haakaas 2008). A stricter penal code 
and increased resources dedicated to the detection of economic and organized 
crime, have increased the number of cases detected. Up until 1996 Norwegian 
businesses were allowed to deduct bribes in foreign countries on their tax returns 
(Haakaas 2008). Today they are faced with a very different legal reality.  
Economic crime such as money laundering, embezzlement, corruption, 
fraud and forgery combined consisted of only two percent of total charges filed in 
Norway in 2006. Økokrim maintained in their 2007 status report that this low 
proportion reflects the propensity to file certain charges while overlooking others, 
and lacking prioritization by police and authorities rather than the actual scope 
and degree of severity of this type of crime. The widespread contention that 
money laundering and other forms of white-collar crime are relatively harmless, 
may be partly to blame. The truth is more uncomfortable: White-collar crime 
undermines the most important institutions of modern society and leads to 
inflation of criminal enterprise. The concept of the black economy encompasses 
the total value of all tax evasions and illegal dealings. It includes all income not 
listed on a tax return. In general the black economy is estimated at between 4 and 
6 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of a nation. No exact estimation 
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exists for Norway, but Norwegian tax authorities claimed that an approximation 
of 10 percent in 1999 was plausible. Half of this percentage is black labor; the 
other half consists of income from criminal activity. (Kristiansen 2009)  
 Several of the cases unravelled in the past decade have been uncovered by 
means of forensic journalism. Several cases are also the product of routine internal 
controls in the companies themselves, in the government or audits performed by 
tax authorities. Rarely is the unravelling initiated by the police. (Gedde-Dahl, 
Hafstad and Magnussen 2008) The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 
(ACFE) Report to the Nation for 2002 shows that the main source of detection in 
the USA is employee tip-offs. Internal and external auditing clock in at third and 
fifth place respectively. (Pickett 2005, 167) These results are largely unchanged in 
the 2004 report. It is, however, worth noting that when it comes to cases of 
financial statement fraud specifically, external audits led to the detection of almost 
one-third of the incidents (Wells 2005, 312). To what extent internal or external 
auditing functions also have a place among these means of detection in Norway, is 
what this thesis will attempt to map.  
 Another justification for increasing insight into the topic of white-collar 
crime is the tremendous costs it inflicts upon society. It is contended that ―white 
collar crime has a universal impact on a broad range of socio-economic groups‖, 
and that ―beyond the direct economic costs of white collar crime, there are a 
number of indirect costs. Among these are higher taxes, increased insurance 
premiums, and increased cost of goods sold‖ (Ivancevich et al. 2003, 117).  
Economic crime trends are analyzed by several institutions in Norway, 
both private and governmental. Most notably The National Authority for 
Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim) 
publishes a report every other year on national trends in all areas pertaining to 
economic and environmental crime. Also, The Global Economic Crime Survey 
conducted by PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) is a transnational comparative study 
mapping trends in economic crime on a global scale.  Presented below are some 
key points from the 2008–2009 Økokrim report on trends in economic crime.  
Firstly, the official crime statistics from Statistics Norway (SSB) show a 
slight but steady rise in reported economic crime during the past few decades. Tax 
evasions are the most commonly reported economic crime. These cases are 
primarily detected by the tax authorities.  
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Accounting violations and offences are the second most commonly 
reported form of economic crime, and have risen steadily since 2002. As 
accounting violations are often a part of (or a necessary means of hiding) other 
forms of economic crime, this is considered one of the single most important 
categories and one in need of significant attention.  
Fraud is another form of economic crime that stands for a large amount of 
reported incidents. A steady growth in cases from 2000 to 2005 has been followed 
by a steep decline from 2007 onwards, although the sums involved in each case 
are rising. Fraud in banking and finance mostly pertains to smaller amounts. 
However, some exceptions to the rule exist, Finance Credit being among the 
better known cases. This case was unravelled in 2002 and cost the banks involved 
in excess of NOK 1.2 billion.  
Embezzlement has seen a relatively steady stream of reported incidents in 
spite of a slight decline from 2003 onwards. This is consistent with the findings of 
The Global Economic Crime Survey conducted by PwC, where embezzlement as 
a percentage of reported incidents has dropped from 55 % in 2005 to 25 % in 
2007.  
Despite the relatively low number of cases on corruption reported, several 
indicators suggest that continued vigilance on the subject is needed. This view is 
backed by the findings of the 2007 survey by PwC, where Norwegian corruption 
levels were found to be close to the world average of 13 %, but higher than the 7 
% average of Western Europe. These percentages refer to the number of 
companies that report having knowledge of, or experiences with, corruption in 
their dealings. These seemingly heightened levels of corruption may be a true 
representation, but may also simply be the result of a stricter legal framework and 
Norwegians’ current focus on corruption.  
It is worth noting, however, that the numbers reported above do not 
provide the entire picture. This is because only a small amount (around 20 
percent) of detected cases of white-collar crime in the private sector are reported 
to the authorities. Similarly, not all grounded suspicions of white-collar criminal 
offences in the public sector are reported. The Personnel Handbook for 
governmental employees section 10.19 is devoted to guidelines for handling cases 
of embezzlement, corruption, theft and fraud on duty, and government policy in 
such matters is not to involve the police unless the incidence is thought to lead to 
criminal prosecution. (Olsen 2007)  
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1.2.  The purpose of this thesis 
As economic criminal activity becomes more obtrusive and severe, so the 
importance of the institutional arrangements and professions in place to monitor, 
prevent and detect such activity increases along with it. Among these frameworks 
and professions we find the auditing community and the laws and guiding 
principles that underlie their workings. The perceived heightened and still 
increasing importance of the auditing function by the author is yet another 
argument for the research question at hand, as is the fact that accounting fraud is 
among the fastest growing categories of economic crime 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009). Now more than ever there is a need to map and 
improve a function that has evolved in part for the purpose of ensuring the legality 
of businesses’, institutions’ and persons’ economic actions, a function that 
underlies the sound operations of our society.  
 Furthermore, during the last decade or so the number of cases and 
convictions in Norway has reached a number that allows for more extensive and 
quantitatively angled research than has been possible before. Also, this type of 
empirical research has some innate characteristics that to some degree hinder 
prolific projects on the subject. ―First, it is very difficult to gather evidence about 
frauds that have occurred. Litigation surrounding frauds often lasts for years, 
during which time public evidence is unavailable and private evidence is rarely 
shared. In addition, companies are reluctant to make their frauds public 
information. Second, what information is available about actual frauds is not 
usually uniform or consistent, resulting in an inability to perform empirical studies 
or draw generalizations about fraud‖ (Albrecht, Albrecht and Dunn 2001, 8). For 
these reasons, it is supposed that several of those cases initially incorporated in the 
sample below will not prove possible to include in the final analysis due to lack of 
available information.  
As there can be no doubt that additional insight into the nature of, types of, 
and motivations for white-collar crime is needed, this thesis seeks to improve on 
one of the areas now made researchable:  
 
What is the role of the auditing function in the detection of white-collar 
crime in Norway today?  
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A number of research questions have been formulated which collectively will 
provide answers to the research topic outlined above:  
 
 1) What are the responsibilities of the auditing function regarding 
the detection of white-collar crime?  
 2) What are the most common means of white-collar crime 
detection?   
 3) Are these findings in accordance with the views presented in 
extant literature and research on the matter?  
 4) If not, what are the implications for the auditing function of 
these findings?  
 
The first research question is answered in the section on definitions and 
terminology, where the auditor role in the detection of white-collar crime is 
explained in some detail. The second is mapped through the descriptions of 
auditor involvement in each case, a summary of which can be found at the 
beginning of the fourth chapter, as well as a discussion of whether or not these 
findings can be said to comply with literature opinions on the subject, answering 
the third question. Implications of findings can be found in the final discussion 
chapter.  
These research questions will generate a set of hypotheses regarding the 
auditor role in the detection of white-collar crime. In order to make qualified 
assumptions these hypotheses will be formulated as the literature review 
progresses, and will be based on a priori theories on what the literature predicts 
the findings of this research to be.  
 
1.3.  Boundaries and limitations 
Just as important as explaining what this thesis seeks to elucidate, is clearly 
defining the boundaries of the upcoming research. The chosen methodology of a 
descriptive multiple case analysis necessitates limiting the research question to 
encompass only the extent to which the auditing function detects white-collar 
crime already committed; whether or not the auditing function may embody some 
preventative power lies outside the research at hand, as such a subject would 
require an altogether different methodology.  
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Further, the research objective of this thesis will include both internal and 
external auditing functions, and so for the purpose of this paper auditing is defined 
in the broadest possible sense. Also, cases are not restricted to organizations that 
are required by law to make use of an auditor, but rather any case in which the 
auditing function has been involved in one way or another may qualify. The 
reason for this is the impression left on the researcher after sorting through 
published material on the cases to be studied, as described in the section on extant 
literature and research.  
A few remarks on what this thesis does and does not purport to explain 
regarding the auditing function and their role in the detection of economic crime, 
are in order. ―Auditing is often bound up with preventing fraud and corruption, 
particularly in the minds of lay people and politicians. In some respects this is 
unfortunate as most audit work is relatively routine and not particularly concerned 
with fraud. Yet it is generally true that good audit work, like good management 
and sound operations in general, will help to deter fraud and make life difficult for 
fraudsters.‖ (Jones 2004, 39)  
The examinations undertaken should not in any way be interpreted as an 
insinuation of inadequacy of the auditing function. The a priori opinion of the 
researcher is not one of substandard work by those who guard the financial 
numbers of companies. Rather, it is an inquisition into the workings of detection 
of financial crime in Norway today undertaken for the purpose of uncovering 
possible areas of improvement when it comes to the laws and standards that 
provide the framework for how the auditing function undertakes its duties. 
Perhaps future research may be able to reframe and rewrite how the auditor 
works, possibly increasing the contribution of the auditing function to the 
detection of such crime. Further definition of the auditing framework and what 
can and cannot be expected of the auditing function will follow in the chapter on 
literature and theory.  
At the end of the day the job of an auditor is to ensure that ledgers are 
correct beyond a reasonable doubt according to law and auditing standards and 
norms. The typical auditor personality is accurate, principled and proper, and in 
the process of auditing accounts the auditor is constantly on the look-out for 
possible errors, irregularities or malpractices. Most will be revealed as mere 
personal negligence or oversight, but some may turn out to be cases of (attempted 
or accomplished) white-collar crime.  
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As can be seen from the following chapter on theory and literature there 
exists good faith in the extant literature that auditors and the auditing function in 
general do a great deal in combating attempts at white-collar crime simply 
through the preventative function they hold (Drage and Olstad 2008) and through 
the rectification of errors that are in fact visible from the perspective of the 
auditor. This is a side of auditing rarely given much attention; the cases we 
remember are the scandals and media storms created around those few who use 
their position and knowledge to partake in or hide white-collar crime, and who 
thereby drag the entire auditing community through the mud. The secondary 
purpose of this thesis is to provide a more nuanced picture of the services to 
modern communities provided by the auditing function, and to a certain extent to 
report fit the auditing function in general when it comes to the standard processes 
and routines they are governed by in their daily bout.  
However, this does not imply that a good thing cannot be made better. 
There may exist potential for the auditing function to do more. It is possible that 
the findings of the forthcoming analysis may point towards more work being done 
on the current framework of the auditing function; perhaps new requirements and 
routines are called for that may enable the auditing community to play a more 
active role in the detection of white-collar crime. This is a subject somewhat in the 
periphery of the subsequent research, and one that it will not be possible to answer 
fully within the constraints of this thesis. It is, however, a subject of sufficient 
interest to receive some attention in the chapter concerning a discussion of 
findings and implications for further research.  
 
1.4.  Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured in the following way: The theoretical framework and 
literature review will describe the extant body of research and literature on the 
topic and illustrate how this thesis will contribute to the field. The definitions of 
key concepts and terminology that the research will be based on, will also be 
included in this section.  
A chapter on chosen methodology and research design will follow the 
literature review. A description of the cases selected is kept as a separate chapter.  
Next is the chapter on the presentation and discussion of findings from the 
judgment of several raters concerning auditing function involvement in detection, 
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along with a discussion of research quality. Lastly, a summary of findings as well 
as recommendations for further research will be drafted along with concluding 
remarks. In the appendix can be found a complete list of cases and the page 
numbers on which these can be found, the rating forms of the three independent 
raters and the preliminary thesis report.  
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2. Theoretical framework and literature review 
2.1.  A preliminary opinion of the topic 
An overview of extant literature and research is needed to provide sufficient 
argumentation for the research at hand and to clarify which hole(s) in the existing 
body of works this paper will seek to fill. Also, ―even when we believe ourselves 
to be unfettered theoretically, we always begin a research project with an arsenal 
of preconceived theoretical notions‖. As these notions may affect and bias the 
interpretation of information along the way, it is by some recommended ―that, to 
the best of our ability, we make our theoretical notions explicit from the 
beginning‖, as this ―creates the possibility of control. ... By acknowledging our 
theoretical tools (i.e. our biases) as best we can at the outset, we can better guard 
against the tendency for our worldview to affect our interpretation of information 
in unacknowledged ways‖. This literature review therefore also serves the purpose 
of explicitly stating the a priori notions of the researcher in addition to describing 
the extant body of research on the topic. (Ragin and Becker 1992, 195-196)   
A handful of articles published in the Journal of Forensic Accounting 
seem to describe the closest match the author has found within research similar to 
that planned for this paper. The articles are White Collar Crime: A Profile of the 
Perpetrator and an Evaluation of the Responsibilities for its Prevention and 
Detection (Farrell and Healy 2000), Auditors’ Beliefs about the Fraud Detection 
Effectiveness of Standard Audit Procedures (Moyes and Baker 2003), Can 
Auditors Detect Fraud: A Review of the Research Evidence (Albrecht, Albrecht 
and Dunn 2001), and SAS No. 99: A New Look at Auditor Detection of Fraud 
(Beasley 2003). These will be briefly reviewed in the following.  
Beasley (2003) is concerned with the fact that auditors seem to struggle 
with reducing occurrences of material misstatements due to fraud, and purports to 
examine whether the introduction of SAS No. 99 can provide insights to 
practitioners and standard setters. The focus of this new standard remains on 
―fraudulent activities that lead to intentional material misstatements due to fraud‖ 
as in its predecessor SAS No. 82, but ―significantly expands the guidance and 
procedures to be performed in every audit‖ (Beasley 2003, 3). He concludes that  
this expanded guidance will hopefully ―lead to substantial improvements of 
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auditor detection of material misstatements due to fraud by strengthening the 
auditor’s responses to identified high fraud risks‖ (Beasley 2003, 20).  
Moyes and Baker (2003) asked external, internal and governmental 
auditors to evaluate the effectiveness of various standard audit procedures in 
detecting fraud. Although external and internal auditors differed in the types of 
audit procedures they recommended, the authors conclude that ―the audit 
procedures judged more effective in detecting fraud were those which provided 
evidence about the existence of internal controls and those which evaluated the 
strength of internal controls‖, and that ―strategic use of standard audit procedures 
may help auditors fulfill their responsibilities under SAS No. 99‖ (Moyes and 
Baker 2003, 199). Further, ―the results of this study indicate that fraud detection 
might be improved through the strategic use of standard audit procedures earlier 
in the audit examination. … If these audit procedures were applied during the 
preliminary stages of the audit, they would be more likely to indicate the potential 
existence of fraud, in which case the auditor would have more time to revise the 
audit plan and conduct other necessary investigations‖ (Moyes and Baker 2003, 
216).  
Albrecht, Albrecht and Dunn (2001) ―review the fraud detection aspects of 
current auditing standards and the empirical and other research that has been 
conducted on fraud detection‖. They conclude that ―even though the red flag 
approach to detecting fraud has been endorsed by policy makers and written about 
widely by researchers, there is little empirical evidence that shows the red flag 
approach is an effective way to detect fraud, especially for fraud that has yet to be 
discovered‖. (Albrecht, Albrecht and Dunn 2001, 4) Their research review on the 
subject reveals that one of the major conclusions drawn from previous studies 
included the fact that only 18–20 % of frauds seem to be detected by internal and 
external auditors, and further that only about half of the perpetrators of frauds 
detected are prosecuted. The article also calls for further fraud detection research, 
this thesis being a partial answer to that call. These detection rates are loosely 
corroborated by Silverstone and Sheetz (2003), who estimate that approximately 
12 percent of initial fraud detection is through external audit and approximately 
19 percent is from internal audit. Both of these estimations apply to the American 
context. This thesis seeks to provide a loose estimate of whether similar figures 
for the Norwegian context can be corroborated.  
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An article dealing with the responsibilities for prevention and detection of 
white-collar crime refers to a study undertaken to map how members of the 
accounting profession viewed the changing role of the external auditor following 
the introduction of SAS No. 82. ―Most of those answering the questionnaire 
disagreed that they should be responsible for searching for fraud. … Clearly, this 
notion concerning the auditor’s responsibility is not widely held by the public at 
large. … The general public and Congress certainly sided against the CPAs and 
was the reason for this legislation.‖ To the question of whether the certified public 
accountants (CPAs) should act as police or detectives when performing the audit, 
the response was a resounding no. ―This may also indicate that changes brought 
about with the implementation of the SAS No. 82 requiring a policing component 
clearly require added responsibility and may necessitate additional training and 
changes to job description requirements. Again, although the general public may 
believe policing is within the auditors’ duties, even SAS No. 82 does not require 
this.‖ (Farrell and Healy 2000, 25)  
Similarly, an investigation into fraud prevention and detection in the 
United States uncovered that the majority of CPAs that responded to the study 
―believe the external auditor’s responsibility for fraud detection extends only to 
assessing the probability of fraud and planning the audit accordingly. They rank 
internal auditors the group most effective in detecting fraud, followed by fraud 
examiners and client management‖ (Johnson and Rudesill 2001, 75).  
―A persistent debate has dogged relationships between auditors and 
managers. This debate revolves around the precise roles and duties of each party 
in relation to fraud and corruption, and particularly who should take responsibility 
for investigation. Current legal and professional precedents leave little doubt that 
management bears the main responsibility for ensuring that reasonable measures 
are taken to prevent fraud and corruption. In any event it is common practice for 
managers to request assistance and advice from auditors upon suspicion or 
discovery of fraud. The final responsibility must lie with managers unless the 
auditor has given specific assurance regarding particular controls or the absence of 
error or fraud.‖ (Jones 2004, 12-13)  
Within the extant accounting and auditing research much attention is 
devoted to how the external auditor is a primary figure in detecting irregularities 
and corruption, and government and standard setters also stress the importance of 
the responsibilities of the auditing community in this respect (Olsen 2007) 
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(Telberg 2004). Even though a thorough investigation into the means of detection 
of white-collar crimes in the cases chosen for this thesis has yet to be undertaken, 
the researcher has uncovered limited faith in the auditing function among some 
for this specific purpose: Only in very few cases does auditing in some form seem 
to be responsible for the detection, unravelling and exposure of the offence 
(Ellingsen and Sky 2005). This opinion is backed by the work of Drage and 
Olstad (2008), who analyzed the role of the auditing function in relation to both 
preventing and detecting white-collar crime. Although their study included a look 
at the perceived preventative power of the auditing function as well as actual 
detection of criminal offences, their findings were consistent with the 
abovementioned hypothesis: Many of their interviewees were sceptical as to the 
auditing function having a central role in the detection of white-collar crime 
(Drage and Olstad 2008).   
Olsen (2007) reminds us that the auditing standards external auditors must 
act in compliance with, also require them to uncover irregularities should they be 
present. However, the primary concern of the external auditor is to reduce the 
auditing risk (i.e. the risk that the financial statements may still contain material 
misstatements even after the auditor has given a positive auditor report), not the 
risk of irregularities. In spite of external auditors rarely being credited for the 
detection of financial crime, Olsen still believes that the auditing function 
contributes significantly to the prevention of such crime by reducing temptations 
and opportunities, thus corroborating the findings of Drage and Olstad (2008) on 
prevention.  
Rendal and Westerby (2010) have examined Norwegian auditors’ 
expectations relating to their own abilities in detecting and preventing 
irregularities and compared these with the expectations other users of financial 
information have towards this same issue. Their findings indicate certain gaps in 
how the auditor is expected to perform. Auditors themselves answer that they 
sometimes do not act in accordance with laws and regulations, and both auditors 
and users of financial information feel that the auditing function should include 
more than what is required today through standards and regulations, for example 
pertaining to companies’ internal guidelines. They also uncover unrealistic 
expectations regarding the extent to which the auditing function is capable of 
uncovering irregularities. They conclude that auditors to a certain extent are too 
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reserved and aloof when it comes to their responsibilities in the prevention and 
detection of irregularities, and call for improvements.  
This contention is generally supported by The Global Economic Crime 
Survey 2009 conducted by PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers), where 32 % of 
incidents were reported to be detected by means of internal and external tips and 
11 % through established whistle-blowing channels. The survey also states, 
however, that 47 % of incidents were detected by means of various internal 
control measures and initiatives, but whether (and to what extent) this includes the 
internal auditing function is not specified.  
Davia (2000, iii) states: ―A maxim of the auditing profession is, ―Most 
frauds are discovered by accident, not by auditing or accounting system design‖. 
This has been repeated so many times by so many accountants and auditors that 
the general public accepts it as an axiom or self-evident truth.‖ This axiom is in 
need of scientific testing, and this is precisely the intent of this paper: To what 
extent is the auditing function to be credited for the detection of various cases of 
white-collar crime? A complete answer to this question is next to impossible to 
give, as it must be assumed that most instances of auditor detected irregularities 
are resolved with the company in question without the cases escalating to the 
point where they fulfil the selection criteria of this study. However, to the extent 
that the issue allows mapping, it is thought highly relevant to do so.  
Some quotes from Jayasuriya (2006, 53) show a different opinion than that 
depicted above: ―In a case decided at the end of the nineteenth century, a British 
Judge (Lopes LJ) remarked that an auditor is ―a watch dog but not a bloodhound‖ 
and that the auditor does not guarantee the discovery of all fraud.‖ This statement 
reflects a view (although perhaps not of the judge) of the auditor as an 
accomplished detector of fraud, but also a wish to dial down the expectations 
toward the auditing function. The responsibility for the completeness of the 
financial statements and the sound functioning of the capital markets is not the 
auditor’s alone to bear.  
Wells (2005, 4) highlights some important differences between auditing 
and fraud examination which may account for a possible gap between 
expectations towards auditors’ fraud detection and what the auditing function is 
actually able to deliver: ―Fraud examination and auditing are related, but they are 
not the same. Because most occupational frauds are financial crimes, there is 
necessarily a certain degree of auditing involved. But a fraud examination 
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encompasses much more than just the review of financial data; it also involves 
techniques such as interviews, statement analyses, public records searches, and 
forensic document examination. There are also significant differences between the 
two disciplines in terms of their scopes, objectives, and underlying presumptions.‖ 
This contention is in line with the view of Bernardi (1994), who holds that ― the 
probability of detecting fraud is dependent upon time pressures, holding 
chargeable costs down, and client and public expectations that the auditor will 
detect any fraud‖, resulting in an ―expectation gap between auditors’ performance 
and what an audit implies to users‖ (Bernardi 1994). Johnson and Rudesill (2001, 
61-62) agree, stating that ―business owners, managers and auditors share the 
responsibility to detect fraud, but the belief persists that the primary benefit gained 
from an external audit is the determination of whether fraud has occurred. The 
accounting profession’s position, however, is that the auditor’s responsibilities are 
related only to detection of errors and fraud that have a material effect on the 
financial statements. ... These differences in perception of responsibility and the 
public’s disenchantment with audits have been termed the expectations gap.‖  
Some types of white-collar crime are hard, if not impossible, to detect 
using normal auditing routines. Examples include insider trading and cartel 
activities (Gottschalk 2010b, 233), ―so-called off-book frauds (i.e. bribery and 
kickbacks), which do not leave an audit trail and are often discovered by tip-offs‖ 
(Silverstone and Sheetz 2003, 80), and document forgery (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad 
and Magnussen 2008). ―The forensic accountant must be prepared to reach far 
beyond the company’s books to industry and government information, proprietary 
databases, court records, and any source, for that matter, that might throw light on 
the case‖ (Silverstone and Sheetz 2003, 77). Expecting this from a standard audit 
procedure is not always possible. In addition, unless suspicions or tips indicate 
otherwise, an auditor will most likely not expect conscious illegalities from the 
onset and further investigations may require time and resources not included in 
the contract between auditor and client. There is a strong competition in the 
auditing market, and a certain amount of efficiency and goal orientation is 
necessary in order to survive. There is little room for improvisation that is not 
anchored in the standard auditing procedure. (Olsen 2007)  
Davia (2000, 3) contends that auditor detection rates might be higher if 
auditors were more aware of their power in this respect, blaming two fallacious 
decisions made by many auditors: 1. It is not necessary to audit for the purpose of 
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discovering fraud. 2. Good accounting records and internal control are sufficient 
to control fraud. He calls for a more proactive approach to auditing, a concept 
deemed too peripheral for the purpose of this paper to warrant further 
introduction. Other authors also make recommendations for changes in current 
white-collar crime deterrence systems, some pointing to the need for accounting 
systems reform: ―One problem at Enron was that the Arthur Andersen firm served 
as both independent auditor and outside consultant, a potential conflict of interest‖ 
(Ivancevich et al. 2003, 120), stating that this conflict of interest has become an 
emotionally and politically charged issue in need of attention.   
Jayasuriya (2006, 53) goes on to state that in 1996, ―the Court of Appeal 
stated that while the primary responsibility for safeguarding a company’s assets 
and preventing errors and defalcations rests with the directors, material 
irregularities and fraud will normally be brought to light by sound auditing 
procedures‖. Clearly, there also exist those that have confidence in the white-
collar crime detection abilities of the auditing function, and it has hence been 
shown that views on the matter are heavily conflicting. This fact is part of the 
rationale for the thesis at hand, which hopes to shed light on the matter at least 
partially.  
 
2.2.  A broader view of the field 
After an extensive search for previous studies similar to the research question of 
this thesis, it seems safe to conclude that little has been done to map this specific 
relationship between white-collar crime and auditing in Norway. In addition to a 
database search using common keywords on the subject, popular authors have 
been mapped according to their research interests and business schools and 
universities, also in Europe and the US, have been scanned for published research 
in the area. A full overview of a field as vast as this is almost impossible to 
achieve. However, it does seem unlikely that such a mapping of Norwegian cases 
has been done before, as argued above during the run-through of the thesis 
rationale. The research objectives presented above will hopefully provide valuable 
insight into this relatively unexplored area of the relationship between white-
collar crime and auditing in Norway.  
 Although few studies relating to the specific research objective of this 
thesis have been found, there exists a large body of literature on the slightly 
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broader topic of financial or economic crime and accounting. What is thought to 
be a representative selection of the works deemed most relevant, are included in 
the following section to provide a somewhat broader perspective.  
 Nardo (2004) argues that ―recent economic and geo-political events have 
alarmingly highlighted the risks to peace and economic prosperity that could 
occur if phenomena such as terrorism, organized crime and political subversion 
were to join forces for mutual support. The financial crimes that could result from 
such collaborations are particularly worrying and include fraud, money laundering 
and operations of a direct criminal nature‖ (Nardo 2004, 139). He also includes 
―the damage to the financial system that the use of credit and financial channels 
for criminal ends can cause‖ (Nardo 2004, 139) as a very real threat to a well-
functioning market economy. He adds that this threat is growing in size and 
severity parallel to the technological developments our financial systems are 
experiencing, and therefore may be said to be yet another proponent of the views 
expressed in the Økokrim and PwC reports discussed earlier.  
 A substantial body of research exists on the prevention of economic crime 
and the roles some functions or communities might have in this respect. Although 
prevention is not a part of the research objective of this thesis, some reflections on 
the subject might still be valuable to our understanding. Goldschmidt (2004) 
examines the role of boards in preventing economic crime, and concludes as 
follows: ―Economic crime as committed by companies and their actors can be 
reduced – if not completely averted – as principals – especially owners – take 
charge of monitoring their agents more actively through various corporate 
governance mechanisms. Among these mechanisms, company boards have an 
essential role to play‖ (Goldschmidt 2004, 345-346). Baldwin (2006) looks at how 
financial institutions, in order to avoid sanctions, including criminal and civil 
liability, ―must be better prepared and willing to assess prototypical money 
laundering typologies‖ (Baldwin 2006, 387). A wide range of financial 
institutions are exposed to this type of risk, meaning that from a governmental and 
regulatory point of view they are in a position to both prevent and detect 
economic crime. A further investigation of the types of institutions and 
professions exposed to such criminal liability is not deemed relevant for the topic 
at hand.  
 Jayasuriya (2006, 54) highlights various views of the role of the auditor 
and auditing function, and argues that ―there is a need for greater clarity as to the 
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role of auditors and as to the expectations of regulators‖. A recommendation that 
regulators and auditors together must decide on benchmark standards and that 
these may require altering laws, regulations and codes of practice is set forth.  
 Kayrak (2008, 60-68) investigates the ever evolving challenges for 
supreme audit institutions (SAIs) in dealing with corruption, and concludes that 
―SAIs are able to detect cases of corruption without having power to investigate‖, 
and hence ―that SAIs to some extent may take part in the fight with corruption 
directly by detecting it besides its conventional role of deterring and preventing‖.  
 Gottschalk has published extensively in the field of financial crime, and 
has looked at the stages of financial crime by business organizations, theories and 
categories of financial crime and, most recently, a survey on financial crime in 
business organizations in Norway with Solli-Sæther. These provide a thorough 
overview of the financial crime field and are very much a part of the theoretical 
framework of this thesis, but will not be discussed in detail here. (Gottschalk 
2010c, 2010a, 2008; Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther 2011)  
With all that has been done before, what will this thesis add to the existing 
body of research? As mentioned earlier the author finds the extant research and 
literature to be lacking in the area of the role of auditing specifically in the 
detection of white-collar crime, especially in a strictly Norwegian context, and 
seeks to remedy this gap. Many views on the role of the auditor have been set 
forth, and many opinions on the extent to which the auditing function has the 
ability to detect white-collar crime have been given. Many of them are conflicting. 
Although it will not allow for definitive conclusions, the following analysis will 
shed light on the means of detection in a limited number of Norwegian cases to 
date, and may provide valuable input for further research on the topic.   
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
Based on the preceding literature review the following hypotheses regarding the 
current piece of research are formulated:  
 
Based on the estimations of Albrecht, Albrecht and Dunn (2001) and Silverstone 
and Sheetz (2003) the following is hypothesized:  
H1: Less than 20 % of white-collar crime is detected by the auditing function.  
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In accordance with Wells (2005) and Johnson and Rudesill (2001) the following 
hypothesis tests a possible discrepancy between expectations and what the 
auditing function is able to deliver:  
H2: There exists a gap between expectations towards auditors’ fraud 
detection and what the auditing function is able to deliver.  
 
According to Gottschalk (2010b) and Silverstone and Sheetz (2003) some types of 
white-collar crime are difficult, if not impossible, to detect using normal auditing 
routines, such as so-called off-book frauds:  
H3: Some types of white-collar crime are more often discovered by auditors 
than others.  
 
The above hypotheses are based on categories introduced in the following chapter, 
which refer both to the investigative process (suspicion, investigation and 
prosecution) and to the means of detection (whether by the auditing function, 
media, whistle-blowers, authorities or other means). In common for the 
hypotheses is the contention that the auditing function makes a positive 
contribution to the detection of white-collar crime. Whether or not this coincides 
with findings based on contemporary Norwegian cases is what this thesis purports 
to examine.  
 
2.4.  Definitions and terminology  
In order to operationalize the research objectives, the main concepts they 
introduce should be clarified: How is the auditing function defined for the purpose 
of this paper? What is needed for us to be able to conclude that the auditing 
function is to be credited for the detection of economic crime? Is the reporting to 
some policing body of an irregularity sufficient, or must the auditing function 
itself be the one to uncover the offence in its entirety? Can we call the incident a 
crime only when there has been a court ruling and this has legal efficacy, or can 
an incidence – for the sake of this paper – be called an incidence of white-collar 
crime when an offence according to Norwegian law can be said to have been 
committed? A natural precursor to this latter section is a clear definition of white-
collar crime and its characteristics as well as a definition of what is meant by the 
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auditing function, as the choice of definitions may influence the choice of cases to 
be included in the upcoming analysis.  
 
2.4.1.  The auditing function 
Auditing is defined by Wallace (1995, 4) as ―a systematic process of (1) 
objectively obtaining and evaluating evidence regarding assertions about 
economic actions and events in order to ascertain the degree to which such 
assertions correspond to established criteria, and (2) communicating the results‖. 
As this thesis will include both external and internal auditing, these more specific 
definitions follow: ―External auditors issue an independent report on the fairness 
of representations (SAS 1, Section 110). Internal auditors are employees of an 
entity who audit that entity’s operations and overall control system as a service to 
its management‖ (Wallace 1995, 4-5). ―The external auditor seeks to test the 
underlying transactions that form the basis of the financial statements. The 
internal auditor, on the other hand, seeks to advise management on whether its 
major operations have sound systems of risk management and internal controls‖ 
(Pickett 2005, 30). Often, many of the tasks undertaken by internal and external 
auditors will overlap, making it hard to draw a definitive distinction between the 
two.  
 ―The following is essentially an external auditor’s definition. The Auditing 
Practices Board (APB) states: ―Fraud comprises both the use of deception to 
obtain an unjust or illegal financial advantage and intentional misrepresentations 
affecting the financial statements...‖.‖ The statement is taken from the SAS 110 
on Fraud and Error. ―The auditor is being asked not merely to consider any 
illegality but also any injustice, a much wider term, in the above definition. What, 
after all, is an unjust financial advantage? The APB’s definition seems to imply 
that unjust and illegal will coincide.‖  (Jones 2004, 7)  
Statutory audits are to a large extent mandatory in Norway. ―The general 
rule is found in the Auditors Act of 1999 which states that anyone subject to issue 
financial statements according to the Accounting Act is also subject to statutory 
audit‖ (Auestad 2011). All limited and listed companies are required to present 
audited financial statements. To the extent that a general partnership is required to 
present audited accounts (only companies with revenue exceeding NOK 5 million 
are) they too must employ an auditor. (Bråthen 2008)   
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The external auditor spends very little time in the organization compared 
to management and employees, and therefore has less insight into the workings of 
company operations and business culture than internal actors. On the other hand, 
auditors, through their mandate and through legislature have extensive rights to 
company records and information, and may demand access to any documentation 
concerning matters pertaining to the organization being audited. (Olsen 2007)  
To be able to answer the question of what the auditing function’s 
responsibilities (also towards the detection of economic crime) consist of in a 
good way, it is necessary to firstly look to the laws and governing principles that 
underlie the workings of this profession. When mapping Norwegian cases the 
author will therefore make use of the Norwegian statute on auditing and auditors 
as well as the standards set forth by The Norwegian Institute of Public 
Accountants and The Norwegian Accounting Standards Board, which is 
responsible for setting accounting standards in Norway. The paragraphs central to 
understanding the auditing community’s responsibility for detecting white-collar 
crime will be presented briefly in the following. It should be stressed that this will 
not be an exhaustive run-through, but rather a brief presentation of the aspects 
most applicable to this particular piece of research.  
Auditing of company accounts has been a part of Norwegian law since 
1899, but only much later in the nineteenth century was a complete piece of 
legislature dedicated in its entirety to the auditing community (Act Relating to 
Auditing and Auditors from 1999). In addition, several other laws include the 
auditor and auditing function in some way; examples are Act Relating to Limited 
Liability Companies (Limited Liability Companies Act) and Act Relating to 
Measures to Counter Money Laundering and the Financing of Terror (§§ 4, 7, 18 
and 20 are good examples).  
Chapter five of Act Relating to Auditing and Auditors (Auditors Act) 
contains a run-through of the auditors’ duties, and this chapter is therefore closest 
to providing an understanding of what one may and may not expect an auditor to 
accomplish as stated by law. According to § 5-2 the auditor is required to assess 
the risk of misrepresentations in the accounts that stem from irregularities, 
malpractice or errors and is also expected to conduct his or her activities in 
accordance with good accounting practice. Good accounting practice is a legal 
standard, defined by the prevailing auditing standards agreed upon by The 
Norwegian Institute of Public Accountants. These are based on the International 
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Standards on Auditing (ISAs) set forth by the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC). The ISA 200 on Overall objectives of the independent 
auditor and the conduct of an audit ―deals with the independent auditor's overall 
responsibilities when conducting an audit of financial statements‖ (International 
Federation of Accountants 2008). From this ISA the following definition of the 
purpose of auditing is taken:  
 
“The purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of intended users 
in the financial statements. This is achieved by the expression of an opinion by the 
auditor on whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, 
in accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework.”  
 
This standard also states the overall objectives of the auditor:  
 
”In conducting an audit of financial statements, the overall objectives of the 
auditor are: 
(a) To obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements 
as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, 
thereby enabling the auditor to express an opinion on whether the financial 
statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an 
applicable financial reporting framework; and 
(b) To report on the financial statements, and communicate as required by the 
ISAs, in accordance with the auditor’s findings.” 
 
The vehicle of this reporting is the auditor’s report, regulated by § 5-6 of the 
Auditors Act. Discrepancies or irregularities are to be stated here, regardless of 
whether they affect the auditor’s conclusions regarding the financial statements or 
not. Depending on the severity of the uncovered irregularities the auditor may not 
be able to sign a positive auditor report without reservations, such as if the audit 
was in some way limited or if there is disagreement between auditor and 
management concerning choice of accounting principles or their application. 
Several other examples also exist, and exactly how these are to be reported is 
regulated in IAS 240 and 700, among other standards. What is important here is 
that users of financial statements should be able to have confidence in them unless 
explicit statements in the auditor’s report indicate otherwise.  
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2.4.2. The auditor role 
Besides the legal obligations and professional norms the auditing function are 
required to follow, further definition of what is meant by the role of the auditor is 
needed. Irrespective of whether the focus is on the actual role the auditor or 
auditors held in the specific cases or on what role they should have had, a clear 
understanding of the role concept is important.  
―We may define a role as the typical behaviours that characterize a person 
in a social context. An individual in a group may play one or more specific roles‖ 
(Greenberg 2011, 287). In the context of a work environment such as the one an 
auditor operates within, the role concept may have a different meaning than in 
other settings. ―Organizations ask employees to take on roles with certain 
behavioural requirements. The roles develop from the organization’s division of 
labour and its organizational design. Other aspects of roles are defined by the 
organization’s culture. A role is a set of activities, duties, responsibilities, and 
required behaviours that the organization wants an individual to acquire‖ 
(Champoux 2006, 126). George and Jones (2008, 10) define a role as ―a set of 
behaviours or tasks a person is expected to perform because of the position he or 
she holds in a group or organization‖. Berger and Luckmann (1988) contend that 
―roles define the values and norms and, thus, the appropriate action for specific 
social positions‖ (Misangyi, Weaver and Elms 2008, 754). Henry Mintzberg 
distinguishes between 10 different roles managers may assume ―as they manage 
the behaviour of people inside and outside the organization‖, some of which are 
figurehead, liaison or spokesperson (George and Jones 2008, 11).  
―Management and the internal audit activity have differing roles with 
respect to fraud detection‖, and the organization’s ―audit charter should establish 
the audit role in frauds‖ (Pickett 2005, 167). The important distinction to note 
here is that the individual auditor’s role in any given audit or detection process 
may vary according to his or her role in the organization in general and according 
to the role he or she has been assigned to in each individual case. This role may 
vary in how active or passive it is and may require involvement at an earlier or 
later stage in the auditing or investigative process. In the subsequent introduction 
of each case included in this piece of research, the role of the auditing function 
will be defined more precisely as part of the analysis if this information is possible 
to come by.  
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Similarly, the role of the auditing function can be viewed as placed 
somewhere along a continuum, or a discreet scale, where involvement ranges 
from a negative role where the auditor(s) may be characterized as criminal, 
through a passive role where no intervention was sought, to a positive role in 
which the auditing function to some extent can be credited with detection. In the 
following analysis of cases this continuum will be stripped of normative values, 
and rather than establish whether the auditor role may have been positive or 
negative will focus strictly on the extent of involvement.  
 
2.4.3. White-collar crime 
Historically the term white-collar was coined based on the more formal dress code 
of upper and middle class salaried professional or clerical employees – they wore 
white collars, as opposed to e.g. the term blue-collar, which related to the working 
class, wage earners performing primarily manual or industrial work dressed in 
work clothes – they wore ―blue‖ collars. Criminologist Edwin H. Sutherland 
introduced the term white-collar crime in 1940. He defined it as ―crime in the 
upper or white collar class, composed of respectable or at least respected business 
and professional men... It consists of violations of delegated or implied trust...‖ 
(Ivancevich et al. 2003, 114-115).  
The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police define economic or 
white-collar crime in their most recent Action Plan for Combating Economic 
Crime (The Ministry of Justice and the Police and The Ministry of Finance 2004, 
9) in the following way:  
 
Economic crime is an umbrella term for a number of crimes associated 
with industry and commerce and other organized activities in the private 
or public sector. It consists of profit-motivated, illegal activities conducted 
within or arising out of an economic activity that is in itself legal or is 
purported to be so.   
 
The following is an internationally acknowledged definition, quoted by 
Gottschalk (2010b, 44):  
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Financial crime is defined as crime against property, involving the 
unlawful conversion of property belonging to another to one’s own 
personal use and benefit. Financial crime is profit-driven crime to gain 
access to and control over property that belonged to someone else.  
 
White-collar crime is most often directed towards substantial financial institutions 
or companies rather than individuals (although the latter also occurs). Cases are 
often complicated and lacking in tell-tale signs that violations of the law may be 
occurring (or have occurred). Knivsflå and Sættem (1994) define the following 
characteristics of white-collar crime (Gottschalk 2010b):  
 The motive is economic gain.  
 The act is conducted in conjunction with trade or industry, which 
makes up the economic basis for the violation.  
 The violation touches vast economic assets and may be a threat to 
significant social interests.   
 
White-collar crime may be defined in terms of the offence, the offender, or both. 
If we are to include the aspect of the offender in the above definition, we must 
introduce the following addition (Gottschalk 2011b, 14):  
 
White-collar criminals are individuals who are wealthy, highly educated, 
and socially connected, and they are typically employed by and in a 
legitimate organization. They are persons of respectability and high social 
status who commit crime in the course of their occupation.  
 
This addition completes the definition of white-collar crime that is the basis for 
the paper and research at hand, and cases included in the research are all cases that 
satisfy the inherent criteria illustrated by it.  
In the extant body of research and literature the terms white-collar crime, 
economic crime, fraud and financial crime are often used interchangeably 
(Johnson and Fludesill 2001), and will for the sake of this paper be considered 
synonyms. In instances where the criminal act is perpetrated by someone who is 
able to do so because of his or her position in a lawful business (official or 
private) or government, this may be defined specifically as white-collar crime and 
deemed a sub-category of financial crime in general (Gottschalk 2010b). 
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However, the cases presented in this piece of research do not require such a 
division in order to answer the research questions satisfactorily. Our focus will 
remain on the criminal offences committed and how these came to be detected.  
Blackmail and various forms of economic fraud are not necessarily 
considered organized crime in Norway today. What we have defined above as 
white-collar crime is not a part of the umbrella term organized crime as it is used 
by police and other Norwegian governmental agencies, although this is simply a 
matter of organizational strategy. When referring to organized crime we usually 
mean criminal offences committed by a group of people, often within an existing 
network of some kind. The intent is economic gain, and the offence(s) is often 
characterized as serious. (Larsson 2008) With this definition in mind it becomes 
clear that several of the cases included in the subsequent research can be said to be 
cases of organized crime as well, although this distinction is not essential for the 
understanding of the offences committed. Suffice it to say that the cases included 
are cases that satisfy the criteria inherent in the definition of white-collar crime.  
In depictions of white-collar crime in the media the words fraud or 
corruption are often used when the meaning is that of economic crime. Terms 
describing specific sub-categories of white-collar crime (such as embezzlement, 
corruption or bribery) will be used when more detailed descriptions of incidents 
are needed, and should here never be understood as synonyms for white-collar 
crime in general.  
 Some sub-categories of white-collar crime also warrant an introduction. 
Fraud may be defined as ―deliberate (as distinct from innocent error), it involves 
deception and it leads to loss for the victim. Given the deliberate and damaging 
nature of fraud and corruption these can, and usually will, occur when two basic 
conditions exist:  
 Intent: There must be intent in the mind of the perpetrator.  
 Opportunity: There must be opportunity to perpetrate a corrupt or 
fraudulent act.‖ (Jones 2004, 1)  
 
Money laundering and insider trading are both considered sub-categories of the 
umbrella term manipulation. ―Money laundering means the securing of the 
proceeds of a criminal act. The proceeds must be integrated into the legal 
economy before the perpetrators can use it. The purpose of laundering is to make 
it appear as if the proceeds were acquired legally, as well as disguising its illegal 
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origins.‖ (Gottschalk 2010a, 455) ―Insider trading is defined as trading by 
managers and board members in the stock of their own firms‖. ―Illegal insider 
trading may undermine investor confidence, increase the rate of return demanded 
by less-informed investors, reduce liquidity in secondary markets, raise the cost of 
capital for firms, and ultimately hurt public welfare by reducing economic 
growth.‖ (King and Padalko 2007)  
 Bribery and embezzlement may be considered sub-categories of the term 
corruption in the same category framework as mentioned above. Baughn et al. 
(2010) and Sun and Peng (2011) corroborate this division. Corruption in general 
―is defined as the giving, requesting, receiving, or accepting of an improper 
advantage related to a position, office or assignment‖ (Gottschalk 2010a, 443). 
―Bribery is one of the important manifestations of corruption, and its purpose is, 
through the exchange of money and power, to get reciprocity of benefits‖ (Sun 
and Peng 2011, 104). Embezzlement ―is the fraudulent appropriation to personal 
use or benefit of property or money entrusted by another. The actor first comes 
into possession of the property with the permission of the owner‖ (Gottschalk 
2010a).  
 
2.4.4. Detection of white-collar crime 
What is meant by detection in this context? What level of certainty is required for 
us to be able to conclude that white-collar crime has been uncovered? What is 
needed for us to be able to conclude that the auditing function is to be credited for 
detection?  
 O’Gara (2004, 132) draws an interesting distinction that puts the process 
of detection into a realistic context:  
 
There is no clear line of demarcation between recognition and detection. A 
convenient (but oversimplified) way to view the process is as a continuum, 
with recognition as the first step in the recognition, detection and 
investigation fraud chain. Recognition is the proverbial light bulb that 
goes off as the auditor becomes aware of the possibility of fraud and how 
it may have occurred. Detection is the next step: determining the 
probability of fraud.  
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Although the direct referral is to fraud specifically, the above definition is thought 
to be just as applicable to white-collar crime in general, as the two concepts are 
often viewed as synonyms. He goes on to further elaborate on detection 
specifically (O'Gara 2004, 169):  
 
Detection of fraud consists of identifying indicators of fraud sufficient to 
warrant recommending an investigation. These indicators may arise as a 
result of controls established by management, tests conducted by auditors, 
and other sources both within and outside the organization.  
 
Once irregularities are uncovered, the investigative or forensic phase that follows 
will normally be undertaken by individuals with a more specialized skill-set 
(O'Gara 2004, 137). For the purpose of this thesis detection is defined in the 
broadest possible sense, meaning that any further inquiry above and beyond the 
standard audit procedure will suffice for us to conclude that the auditing function, 
at least in part, can be credited with detection.   
 Because the auditing framework sketched above prescribes that an auditor 
cannot, or is not required to, make legal determinations of whether fraud (or 
white-collar crime) has occurred, it is only natural that the role of the auditing 
function in the phases following initial detection – investigation and prosecution – 
be a supporting role. Auditors may be involved in these final two phases in a 
number of ways, among these as forensic accountants or expert witnesses. The 
role of auditing in the cases included in this thesis specifically will be further 
discussed in the next two chapters.  
 
2.4.5.  The role of auditing in the detection of white-collar crime  
 ―Up until 1500, auditing was primarily concerned with preventing fraudulent 
acts.‖ This view of the auditor was somewhat negated in the 1951 Codification of 
Statements on Auditing Procedures issued by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA), which stated that ―the ordinary examination ... is 
not designed and cannot be relied upon to disclose defalcations and other similar 
irregularities‖. ―SAS No. 16, which was issued in 1976, acknowledged what was 
implicit in prior pronouncements – that the auditor has a responsibility to search 
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for irregularities (frauds) that may have a material effect on financial statements.‖ 
(Albrecht, Albrecht and Dunn 2001, 2)  
An extensive framework deals exclusively with the role of the auditing 
community in relation to prevention and detection of white-collar crime in 
addition to some more general regulations. Firstly, § 5-1 of the Auditors Act states 
that the auditor through the auditing process is to contribute to the prevention and 
detection of irregularities, malpractice and errors. This clause was one that 
previously referred to prevention exclusively, and the inclusion of detection bears 
witness to confidence on the part of the regulator in a more active and assertive 
auditing function. § 5-2 requires the auditor to ensure that there are no substantial 
or material violations of accounting laws and practices. This materiality 
requirement is at the heart of the auditing framework that governs Norwegian 
auditors today. It represents the resource constraints they are subjected to and 
indicates that there are limits to what scale and type of misrepresentations one can 
expect the auditing function to detect. Therefore, all errors deemed immaterial in 
their effect on the company accounts will not be emphasized, regardless of 
whether they are due to white-collar crime or a software error, but this 
interpretation does not coincide with the intention of the standard setters (Drage 
and Olstad 2008, 36).  
Central to our research questions is IAS 240 (International Federation of 
Accountants 2009) on the auditor’s responsibilities relating to fraud. This is a 
standard that can help clarify what is meant by the materiality requirement. On the 
characteristics of fraud the IAS states the following:  
 
“Although fraud is a broad legal concept, for the purposes of the ISAs, the auditor 
is concerned with fraud that causes a material misstatement in the financial 
statements. Two types of intentional misstatements are relevant to the auditor – 
misstatements resulting from fraudulent financial reporting and misstatements 
resulting from misappropriation of assets. Although the auditor may suspect or, in 
rare cases, identify the occurrence of fraud, the auditor does not make legal 
determinations of whether fraud has actually occurred.”  
 
It also defines the responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud:  
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“The primary responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud rests with 
both those charged with governance of the entity and management.”  
 
On the responsibilities of the auditor we find the following:  
 
“An auditor conducting an audit in accordance with ISAs is responsible for 
obtaining reasonable assurance that the financial statements taken as a whole are 
free from material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error. Owing to the 
inherent limitations of an audit, there is an unavoidable risk that some material 
misstatements of the financial statements may not be detected, even though the 
audit is properly planned and performed in accordance with the ISAs. As 
described in ISA 200,4 the potential effects of inherent limitations are particularly 
significant in the case of misstatement resulting from fraud. The risk of not 
detecting a material misstatement resulting from fraud is higher than the risk of 
not detecting one resulting from error. This is because fraud may involve 
sophisticated and carefully organized schemes designed to conceal it, such as 
forgery, deliberate failure to record transactions, or intentional 
misrepresentations being made to the auditor.”  
 
The latter statement is further developed by emphasizing the lack of omniscience 
in the auditing function. Even though it may be possible to identify potential 
opportunities for fraud, this does not mean that the auditor can determine whether 
errors on items subjected to personal judgment are caused by fraud or error just as 
easily. In addition, this standard clearly states that the auditor may accept records 
and documents as genuine unless he or she has reason to suspect otherwise. ISA 
240 goes a long way in explaining what the auditor is up against:  
 
“The auditor’s ability to detect a fraud depends on factors such as the skillfulness 
of the perpetrator, the frequency and extent of manipulation, the degree of 
collusion involved, the relative size of individual amounts manipulated, and the 
seniority of those individuals involved.” 
 
Finally, the objectives of the auditor are defined as follows:  
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(a) To identify and assess the risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements due to fraud; 
(b) To obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding the assessed risks of 
material misstatement due to fraud, through designing and implementing 
appropriate responses; and 
(c) To respond appropriately to fraud or suspected fraud identified during the 
audit. 
 
―Statement No. 3 of the Institute of Internal Auditors states that in conducting 
audit assignments, the internal auditor’s responsibilities for detecting fraud are to: 
(1) have sufficient knowledge of fraud to be able to identify indicators (red flags) 
that fraud might have been committed and (2) be alert to opportunities such as 
control weaknesses, that could allow fraud ... ; (3) Evaluate the indicators (red 
flags) that fraud might have been committed and decide whether any further 
action is necessary, or whether an investigation should be recommended; (4) 
Notify the appropriate authorities within the organization if a determination is 
made that there are sufficient indicators (red flags) of the commission of a fraud to 
recommend an investigation‖ (Albrecht, Albrecht and Dunn 2001, 3-4).  
 ―Similarly, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 imposed 
some of the same requirements on public company auditors. The requirements are 
as follows‖ (Farrell and Healy 2000, 23):  
1. Audits must include procedures designed to provide reasonable 
assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and material 
effect on financial statement amounts.  
2. Each audit must include procedures to identify related-party 
transactions that are material.  
3. Each audit must include an evaluation of the ability of the issuer of 
financial statements to continue as a going concern.  
 
An important part of the framework outlining the auditing function’s 
responsibilities towards the detection of white-collar crime is the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. ―Named for Senator Paul Sarbanes, a long-serving former Senator, 
and Representative Michael Oxley, a former Republican from Ohio, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is designed to combat fraud in public companies‖ (Brightman 2009, 
222). Aimed primarily at ―public accounting responsibilities in improving the 
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quality, reliability, integrity and transparency of financial reports‖, it includes 
aspects such as standards and procedures related to listed company audit 
committees, the strengthening of requirements regarding auditor independence, 
and the retention of records relevant to audits and reviews. One of the main stated 
goals of the act is improving the probability of detection of corporate 
misstatements as well as establishing new protections for corporate whistle-
blowers. (Wells 2005, 296-297)  
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Introduction to the research project 
At the core of this thesis is the task of defining the role of the auditor or auditing 
function in the detection of white-collar crime. Through the subsequent analysis 
cases will be sorted on the basis of means of detection; for starters the bivariate 
answer of whether the auditing function can be credited or not, will be mapped. 
However, in the interest of a more thorough examination of case material we will 
proceed to categorize the cases in a manner that provides more nuances: If not 
auditing, what was the means of detection? The following categories of means of 
detection (including auditing) will be included:  
 Detected by auditing/the auditing function (internal or external)  
 Detected by media/journalism 
 Detected through whistle-blowing or tip-offs  
 Detected by authority routine of some kind 
 Detected by other means  
 
The above categories are chosen because they seem to provide a good description 
of the alternatives available. This a priori opinion is based on the literature review 
and preliminary knowledge of contemporary Norwegian cases. The first category 
warrants no introduction; whether or not the auditing function can be credited for 
detection, and to what extent, is the main research question of this thesis. It also 
seems to be the case that many instances of white-collar crime are detected by 
forensic journalism, as will also be shown in the upcoming case analysis. Several 
central cases included in the sample (the Henriksen case, the Red Cross case and 
the Ullevål case are some examples) were uncovered through media 
investigations. The press has great influence in such situations, both through 
independent uncovering of irregularities and by providing wide publicity to cases 
that would otherwise not receive sufficient attention for further investigation when 
raised through other channels. Journalists’ threshold for getting involved in cases 
of irregularities and suspicious instances is lower than that of law enforcement; 
they have the luxury of not having to focus on a criminal liability perspective. 
Finding something reprehensible and interesting is usually sufficient to merit 
further investigation, and cases described may later prove to be of a nature that 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 34 
warrants law enforcement involvement. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 
2008) Many journalists see it as their social task to undertake such forensic 
activities, including the detection and unraveling of white-collar crime (Haakaas 
and Sæter 2010).  
 As the reports published by PwC indicate, a substantial number of cases 
are unraveled after tip-offs are received, either informally or through established 
whistle-blowing channels. Prior knowledge of the case material leads this 
researcher to also include a category fathoming various authority routines, such as 
audits by the Office of the Auditor General of Norway and the requirement of a 
range of financial institutions and actors to alert the authorities when they come 
across certain transactions. In addition, the alternative of detection through any 
other means is also included, to account for the inevitable case(s) that does not fit 
into any of the above categories.  
As sketched in the section on extant literature and research, it is thought 
that the conclusion with an angle of counting incidences in which auditing can be 
credited with detection, will be ―unfavorable‖ towards the auditing function. 
However, this approach does not provide the entire picture. Rather than simply 
answering ―yes‖ or ―no‖ to the question of whether auditing was the primary 
means of detection, one could instead ask: In what way/phase of the process was 
auditing involved, and to what extent? The rationale for this approach is given 
above, where the roles and responsibilities of the auditor are introduced. The 
unfairness of requiring the auditing function to detect irregularities or malpractice 
that may not surface through the routines and standard procedures they are 
required to adhere to, cannot be justified. From this more nuanced point of view, 
however, the auditing function will probably have been involved in some number 
of cases. In order to operationalize this approach it becomes necessary to define 
more clearly the different stages of the detection process, and also to keep in mind 
the definition of detection given in the preceding section on definitions and 
terminology.  
In order to utilize such an approach one may view the detection process as 
various separate stages of inquiry depending on the severity of suspicion and/or 
progression of the case at hand. These phases have here been defined in the 
following way:  
 Suspicion/discovery 
 Investigation 
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 Prosecution/conviction  
 
These stages of inquiry or phases are inspired by Williams (2006), Kuykendall 
(1982) and Ashworth and Redmayne (2010) . The former divides the investigative 
process into the phases ―discover‖, ―investigate‖, and ―prosecute‖, while 
Kuykendall introduces a quest for a conceptual framework for the criminal 
investigation process which is thought to apply equally well to the investigation of 
white-collar crime. Investigations are thought to proceed through a three-stage 
process where the stages are named ―suspect identification‖, ―suspect location‖, 
and ―case development‖. This means of characterizing the process is essentially 
quite similar to the one utilized here. Person-oriented investigations (where a 
pattern of events has led the police to believe that a person is a lifestyle criminal) 
may consist solely of stages two and three, or even stage three alone. ―This latter 
stage, case development, is an important part of the investigatory process because 
the information necessary to identify, locate and apprehend is often insufficient to 
obtain prosecution and conviction; therefore, the investigation must frequently 
continue‖ (Kuykendall 1982, 133). This division is roughly corroborated by 
O’Hara (1956, 12).  
 Innes (2007, 255) divides the phase of investigation further into three 
stages, or movements. ―The first movement involves identifying and acquiring 
that which forms the basis of an investigation. This process of identifying and 
acquiring informs the second movement of the act, which is interpreting and 
understanding‖, which is where ―information is translated into intelligence or 
knowledge‖. The third and last movement constitutes ordering and representing. 
―This is about configuring new knowledge with extant knowledge held by the 
investigator(s) in a format that enables a solution to the question that is the focus 
of the investigation‖. Although such a distinction between different stages of 
investigation is not strictly necessary for the study at hand it, does provide insight 
into what an investigation entails.  
In order for these phases to be fully operationalized, definitions should be 
provided. For our purpose we will not deviate from the basic meaning of the 
concepts as they can be found in dictionaries of the English language. The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary (Soanes and Stevenson 2006) provides the following 
definitions: To suspect something is defined as having an impression of the 
existence or presence of something, in this case irregularities or violations of 
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financial or economic laws and regulations. To detect is equated to revealing the 
guilt of someone or discovering a crime. To investigate is to inquire into, examine 
or study carefully. ―Essentially, an investigation is an information-gathering and 
analysis process‖ (Kuykendall 1982, 133). ―The concept of solving the crime does 
not satisfy the requirements of a completed investigation. To the general public, 
this term describes merely the process of discovering the identity of the suspect 
and apprehending him. These achievements, however, are but two of the 
objectives of the investigation and leave the investigator far from his ultimate goal 
of presenting sufficient in a court of law to warrant a conviction‖ (O'Hara 1956, 
6).  
 Prosecution is by the abovementioned dictionary defined as the institution 
and carrying on of a criminal charge in a court of law, or also the carrying on of 
legal proceedings against a person. Context may also define this term as the 
prosecuting party in a court case. Lastly, conviction is defined as the act or 
process of proving or finding guilty. With these definitions in mind the time has 
come to introduce the final definition of the study, before the methodology is 
described in more detail.  
 
3.2. What is a case?  
As the subsequent research project is a (multiple) case study, it becomes necessary 
to define more closely what is meant by a case in this context. ―The term case and 
the various terms linked to the idea of case analysis are not well defined in social 
science‖. However, it can be maintained that ―implicit in most social scientific 
notions of case analysis is the idea that the objects of investigation are similar 
enough and separate enough to permit treating them as comparable instances of 
the same general phenomenon‖. Defining on what level of analysis the distinct 
lines of each case are drawn, is not always straightforward. In some instances it 
may be useful to characterize how cases are conceived according to whether they 
are seen as involving empirical units or theoretical constructs and whether these, 
in turn, are understood as general or specific. (Ragin and Becker 1992, 1-5) For 
the current research project an understanding of cases as empirical units is 
adopted, as each is seen as a separate case of the construct white-collar crime 
(rather than each case embodying a separate construct) and may be studied by 
accessing an extant body of information. Also, a case is seen as general rather 
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than specific in the sense that cases are viewed ―as empirically real and bounded‖, 
and not in need of verification of their empirical boundaries, ―because cases are 
general and conventionalized‖, based on ―existing definitions present in research 
literatures‖ (Ragin and Becker 1992, 10). Here the conventional units referred to 
are organizations, public or private, or individuals, which in the course of their 
financial dealings have been subjected to (or committed) white-collar crime.  
 
3.3. Sketch of method chosen 
Because it has been viable to acquire a certain insight into the field being studied 
through the means of a rather large extant body of research and literature, this 
piece of research is deemed descriptive in nature (Gripsrud, Olsson and Silkoset 
2004). It seeks to describe in more detail than has previously been possible the 
nature of the auditing function’s role in the detection of white-collar crime in 
Norway. This is done by means of a (descriptive) case study of several 
instrumental cases, named so because they ―provide insights into an issue or refine 
a theoretical explanation, making it more generalizable. In these situations, the 
case actually becomes of secondary importance‖. Cases are chosen because they 
are thought to ―help the researcher better understand some external theoretical 
question, issue, or problem‖. (Berg 2007, 291)  
The fact that more than one case is included in the research makes this a 
collective (Merriam 2009) or comparative case study, which involves ―extensive 
study of several instrumental cases, intended to allow better understanding, 
insight, or perhaps improved ability to theorize about a broader context‖ (Berg 
2007, 292), and where ―individual cases share a common characteristic or 
condition‖ (Merriam 2009, 49). For the purpose of this paper these common 
characteristics are outlined below, where selection criteria and case definitions are 
given.  
―Some sources define the case study method as an attempt to 
systematically investigate an event or a set of related events with the specific aim 
of describing and explaining this phenomenon‖ (Berg 2007, 283). Yin (2009, 18) 
defines case study methodology in terms of the research process: ―A case study is 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context.‖ Regardless of which specific definition of case study research one 
chooses to adhere to, it should be clear that ―case study is an approach capable of 
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examining simple or complex phenomenon, with units of analysis varying from 
single individuals to large corporations and businesses; it entails using a variety of 
lines of action in its data-gathering segments, and can meaningfully make use of 
and contribute to the application of theory‖ (Berg 2007, 283).  
A comparative case study design is chosen over other alternatives for the 
range of characteristics inherent in it. It allows the description of a multitude of 
different Norwegian cases from the recent past, mapping the auditor role in more 
detail than a strictly quantitative approach would allow. At the same time, the 
number of cases lets us count instances and categorize cases in a way that would 
not be possible if one or two cases received all our attention.  
―Unlike experimental, survey, or historical research, case study does not 
claim any particular methods for data collection or data analysis‖ (Merriam 2009, 
42). Yin (2009) suggests utilizing several sources of evidence in case study 
research. Among those he recommends are documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation and physical artefacts. Each has their inherent 
strengths, and combining several approaches to data collection ensures their 
complementing effects are harvested for the benefit of the study. The research 
conducted in this paper involves secondary data collection as well as interviews. 
The secondary data collection mainly refers to the use of various public records or 
documents, such as court rulings, mass media and government documents as well 
as previous studies, in other words both documentation and archival records in the 
language of Yin. Interviews, either in person or by telephone or e-mail, are used 
as a supplement. The use of multiple data collection methods also serves as a form 
of methodological triangulation recommended by several researchers to 
―counteract the threats to validity‖ inherent in various methods if used alone (Berg 
2007, 7).  
―As a means of collecting data, interviews can be an invaluable source of 
information and opinions that generate valid, representative and reliable data‖ 
(Jupp, Davies and Francis 2011, 104). The aim of this thesis is to uncover the 
means of detection of relevant cases of white-collar crime, i.e. to describe the 
cases in some detail. However, because cases differ in a variety of ways and 
because the missing links of information are likely to vary greatly from case to 
case, a structured or semi-structured approach to interviewing implicated parties is 
not deemed most suitable. Rather, interviews as a supplement to information 
gathered in other ways suggests an informal approach where questions vary 
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according to the interviewee and the type of information sought. This allows for 
individualization of the interview depending on the researcher’s level of 
knowledge in each case, and increases the likelihood that only relevant questions 
are asked. This brand of interviews is commonly known as factual interviews, 
where ―obtaining valid factual information‖ is the key goal (Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009, 150), alternatively investigative interviewing, which is ―narrowly focused to 
learn what happened in a specific instance‖ (Rubin and Rubin 2005, 6).  
It has not been deemed necessary to transcribe the interviews in order to 
maintain adequate validity and reliability of the research due to the brief and ad 
hoc nature of the interviews, and so note-taking was resorted to (Jupp, Davies and 
Francis 2011). In some instances the most appropriate and convenient means of 
communication with persons inhabiting key information was through e-mail, and 
consequently this also became an important means of gathering data. Insights 
gained from interviews via telephone or e-mail are included in the introductions of 
each case in the same way as information gathered from other sources.  
 The inquiries consisted of open questions, which did not require the 
respondent to select a response from a predetermined list (Jupp, Davies and 
Francis 2011, 65). This choice was made with the intention of allowing 
respondents’ own interpretations of events and actions, and is part of what makes 
this piece of research descriptive in nature. When the range of possible answers is 
not predetermined, this allows for ―the creation of categories based on recurrent 
themes‖. For the purpose of this thesis there will inevitably be a limited number of 
alternative answers many respondents will resort to, such as when they are asked 
about the means of detection of the case at hand or their thoughts on the 
involvement of the auditing function. The analysis of responses may uncover 
possibilities for categorizing, and the various categories can then be mapped 
through the calculation of frequencies of responses, providing additional insight 
into the area. (Jupp, Davies and Francis 2011, 67)  
 A few points on how interviewees were chosen should also be included. 
The goal of the researcher has been to provide as nuanced a picture of each case 
as possible, and so, where possible, several views on facts and circumstances have 
been sought rather than a simple reliance on just one source. This is an approach 
also suggested by Rubin and Rubin (2005, 70-72), who argue that ―choosing 
interviews to obtain disparate views and carefully piecing together the separate 
parts of the puzzle‖ is an important part of maintaining and ensuring credibility of 
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argumentation. They also state that ―interviews are more believable when it is 
clear that the interviewees have had direct access to the information requested‖. It 
has therefore been a goal of the researcher to seek the opinions of those who have 
had some form of direct relation to the various cases, whether from an auditing 
standpoint, prosecutors or defence attorneys or the like. When possible, interview 
findings have been compared to other sources such as newspapers or court 
documents to check for consistency. As these are cases of legal violations the 
researcher has also sought to be aware of the incentive of interviewees to 
somehow distort, exaggerate or evade the issue, and therefore interviewees have 
been chosen that are thought to be least likely to resort to such biasing of 
information. (Rubin and Rubin 2005) This form of bias is argued to be reduced by 
the use of telephone for several of the interviews, making it easier for 
interviewees to respond to questions of a sensitive nature (Berg 2007, 109-110).  
 To ensure sound methodological quality, the judgment of auditor 
performance has not been left to the researcher alone. Three independent raters 
were given the task of judging auditor performance in each case, rating auditor 
involvement on a scale from one to five (where one signifies no involvement and 
five is the highest detection score) in each of the detection stages introduced 
above (suspicion, investigation and prosecution) based on the case descriptions in 
the following section. Such an ordinal scale allows judgment about whether one 
case depicts higher auditor involvement than another, but does not enable us to 
define in exact terms how much more (Gripsrud, Olsson and Silkoset 2004). This 
exact definition is not necessary for us to explore the findings that matter to the 
research questions we seek to answer, namely the detection rate of the auditing 
function compared to other means of detection, and the establishment of an 
approximate auditing detection rate for the Norwegian context.  
If available information was not considered adequate by raters to judge 
auditing performance, raters instead marked the case and phase as not available 
for judgment (NA). Cases judged to contain insufficient information by two raters 
or more were not included in the subsequent analysis of rater findings. The rating 
form is included in the appendix, both an original version and the forms filled in 
by each rater, which include the age, sex and education of raters as well. Based on 
the scores given the auditing function in each case, the prevalence of various 
scores will be mapped, providing input for the subsequent interpretation of 
findings to be found in the discussion chapter.  
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3.4. About the cases 
The research undertaken here will bear the characteristics of a collective case 
study, ―where a number of cases are studied in order to investigate some general 
phenomenon‖ (Silverman 2005, 127). For this reason it becomes necessary to 
define more closely what is meant by a case in this specific context, and so the 
reader is referred to the previous chapter on literature and definitions if a 
recapitulation is needed.   
The cases included will be a judgment sample (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 
1991, 321) or purposive sample, where ―people and events are deliberately 
selected because they are interesting or suitable, rather than being representative‖ 
(Payne and Payne 2004, 210). A judgment sample may also be referred to as a 
convenience sample, and a ―convenience sample is one that is simply available to 
the researcher by virtue of its accessibility. ... The data will not allow definitive 
findings to be generated because of the problem of generalization, but it could 
provide a springboard for further research or allow links to be forged with existing 
findings in an area. ... Even when a sample has been selected using probability 
sampling, any findings can be generalized only to the population from which that 
sample was taken‖ (Bryman and Bell 2003, 105-109).  
As the research will be relying on a non-probability sampling technique it 
will not be ―possible to estimate sampling errors. Therefore, validity of inferences 
to a population cannot be ascertained‖ (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991, 321). The 
limited number of instances available for analysis would in any case have limited 
the statistical generalizability of findings, and it is the hope of the researcher that 
insights gained will still make a contribution to the field in the ways described 
above. The fact that evidence from multiple cases is considered more compelling, 
increasing the robustness of the study, contributes in this effect (Yin 2009). Yin 
(2009, 53) suggests considering ―multiple cases as one would consider multiple 
experiments‖, which is to follow a replication logic rather than a sampling logic. 
―Any application of this sampling logic to case studies would be misplaced. First, 
case studies are not the best method for assessing the prevalence of phenomena. 
Second, a case study would have to cover both the phenomenon of interest and its 
context, yielding a large number of potentially relevant variables. In turn, this 
would require an impossibly large number of cases – too large to allow any 
statistical consideration of the relevant variables.‖ The replication design is 
described as follows: ―Each individual case study consists of a whole study, in 
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which convergent evidence is sought regarding the facts and conclusions for the 
case; each case’s conclusions are then considered to be the information needing 
replication by other individual cases.‖ (Yin 2009, 56) To the extent possible this 
replication logic has been the guiding principle of this study, informing both the 
means of data collection and the variety of cases included.  
The convenience sample is also based on a few established selection 
criteria, some of which are inspired by Davia (2000) and Stelfox (2009):  
 
1) They must satisfy the criteria for white-collar crime as illustrated in the 
definitions in the previous chapter.  
2) They must be cases of white-collar crime that has been exposed and 
made public. A case is defined as being in the public domain if it can be ―known 
by anyone who has a serious interest in studying it‖ (Davia 2000, 2).  
3) They must be cases where the perpetrator(s) was prosecuted in some 
Norwegian criminal court, although not necessarily convicted (Stelfox 2009).  
 
The sample of cases chosen for this piece of research is based on cases 
selected by Gottschalk (2011b) as the most central cases of white-collar crime in 
Norway in recent years. The cases below are those first included in this reference, 
although more were added by Gottschalk before publishing and to later editions. 
Although the cases to be included in the research were provided for the author, 
information on the role of the auditing function was not, and a substantial amount 
of research was needed to map each case in the way that is shown below. Some of 
these cases are mentioned in other texts (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 
2008) regarding Norwegian white-collar crime as well, further strengthening their 
position as relevant for the research question at hand. All of them satisfy the 
abovementioned selection criteria as well.  
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4. The cases 
A brief introduction of each case included follows below. The extent to which 
each case is described will depend on the amount of information available. 
Attention will primarily be given to those aspects of the stories necessary to 
understanding the role of the auditing function in each case, and so facts will be 
viewed from the auditor’s perspective as far as possible. How each case was 
detected – therein the role of the auditing function in the detection process – and 
the type of white-collar crime involved will be described. The cases are presented 
in no specific order. A complete list of cases as well as the page on which each 
case description can be found, is included in the appendix at the end of the paper. 
Readers who wish to proceed directly to the discussion of findings, may skip to 
the next chapter.  
 
The Henriksen Case 
“I don’t really belong in a book on corruption.”  
- Ivar Thorer Henriksen, several months after conviction (Gedde-
Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008, 33) 
 
The accused were Ivar Thorer Henriksen, his son Pål Henrik Henriksen, and two 
business associates. Head of the board Petter Elvestad acted as Peab’s 
representative, the engineering company being accused of corruption and financial 
disloyalty on 60 accounts, resulting in the extraction of NOK 60 million in total 
from the public companies Nedre Romerike Vannverk AS (NRV AS) and 
Sentralrenseanlegget RA-2 AS. Økokrim maintained that the following methods 
had been utilized: Inflated billing as well as fictitious billing of goods and services 
that were never actually delivered, the companies having been charged with costs 
completely irrelevant to their business. The companies were relieved of machinery 
and equipment through irregular transactions.  
The case was so extensive that Økokrim made the decision to conclude 
their investigation without following through on a number of leads. Several 
indications of the possible violations can be found in the 400 page report issued 
by Nedre Romerike Distriktsrevisjon in 2007, which was not utilized by Økokrim 
in the case tried in court. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008) 
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The unravelling of the Henriksen case started when a contractor, Tom 
Christensen, contacted the newspaper Aftenposten with information concerning 
irregularities in certain governmental organizations. In the fall of 2005 
Aftenposten published information on financial relationships and transactions that 
were thought to be connected to illegitimate activities, partly in connection with 
the municipal organizations Nedre Romerike Vannverk AS (NRV) and 
Sentralrenseanlegget RA-2 AS. (Olsen 2007)  
The director of these two companies, Ivar Henriksen, had acquired nine 
farms in Africa with company means. Refusing to share where the assets to make 
such purchases had come from, he was given a leave of absence. An entrepreneur 
had been given NOK 100 million worth of contracts without tender, and it was 
later assumed that the entrepreneur was used to channel money from NRV to 
Henriksen’s firm in South Africa, a German-based company that was also 
involved. The report from Nedre Romerike Distriktsrevisjon uncovered that 
draining of assets had been going on since the 1970’s. (Økokrim 2011)  
Siri Gedde-Dahl of the newspaper Aftenposten was part of the team that 
received the tip and subsequently started investigating the allegations made. The 
whistle-blower had worked with Henriksen, and the tip arrived in the wake of 
articles on the prosecution of those involved in the Ullevål case, according to 
correspondence with Gedde-Dahl. The tip referred to irregular dealings between 
Henriksen’s companies and private suppliers, Peab especially. The companies in 
question were approached carefully, and only after several weeks of information 
gathering from sources and from the documents available. The articles published 
from the case built largely on documents from public sources such as firm 
registers, ledgers and accounts, tax authorities, local briefings, tender databases 
and real estate registers. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008) Gedde-Dahl 
describes in an e-mail interview that lessons from the Ullevål case had made them 
more in tune with warning signals, and their suspicions of corruption were sought 
enlightened by mapping the companies, their activities and their mutual relation.  
The auditor, members of the board and several suppliers evaded 
prosecution, but were still sued for damages. The auditing firm PwC were fined 
NOK 15 million. (Gedde-Dahl 2009) (Gedde-Dahl 2011c)  
Nedre Romerike Distriktsrevisjon offered a critique of the board of 
directors of the two companies in the final report issued on their inquiry. Part of 
their critique was too heavy a reliance on the control functions of the auditors. The 
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second status report issued on this inquiry in February 2006 drew attention to 
insufficient or erroneous accounting pertaining to particular projects (e.g. for the 
construction of a plant for Coca Cola AS). Neither was an overview of other 
activities engaged in by the companies available. (Dalseide et al. 2006)  
In the two preliminary reports of this inquiry the fact that auditor reports with 
no remarks were given, is questioned, as significant omissions and errors had been 
uncovered. Among these were large, unspecified bills from Peab, lacking reports 
and missing information on ownership of other companies. In addition, the board 
of directors had not received numbered letters from the auditor. (Nedre Romerike 
Distriktsrevisjon 2005)  
 Correspondence with Gedde-Dahl clarifies that at the starting point of their 
research it had already been decided that an audit of the company was to be 
undertaken by Nedre Romerike Distriktsrevisjon, in part due to suspicions of 
breaches of the full cost principle for public fees. This audit had not commenced. 
Upon the publishing of the article in Aftenposten it was decided that this audit 
was to be converted into a fraud audit, reports from which have been referred to 
above. When Økokrim entered into formal investigations, Gedde-Dahl recounts 
that she assumes that auditors in their employment were part of the forensic team 
assigned to the case.  
 The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway concluded that the auditor 
of the companies in question had committed severe violations of the Auditors Act. 
Auditor Johnny Skaug of PwC would likely have lost his accounting licence had 
he not submitted it himself in the fall of 2005 when the case was made public in 
Aftenposten and Skaug was dismissed as auditor of the company. Skaug 
continued his employment at PwC as partner until his retirement in 2008. PwC 
was criticized for not identifying a number of risk factors, and also for not 
intensifying controls where risk factors actually were found. Skaug submitted 
clean and positive auditing reports in spite of having uncovered serious breaches 
of laws and regulations. He trusted Henriksen and only sporadically had any direct 
contact or information exchange with the board of directors. Most of the auditor’s 
letters Skaug delivered to Henriksen, never made it to the board. (Gedde-Dahl, 
Hafstad and Magnussen 2007)  
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The Finance Credit Case 
This was a case of fraud and accounting malpractice in conjunction with loans 
from several Norwegian banks and financial institutions amounting to NOK 1.5 
billion in total, most of which has been lost. Complex organizational structures 
both in Norway and abroad were used to hide the offences and several 
transactions were channelled through tax havens. (Høgetveit 2004) The business 
plan of the company was to buy receivables and engage in debt collection. 
Accounts that gave a severely misleading picture of earnings and the state of the 
balance sheet served as the alibi for loans from banks such as Sparebank 1 
Gruppen and Nordlandsbanken. (Økokrim 2005)  
A former finance manager was convicted of wrongful reporting of 
collateral, and a former CFO was convicted of gross tax fraud and substantial 
violations of accounting laws and regulations. The finance manager was charged 
with wilfully preparing inaccurate reports on accounts receivable that individual 
companies in the Finance Credit system owned. These accounts receivable were 
collateral for loans with an overdraft of NOK 171 million. He was acquitted of 
two other loans amounting to a total of NOK 75 million. The CFO failed to report 
NOK 150,000 as taxable income, and also failed to list this as a payment to 
himself in the accounts. (Økokrim 2005)  
Kristoffersen and Stensrud were planning on registering Finance Credit on 
the Stockholm stock exchange when Bjørn Olav Jahr, a journalist with the 
Norwegian magazine Kapital, published a story on what he claimed were the real 
goings on in the company. He had been tipped off by former Finance Credit 
management. (Økokrim 2005)  
 Company auditor Per Kristian Ertvaag had previously tried to call 
attention to aspects of the accounts he found irregular, but had not succeeded in 
grabbing sufficient attention. Among these irregularities was the fact that of total 
income of NOK 33 million, 25 million derived from the sale of IT solutions to 
close affiliates, as well as 5 million in management fees. Finance Credit’s 
collateral lay in receivables the company they were purchased from, Royal 
Consulting, considered lost, and could therefore not be considered the most 
reassuring of safety nets. (Jahr 2005)  
Complex company structures will have made it difficult for both banks 
and auditors to monitor and control the accounting figures (Økokrim 2005). 
However, the fact that Finance Credit collateral was in receivables that the 
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previous owner had no hope of collecting, raises the question whether such 
receivables should have been written off. Finance Credit auditor John Haukland, a 
partner at KPMG at the time, would not explain why Royal Consulting was listed 
with several tens of millions of NOK in the balance sheet of Finance Credit in 
spite of the fact that Royal Consulting was insolvent. Many claimed it seemed 
drop-handed of the auditing function not to insist upon more loan loss provisions 
when Finance Credit’s fiercest competitor on invoice purchasing, Aktiv Kapital, 
has a relatively high depreciation rate in this area of their business. (Jahr 2005)  
The KPMG auditing team did not consist solely of John Haukland. It also 
included a senior manager, manager and others. In a telephone interview, Tom 
Myhre, a KPMG partner with first-hand recollections of the case, states that it 
later became clear that Haukland’s involvement and quality control as partner in 
the Finance Credit audit was lacking. In addition, Finance Credit was not viewed 
as a large and complex auditing assignment. It was a company of modest size 
when KPMG first became involved, and their rapid expansion was perhaps not 
followed closely enough.  
Myhre has several other points to make. Firstly, he wishes to emphasize 
that much has changed in the way KPMG implement their audits since the time of 
Finance Credit. Internal functions have been upgraded and the auditing framework 
requirements are becoming more complex. It is no longer sufficient to base an 
audit on management confirmations; other forms of evidence must also be 
presented.  
Although it is clear that the auditing function cannot be credited with 
detection in this case, Myhre questions whether this was a case that auditors, even 
without negligence, would have been in a position to detect. The fraud was not 
merely confined to companies that were clients of KPMG, and with fraudsters 
actively seeking to manipulate and camouflage at the receiving end, this may 
seem unlikely. Also, a lack of communication between the English and 
Norwegian KPMG branches seems to have aggravated the problem, and according 
to the testimony Haukland gave in court, KPMG received no formal warning from 
Ertvaag about the irregularities he had come across, as is required by regulations 
in a switch of auditors. KPMG was sentenced to a fine of NOK 5 million for their 
lacking audit of the company, and auditor John Haukland was also sentenced. In a 
settlement KPMG agreed to compensate Finance Credit creditors with NOK 347 
million. (Gottschalk 2010b)  
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Due to the complexities and scope of the case, auditors and accounting 
professionals from Ernst & Young were hired by Økokrim in the preliminary 
phases of the investigation (Høgetveit 2004). Also, an auditing team from Ernst & 
Young, headed by Kjetil Kristensen, was hired by Sparebanken Vest to 
investigate the allegations made in the aforementioned Kapital article. (Jahr 2005)  
 
The Murud Case 
Property manager Frank Murud swindled the municipality of Oslo for NOK 90 
million over a period of two years utilizing methods such as overbilling and 
billing for goods and services that were never delivered. Several suppliers 
contributed to the overbilling in exchange for being granted contracts, and 
substantial amounts in addition to goods and services were channelled on to 
Murud himself. Murud was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for corruption 
and forging of documents. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008) 
Murud should have been exposed by pure routine. Instead it was a 
different kind of routine that did the job. In December of 2005 he issued a debt to 
his wife of nearly NOK 20 million to hide them from the tax authorities over New 
Year’s. The same amount was then transferred back in January. This classic tax 
evasion transaction requires reporting by banks that come across them. A branch 
of Økokrim dealing with financial intelligence picked up the report, and 
subsequently handed it over to the police. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 
2008) Frank Murud himself figures his case was unravelled due to the 
repercussions of another, rather similar case: the Ullevål case (Gottschalk 2010b).  
 Murud himself was amazed at how long he was able to keep up his 
fraudulent scheme. He had been granted procuration of NOK 200,000, but 
regularly submitted one bill after another of several million NOK. No questions 
were asked. When a project manager in Undervisningsbygg was exposed in 
Aftenposten in 2006 for a non-related fraud, Murud was sure his time had come. 
Not so. The municipal auditing office (Kommunerevisjonen) submitted several 
reports on Undervisningsbygg operations without his name ever being mentioned. 
Even Rudberg, in charge of the internal auditing function of the municipality of 
Oslo at the time, stated that it was the failing of the most basic of control 
functions that were to blame. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008)  
In the auditor’s report from the municipal auditing office on 
Undervisningsbygg Oslo KF for the fiscal year of 2006, the following comments 
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are made, loosely translated (although they are not judged severe enough to 
influence the information given in the financial statements in any material way): 
―Substantial fraud and corruption was unravelled in the organization in 2006. 
After extensive investigations a systematic failure in internal controls and 
breaches of purchasing routines were ascertained.‖   
Despite having been granted procuration for only NOK 200,000, Frank 
Murud was able to deliver one bill after the other of several million NOK. Red 
flags abounded in the organization, but were ignored, also by the auditing 
function. In 2004, the municipal auditing office in Oslo delivered a severely 
critical report on the purchasing routines of the organization. The board of 
directors did not take heed. In 2005 and 2006 substantial budget exceedings on the 
maintenance and running of school buildings were recorded. These exceedings 
were traced to Murud’s area of responsibility. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and 
Magnussen 2008) This has led to substantial subsequent changes in purchasing 
and control routines. (Gedde-Dahl and Kagge 2009)  
 
The Ullevål Case 
Property manager Bjørn Haugseth at Ullevål hospital in Oslo was charged with 
corruption and breaches of accounting and tax legislature pertaining both to his 
post at Ullevål and his prior position as manager in Rom Eiendomsutvikling. 
According to the prosecution Haugseth had taken bribes of more than NOK 1 
million in the form of cash, building materials, furniture and travels. Two 
suppliers, among them Peab, were charged as accomplices. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad 
and Magnussen 2008)  
 During his time at Ullevål Haugseth is said to have accepted NOK 
200,000 in cash and bank deposits from contractor Lars Tomas Karlsson in 
exchange for commissions. Haugseth also participated in a hunting excursion paid 
by Peab and went golfing in Malaga as the guest of Nor Engineering. All are 
instances of corruption according to Økokrim. While employed as a project 
manager in ROM Eiendomsutvikling Haugseth granted commissions both to firms 
connected to Karlsson and to acquaintances from Peab and Nor Engineering. 
From Birkelunden Investeringsselskap represented by Helge Torp Såheim, 
Haugseth received furniture in excess of NOK 125,000. Såheim was charged with 
hiding this cost in the accounts. Haugseth also arranged two trips to Sweden for 
the employees of the property division at Ullevål hospital. These were billed to 
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Karlsson’s BE Entreprenør, who in turn billed Ullevål a total of NOK 183,000. 
The amount was disguised as an additional cost pertaining to the attic of the 
psychiatry building which was under renovation at the time. (Gedde-Dahl, 
Hafstad and Magnussen 2005)  
One of Ullevål’s suppliers, Svein Raknerud, was the whistle-blower in the 
case. When he was not taken seriously by Haugseth’s superiors, he chose to go 
public via the newspaper Aftenposten, whereupon Økokrim initiated an 
investigation. In August of 2005 charges were filed, and for the first time since 
their inclusion in the penal code in 2003, the new clauses on corruption were 
utilized. (Gottschalk 2010b)  
According to Siri Gedde-Dahl, one of the journalists instrumental in 
uncovering the case, the subsequent hunt for information was undertaken through 
relatively traditional journalistic methods. These included checking all available 
sources and registers as well as developing a network of oral sources. Confidential 
conversations with good sources, long days in municipal archives and late nights 
pouring over accounting information, were all necessary aspects of their work, in 
this case as well as in the Henriksen case and others that the Aftenposten 
journalists have been involved in over the past years. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and 
Magnussen 2008)  
Following the articles published by Aftenposten in the fall of 2004, the 
police entered into investigations, quietly at first. According to Gedde-Dahl, a 
certain dynamic in which investigative journalism provides the basis for 
subsequent police involvement, took place, although she clarifies that there is no 
formal cooperation between Aftenposten journalists and the police. Government 
agencies conduct their own, separate investigation and evidence collection, 
subject to a radically different framework from that of the journalist.  
When Peab received news that Økokrim had initiated an investigation in 
which they were included, they hired investigators from the fraud division of 
PwC. The report generated from this investigation was submitted in its entirety to 
Økokrim.  
Also, a report issued from an internal investigation at Ullevål showed that 
a number of employees were aware of the relationship between Haugseth and 
certain suppliers and contractors, but no one dared speak up.  
(Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2005)  
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The Red Cross Case 
CFO Odd Gunnar Ramfløy had allotted a rehabilitation commission, without 
tender, to a company owned by him and two brothers. This company billed the 
Red Cross NOK 17 million more than was stipulated in the contract, and made 
sure that invoices of more than NOK 8.8 million in fictitious claims were 
disbursed. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008) 
 Through the use of shell companies abroad Ramfløy purchased a building 
site outside Oslo for at least NOK 2.5 million sourced from the Red Cross. The 
money was channelled from Devise, a company engaged in a rehabilitation 
assignment for the Norwegian Red Cross via a Scottish business Ramfløy 
controlled. From there it was transferred to Rowa-Med Consultants, at the time 
owned and controlled by Ramfløy’s wife. His sentence also included violations 
concerning accounting and taxes relating to his contracting business. (Gottschalk 
2010b) 
General Secretary Sven Mollekleiv received a phone call from a journalist 
at the magazine Kapital, Vibeke Holth, alerting him to irregularities in the 
workings of a prior CFO, Odd Gunnar Ramfløy. An internal investigation 
revealed issues of a seriousness that prompted handing the case over to Økokrim. 
(Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008) Although auditing cannot be credited 
with detection in this case, Holth states in correspondence with the researcher that 
it is her opinion that the auditing function should have picked it up.  
 
The Siemens Case 
The Siemens consolidated group has been under investigation for corruption, 
competitive crime, money laundering and/or tax evasion in closer to 30 countries. 
They are black listed in Nigeria and were fined billions in Germany in the spring 
of 2008 for corruption and tax evasion. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 
2008)  
 In June of 2006 the first report from district stipendiary magistrate Nils 
Dalseide and his committee was published. It documented the excessive billing of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces, and reprimanded how this practice had continued 
in spite of warnings from employees. (Monsen 2008) (Gedde-Dahl 2011b) 
According to this investigative committee Siemens Business Services (SBS) had 
not fulfilled their obligation to ensure the best interest of the Armed Forces as this 
duty was stipulated in the FISBasis contract. They further maintain that SBS 
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billed prices that were ungrounded in this contract, and that the Armed Forces 
were lacking in their control functions and in living up to regulations they are 
subject to as a governmental agency. This overbilling was thought to possibly be 
in violation of the fraud clauses of the Norwegian penal code. Possible cases of 
corruption in the form of extensive customer care directed towards Armed Forces 
staff were also uncovered. (Dalseide et al. 2006)  
Siemens AS was fined NOK 2 million and two managing employees 
received fines of NOK 75,000 each for corruption, accused of sending several 
senior employees of the Armed Forces to Spain on a golfing trip. Siemens 
Business Services also refused a fine of NOK 9 million for excessive billing 
fraud. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008) In March of 2011 the verdict 
concluded that Siemens was in good faith when they billed excessive amounts to 
the Armed Forces. The accusation of fraud of NOK 60 million and a proposed 
fine of NOK 9 million was dismissed. Siemens claimed to have misunderstood the 
contract and that the excessiveness of the billing was less than Økokrim 
maintained. The court did find singular violations of the penal code, but all in all 
the company’s version of events was deemed believable. (Gedde-Dahl 2011b)  
In February of 2005 former Siemens employee Per-Yngve Monsen told his 
story anonymously in the newspaper VG. That fall Monsen allowed an interview 
in Aftenposten. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008) Monsen had first 
sought to alert his superiors to the irregularities, but was not heard, and has 
subsequently become an important voice for the increased legal protection of 
whistle-blowers.  
The case related to the Norwegian Armed Forces concerned on account 
billing, meaning that the customer was billed in December for goods that were not 
received until January. This ensured that the Armed Forces could rid themselves 
of the last of the year’s budget, borrowing the terminology of whistle-blower Per-
Yngve Monsen. He adds that the Auditor General was most likely aware of this 
fact. The amounts stemming from these ―deliveries‖ were booked in the accounts 
as a reserve until the goods were actually delivered. This is a practice not 
condoned by the Auditor General of Norway, but according to Monsen the 
―solution‖ provided by Siemens is not easy to spot unless the Auditor General 
also has an overview of deliveries. (Monsen 2008)  
In the end Siemens agreed to a repayment of NOK 36.8 million. This 
amount was contested by auditing firm Ernst & Young who maintained that the 
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correct sum should be 15.5 million, but the demands of the committee were none 
the less met. Some believe that the auditing firm was led astray during their 
investigations. (Gedde-Dahl, Hafstad and Magnussen 2008)  
Several of the manoeuvres that according to Monsen (2008) were a part of 
this systematic excessive billing, were actions that should have been uncovered in 
the course of a sound auditing process, among them the transfer of means between 
the company divisions to mask poor performance. He contends that these transfers 
were not questioned, and further that the Armed Forces were not diligent enough 
in ensuring the contract was followed. Siemens quite openly recorded profits from 
sales to the Armed Forces of more than 3.5 percent in excess of that stipulated by 
the contract. The cost estimate of Siemens’ internal auditor is, according to 
Monsen, based on numbers that cannot be documented.  
 The Office of the Auditor General of Norway had for several years prior to 
the unravelling of this case, called attention to a lacking adherence to legislation 
in a number of areas within the Armed Forces. Among these were breaches in 
routines pertaining to the use of framework agreements, violations of the 
competition principle, of ethical guidelines and legal capacity laws as well as 
violations of the prohibition against entering into contractual arrangements with 
an agent and the lacking separation of the executive officer function. (Dalseide et 
al. 2006)  
 
The Sponsor Service Case 
The primary concern Økokrim had about Sponsor Service ledgers pertained to an 
account labelled ―deals in progress‖. These were sponsoring agreements not yet 
signed that were registered as income under the condition that the deals would be 
completed and signed in time for the general assembly in the spring of the 
following fiscal year. As the company filed for bankruptcy before the general 
assembly of 2003 was held, the ledgers for 2002 were never corrected in this way. 
Sponsor Service maintained that they had obtained permission from auditor Ernst 
& Young for this business practice. Økokrim was of a different opinion, basing 
much of their prosecution on unsigned deals that inflated earnings. Roughly 30 
contracts were included in the accounts as earnings without ever materializing. 
(Bogen 2008) (Gottschalk 2010b) Contracts that were later finalized were not 
included in the subsequent prosecution, according to senior public prosecutor at 
the time, Gunnar Holm Ringen. He explains in a telephone interview that two 
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aspects were central to the charges. These were wrongful recording of 
income/revenue recognition and activating costs that did not belong in the balance 
sheet.  
In addition, Terje Bogen neglected to report roughly NOK 460,000 in 
payment and benefits to tax authorities. The municipal court of Oslo (Oslo 
Tingrett) confirmed that a number of trips taken with potential investors and other 
business contacts were to be characterized as taxable income and benefits. 
(Elmholdt 2009)  
Holm Ringen informs that, following the bankruptcy of Sponsor Service, 
Selmer was given the task of reviewing the bankruptcy and the assets that might 
be left in the company. It was during this run-through that irregularities and 
violations were uncovered. Selmer’s findings were subsequently reported to the 
police. In addition, the media had been sceptic about several matters pertaining to 
Sponsor Service accounting in the months leading up to the bankruptcy, among 
these Lars-Erik Nygaard of Dagens Næringsliv.  
Jan Olav Korsmo was the company auditor from the start in 1982. Further 
assistance was hired from Ernst & Young, as well. When Korsmo left in 2001 he 
was replaced by Ole Geir Hagen, who in the first board meeting he attended 
sought to draw the attention of the board to a number of possible issues and 
irregularities in the accounts. Bogen (2008) has later expressed indignation over 
the fact that these errors had not been detected by Ernst & Young.  
The role of auditing is not mentioned much in the sentencing even though 
this is a case in which the auditor was central. Ernst & Young were hired by 
Sponsor Service not just for auditing services but also for substantial consulting, 
and ended up having to pay retribution to the bank Nordea of more than NOK 130 
million for having issued clean and positive auditing reports. The prosecution 
claimed that if it had not been for these shortcomings, the case would never have 
arisen. This includes the internal Sponsor Service auditing function, which did not 
escape prosecution. (Bogen 2008) (NTB 2005) According to Gunnar Holm 
Ringen, former Senior Public Prosecutor and now a partner at PwC, the initial 
phase of investigation was undertaken by auditors at the law firm Selmer. Having 
uncovered criminal offences they then filed charges, whereupon Økokrim auditors 
and detectives took over.  
The means used to accomplish the fraud were the accounts and ledgers. 
According to district attorney Bård Thorsen of Økokrim a sufficiently diligent and 
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careful audit should have uncovered the violations and irregularities, and could 
thereby have prevented substantial losses. Following the bankruptcy the auditing 
firm Ernst & Young paid damages amounting to NOK 135 million to lender 
Nordea. Korsmo admits that certain aspects of the audit of Sponsor Service 
accounts were insufficient. (Gyldenskog 2009)  
During the trial the appeal court were critical of the lack of information 
given in notes in the ledgers. However, as The Financial Supervisory Authority 
had given Ernst & Young clearance to using the gross principle, it was accepted as 
part of GAAP that this principle was applied to the accounts of 2000 and 2001. 
What the court did contest was the fact that the auditor had not insisted on a more 
detailed information disclosure in the notes, especially pertaining to the effects of 
using the gross principle. (Lagmannsretten 2011)  
 
The Brynhildsen Woldsdal Case 
PR-consultant Rune Brynhildsen was convicted of insider trading in 2007 and 
sentenced to 10 months imprisonment, the harshest sentence given so far for this 
felony. According to the verdict Brynhildsen abused inside information on the 
registered companies Via Travel, Findexa and Ignis, companies he knew well 
from his PR capacity in the company Brynhildsen Woldsdal Public Relations. 
Information was leaked to his friend and fellow investor Dag Eriksen, who in turn 
passed it on to several other investors. (Skaar 2007) (Bakken 2009)  
 Brynhildsen came across the information when hired as a consultant to 
handle information on acquisitions of two of the companies in addition to the 
publication of a large deal. Such information often leads to rising stock prices 
when it becomes known, which makes purchasing of the stocks in question prior 
to such publication particularly profitable. However, making use of such inside 
information is against the law, and according to the verdict, the information was 
also passed on to five others. Three were convicted; two were cleared of all 
charges. (Stoltenberg 2009) (Endresen 2008) Brynhildsen himself did not 
purchase stocks, but was given the same sentence as Dag Eriksen, who purchased 
for a total amount of NOK 10.6 million. Brynhildsen was held responsible for the 
entire amount of purchases and attempted purchases resulting from his 
information, a total of NOK 19.4 million. (Johannessen 2009)  
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The Software Innovation Case 
In 2001 Software Innovation purchased three IT-companies. Wnet Partner, in 
which Hans Frisvold was one of the owners, was among them. The others were 
Ementa and Genera. In connection with an audit of Software Innovation in 2005 it 
was uncovered that of the purchased companies, several were registered in 
Gibraltar. Suspicions were aroused when a contract with one of them was written 
in Norwegian. Further inquiry by tax authorities led to the discovery that several 
Norwegian citizens were behind these purchased companies, and that these had 
evaded the sales proceeds from the authorities. A total of NOK 120 million in 
profits from the sales between 1998 and 2001 had remained undeclared on 
accounts in Luxembourg and Gibraltar, and six people had up until 2010 been 
given prison sentences. One of them was Hans Frisvold. (Dugstad, 2010a) 
(Hustadnes and Bergsaker 2008)  
The operation had two central aspects. First, the accused sold their stocks 
in the companies cheaply to companies in tax havens that they themselves were 
behind. The companies were then sold on to Software Innovation for a 
substantially higher price. Stocks in Wnet Partner had then reached a value of at 
least NOK 38 million, and the three companies combined totaled approximately 
NOK 100 million according to Økokrim. (Hustadnes and Bergsaker 2008)  
Norwegian tax authorities were alerted to the case during a general audit 
of Software Innovation, according to Petter Nordeng at Økokrim. One of the fatal 
mistakes made by the accused tax evaders, was a contract between Software 
Innovation and a tax haven company written in Norwegian. This aroused 
suspicion of Norwegian ownership. In addition, their scheme was lacking in a 
plan of how to handle the proceeds. One of the owners diligently reported his 
share of profits on his tax return, establishing that at least one Norwegian citizen 
was behind it all. (Hustadnes and Bergsaker 2008)  
 
The Lyon Case 
Bente Lyon was in 2005 sentenced to five years in prison for pimping, threats and 
for participation in drug smuggling. (Dagbladet 2008) (Hanssen 2004b) 
A young woman was apprehended at Newark Airport in the USA with 1.6 
kilograms of heroin and 11 100 ecstasy tablets. She claimed to have been acting 
under orders of Bente Lyon, but thought she was carrying cocaine, not heroin. She 
was to earn NOK 50,000 for the job. (Hanssen 2004d) Prosecutor Per Egil 
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Volledal contended that Lyon was the chief instigator of extensive cocaine 
smuggling from Amsterdam to New York. Nine other suspects are thought to 
have been acting as couriers.  
The entire case has as its starting point a massage institute/brothel in Oslo, 
Studio 70. All those charged either worked in the studio as prostitutes or were 
somehow linked to its milieu. Lyon’s was a balancing act between legitimate 
business activity and violation of the pimping clause in the Norwegian penal code. 
(Hanssen 2004a) The court did not believe Lyon in that Studio 70 was run in 
fellowship with the girls that worked there; it was concluded that Lyon ran the 
place as her own (Hanssen 2008).  
The appeal court maintained that the prostitution business at the massage 
studio was extensive, and that approximately 100 girls sold sexual services during 
the time it was in operation. The girls paid NOK 300 a day to use the premises, 
and an additional room fee of NOK 300 per customer served. This was the 
conclusion from a report given by police auditor Flood based on the confiscated 
work lists found on the premises. These fees were part of the basis for calculating 
the gross turnover of the establishment, which again served as a basis for 
confiscation/replacement. So did the fact that testimonials established that sexual 
services had a significantly higher cost than the stated massage prices, and the 
assumption that Lyon kept a substantial portion of this premium. (Lagmannsretten 
2006)  
The case was detected by way of a different kind of violation involving 
many of the same people. While smuggling drugs from Amsterdam to New York, 
a young woman belonging to the massage institute milieu, and her boyfriend, 
were detained by customs personnel at Gardermoen Airport when they were 
unable to explain a large amount of American dollars they were carrying with 
them. The money had been given to them in Detroit because they were short on 
cash for the plane ticket home, and they subsequently confessed in police 
interrogations. (Hanssen 2004c)  
 
The Karlsen Case 
Karlsen & Nordseth is an entrepreneurial concern/consolidated group owned by 
the families of brothers Jul Petter Karlsen and Anders Karlsen, as well as their 
sister Line Christin Karlsen. Jul Petter Karlsen has five previous convictions, 
among these one concerning charges of billing fraud and tax evasion. In the 
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instance of billing fraud the court concluded that his was a case of a planned, 
systematic and extensive activity in fictitious billing with substantial effects on 
taxes and duties. (Gedde-Dahl 2010a)  
 In 2008 the Karlsen & Nordseth concern was shut out of two framework 
agreements by the municipal organization Undervisningsbygg in Oslo (more 
specifically Boligbygg KF and Utviklings- og kompetanseetaten i Oslo) due to 
alleged overbilling, a decision later supported by the court in which the eviction 
case was tried (Gedde-Dahl 2010b). It was the Karlsen & Nordseth firm Roald 
Larsen AS that was subject to the eviction, although they contested the attempted 
bribery of Omsorgsbygg they were charged with. The court emphasized the 
untruthful explanations given by company representatives to the police in their 
sentencing, although the actual case of corruption has been dismissed due to 
lacking evidence. All firms belonging to the Karlsen & Nordseth concern are 
black listed for the time being according to Steinar Johnsen, who is legally 
responsible for Boligbygg. (Gedde-Dahl 2011a)  
 
The Stuve Case 
Ragnhild Johanne Stuve was accused and convicted of draining assets from her 
own medical practice, Klinikk Haugesund, by letting the practice pay rent for 
machinery that had already been paid for in full. The money was channeled to a 
company in Guernsey, which again sent it on to Moor Shipping, controlled by her 
brother Tor Johan Stuve. The question was then whether Ragnhild Stuve removed 
assets from her own firm by means of a deal with her brother, or whether her 
intentions with the deal were good, but poorly documented and executed. 
Although Ragnhild Stuve was the sole owner of her clinic, she was not in a 
position to make any financial dispositions she chose. This was why prosecutor 
Anna Haugmoen of Økokrim maintained that Stuve had sought to evade taxation 
by channeling means out of the country and then having them disappear into her 
brother’s companies. The fact that the new machinery being down paid, never 
reached the clinic, Ragnhild Stuve sought to explain through the bankruptcy of 
shipping company Tordenskjold ASA, in which her brother Tor Johan was one of 
the owners. The financial burden on her brother brought on by this bankruptcy 
apparently made him unable to fulfill his end of the deal, but she maintained 
always to have trusted her brother, and never read the documents he would have 
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her sign. He was also a trusted adviser in business matters. (Waal 2010) (Vestvik 
and Nordbakken 2009)  
 The case was detected by coincidence. Økokrim got wind of the alleged 
violations during the investigation of Tor Johan Stuve, her brother, following the 
Tordenskjold bankruptcy. The leasing agreement with Tracktel, to which the 
down payments were directed, contained more than the mere leasing of the used 
machinery. Stuve maintained that Tracktel would also be providing new 
equipment, but that these deliveries had been delayed as a consequence of the 
Tordenskjold bankruptcy. (Vestvik and Nordbakken 2009)  
 When questioned about financial matters concerning her clinic, Stuve 
frequently answered that she did not know the answer, contending that she had 
left most matters of economy to her accountant and auditor, in which she had 
complete confidence. She was aware of her responsibilities as general manager 
and chairman of the board, but admitted not always reading through documents 
she was made to sign. She did, however, add that all dispositions were cleared by 
her auditor before implementation. (Vestvik and Nordbakken 2009)  
 
The WorldCom Case 
Trygve Tamburstuen was charged with fraud on the basis of allegations of 
embezzlement in connection with the sale of stock in a Ghanese cellular 
communication firm. Økokrim maintained that 49 percent of the stocks belonged 
to someone else, namely Børge Granli of WorldCom, who was a former business 
partner of Tamburstuen. Tamburstuen was also charged with providing 
Norwegian tax authorities with false information regarding the proceeds from said 
sale. (Gottschalk 2010b)  
In the early 1990s Granli purchased half of Tele 2 Nornett, a company 
owned by Tamburstuen, for NOK 50,000. The deal included half of 
Tamburstuen’s stock in NetCom, and when these were sold a few years later they 
both received approximately NOK 750,000. Through Tele 2 Nornett Granli and 
Tamburstuen also shared the stocks of Ghanese cellular communication firm 
Scancom, which Tamburstuen had built up from scratch. When these were sold in 
2003 Granli made NOK 2 million from the sale, but Granli maintains that 
Tamburstuen also sold part of his stocks in 2001 when Scancom majority owner 
Investcom took over payment obligations on one of Tamburstuen’s loans in 
addition to providing Tamburstuen with more than NOK 1 million in cash. 
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Tamburstuen claims this was an appreciation of his efforts as entrepreneur and 
chairman of the board in Ghana, that no stocks were sold and that neither Tele 2 
Nornett nor Granli had any right to this money. He maintained in court that part of 
the settlement from Investcom was a loan that would later be remitted. 
Tamburstuen was convicted of fraud and disloyalty towards WorldCom. 
(Gottschalk 2010b) (NTB 2007)  
 
The T5PC Case 
In connection with the collapse of the T5PC pyramid network Økokrim charged 
three individuals, among them Jørn Tagge. Two issues were emphasized. One 
concerned the draining of financial assets paid in by members of the community, 
the other the provision of wrongful information in connection with the sale of 
stocks in the company. Tagge had previously been charged with other offences in 
connection with this same company. (NTB 2006) 
The first part of the new indictment refers to the purchase of broker firm 
Exente Securities in the fall of 2003. The company was to be in charge of trade of 
T5PC stocks. In connection with this purchase three individuals were charged 
with disloyalty and embezzlement of NOK 15, 13 and 3.2 million respectively. In 
addition one of the three was charged with manipulating the exchange rate of 
T5PC stock. (NTB 2006) 
One of the T5PC founders, Jim Alexander Wolden, was put under 
Økokrim investigation for attempted fraud in connection with the pyramid. 
Following the bankruptcy many believed there had been no actual business 
activity in T5PC, and that the money invested in good faith by so many had in fact 
merely been channeled directly into the pockets of a few senior members. 
(Nadheim 2004)  
The bankruptcy also included the other two companies in the T5PC 
system: The 5 Percent Community Invest and The 5 Percent Community Global. 
All of the T5PC companies were pyramid companies in essence, but they were 
organized as limited corporations. This implied that they were also subject to the 
Corporation Act, a fact that did not serve them well during the court case. In 2003 
the T5PC founders sold their T5PC Invest AS stocks to T5PC Global Market AS 
for at total of approximately NOK 25 million. The stocks were then sold on from 
T5PC Global Market AS to T5PC members. The sale was, however, not recorded 
as such in T5PC Global Market AS ledgers, but instead was recorded as 
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purchased goodwill. This transaction is a violation of the Corporation Act, and 
therefore it was concealed in the ledgers by simply being labeled as goodwill. 
This resulted in the annual report appearing to contain vastly more promising 
profits than was actually the case. (Økokrim 2007) (Nadheim 2004)  
The bankruptcy was a result of their auditor, Systemrevisjon AS, 
withdrawing from the company. T5PC were unable to find a replacement, and so 
the company was forcibly dissolved. The annual report for 2003 concludes that 
internal controls had been severely lacking, and that this had made it impossible to 
implement those auditing procedures necessary to confirm that the accounts did 
not contain significant errors. (Nadheim 2004) A former accountant was convicted 
of participating in accounting manipulation. (Økokrim 2007)  
 
The Øye Case 
When the dotcom bubble burst in 2000 most of the substantial fortune of Thomas 
Øye evaporated. Later that year he had acquired some NOK 72 million in personal 
debts and had to sell most of his belongings. During this time he became 
acquainted with several of Oslo’s torpedoes, a term coined for Norwegian 
―muscle‖ collectors of usury debts, although he had nothing to pay them with. 
Some have speculated that he was forced into money laundering instead, and that 
this was why he was presented with a briefcase containing NOK 5 million from 
David Toska, a known accomplice of the NOKAS robbery, in 2001. The money is 
thought to have been intended to be sent through Øye’s intricate network of 
nominees (stråselskap) for laundering. For this he was convicted. (Kristiansen 
2009)  
 Companies controlled by investor Thomas Øye where found to be behind 
a transaction of NOK 20 million hid by law firm Thommessen. Thommessen 
denied tax authorities access to the transaction, claiming it would be a breach of 
their confidentiality. Øye filed for personal bankruptcy in 2002 following his 
conviction for handling stolen goods, and the remnants of his estate were 
purchased by Svein Jønsson, a furniture dealer, and the two have since then been 
inseparable in financial matters. According to the newspaper Dagens Næringsliv it 
was Øye and Jønsson who were behind the transaction of NOK 20 million to 
Thommessen in 2007. The transaction was detected through a routine search by 
tax forensics. But the refusal by Thommessen to reveal any details has stopped tax 
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authorities from being able to fulfill their investigations based on their suspicions. 
(Dugstad and Larsen 2011)  
 In 2004 David Toska gave ―torpedo‖ Imran Saber authority to collect 
NOK 65 million from Thomas Øye. It was thought that this might be a collection 
of the NOK 5 million Øye had received from Toska in 2001, inflated by three 
years’ worth of usury rates. Øye is said to have offered to launder the NOKAS 
robbery service outcome, and supposedly offered the following laundering 
scheme: The money would be sent in batches of NOK 5 million into a Spanish 
bank. From there they would be transferred to Norwegian bank accounts. He 
suggested a fee for his services of 20 % of the laundered money, which was 
considered excessive. The laundering project, according to Saber, never happened, 
and more than NOK 50 million of the NOKAS money still has not been found. 
(Kristiansen 2009)  
 
The Taxi Case 
Mohammed Aslam was sentenced to two years in prison for undeclared cab 
driving, social security fraud, money smuggling and illegal possession of 
weapons. Before he was sentenced Aslam fled to Pakistan and has since never 
returned. Several more charges have since surfaced. The total sum of black labor 
he was responsible for, amounts to nearly NOK 100 million, and he is thought to 
have run a taxi business in several other names besides his own. In January of 
2011 Aftenposten disclosed that Aslam now has been granted a Pakistani 
citizenship and therefore cannot be extradited, as Norway and Pakistan do not  
have a mutual extradition treaty. (Haakaas 2011)  
 372 cab owners have been exposed of fraud since 2003. Of these, 341 
were clients of accountant Henry Amundsen, which has since been convicted. 
According to tax authorities he assisted in the evasion of NOK 625 million. The 
same case has uncovered systematic social security fraud and extensive fraud in 
connection with VAT, customs fees and insurance. (Haakaas 2010) Between 1998 
and 2003 Amundsen contributed to significantly lowering the taxable income of 
300 cab owners’ tax returns. (Henriksen 2010)  
 Confiscated material provides insight into the fraud methods of the case. 
The accounts were constructed with the intention of concealing income, thereby 
cutting taxes. The shift slip is the core of a cab owner’s accounts. It documents 
earned amounts, number of trips and distance travelled, and is printed from the 
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meter upon every change of driver. By composing false shift slips earnings could 
be reduced and undeclared income hidden. (Haakaas and Sæter 2010)  
After publishing an article on the recent redemption of the taxi business in 
Oslo in 1998, two Aftenposten journalists, Einar Haakaas and Kjetil Sæter, 
received a tip from a driver that they were misguided. The information was so 
improbable that the whistle-blower was not believed at first, but other indications 
some time later led them to dig deeper. A cab driver that still wishes to remain 
anonymous to all others than the governmental bodies he has been in touch with, 
was one of the original whistle-blowers in the case. He was one of several union 
activists that decided to uncover the way in which business was conducted in a 
substantial part of the taxi milieu in order to mitigate the poor working conditions 
most of them were subjected to. They went to Økokrim, the Labor Inspection and 
tax authorities with details concerning the fake numbers being reported as a means 
of tax evasion, and were finally taken seriously when Jan-Egil Kristiansen, head 
of the tax crime division of the Norwegian Tax Administration, was alerted to the 
case. Other whistle-blowers, such as Lars Morten Johnsen (deputy chairman of the 
Norwegian Transport Workers’ Union), were also instrumental in alerting the 
authorities. (Haakaas and Sæter 2010)  
  
The Bach Case 
Auditor Terje Strand Eriksen was convicted of participating in a NOK 10 million 
fraud as well as attempted fraud of NOK 5 million. The conviction included 
document forgery. In the verdict Strand Eriksen was made responsible for several 
of the criminal violations committed by Ole Christian Bach, whom he had worked 
for previously. Millionaire Svein Erik Bakke maintained that Strand Eriksen 
willingly had transported fake mortgage bonds that Bach used when he misled 
Bakke into giving him a loan. Strand Eriksen was also indicted for having been an 
accomplice in the many frauds of Bach, an allegation Strand Eriksen denied, 
claiming that his signature had been forged. Bach was indicted for frauds worth 
NOK 65 million, but the case was not pursued after Bach ended his life in Sweden 
in 2005. Strand Eriksen was sentenced to pay retribution to Bakke of NOK 5 
million. (Henriksen 2008) (Sunnanå 2006)  
 Bach had since the 1980s been in sporadic contact with the police for 
luring loans out of potential investors, claiming them to be investments with 
substantial returns. In reality the money received was used to repay Bach’s debt 
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from earlier, similar ventures, and substantial amounts disappeared due to avid 
private consumption on Bach’s part. As was established during a court hearing in 
1988, no accounts were drawn up depicting the various transactions and no 
receipts or witnesses were involved. Very little evidence existed that these alleged 
investments had even taken place but for the bank records of them. Allegations of 
tax evasion and fraud had also been made, but were not part of any indictment due 
to lacking evidence. (Gangdal 1996)  
Strand Eriksen still claims his innocence, and contends that he has been 
the victim of a focus on singular incidents taken out of their proper context, and 
that the investigation undertaken by Økokrim was lacking in both objectivity and 
relevance (Eriksen 2010).  
   
The Furuholmen Case 
Attorney Morten Furuholmen was charged with (and convicted of) receiving 
stolen property by assisting David Toska, later convicted in the NOKAS case, in 
retrieving NOK 5 million he had loaned to investor Thomas Øye and Zoran 
Obuskovic along with attorney Rune Berg. The court maintained that the 
attorneys knew that the money probably originated from criminal activity, and 
they were therefore found guilty. (Heyerdahl and Buan 2011) 
In 2005 David Toska was convicted of receiving stolen property, a total of 
NOK 5 million. The money was loaned to Thomas Øye, introduced above, in 
2001. The court stipulated that Toska, having no legitimate income and with a 
criminal record, could not have obtained the sum legally. This same loan, plus 
interest, is the one Furuholmen was convicted of recovering. The man it was to be 
collected from was Harald Undrum, who had provided surety for Øye. (Heyerdahl 
and Buan 2011) Undrum was said to have been present when the money, a 
suitcase full of cash, was handed over. The money was to be invested in a 
company, but most of it was instead spent by Thomas Øye and his circle. When 
Toska contacted Undrum to collect the money, he used his lawyer, Morten 
Furuholmen, as intermediary. (Molstad and Torgersen 2010) 
 
The Plastic Fantastic Case 
The Oslo police call them the Plastic Fantastic gang. Through the means of fake 
drivers’ licenses, credit cards and the like they extracted in excess of NOK 12.5 
million from various private accounts. If attempted frauds are included, the cases 
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amass to NOK 21.5 million. 16 indicated members of the gang were indicted, 
whereof police maintain that seven are core members. Prosecutor Knut Horn 
wanted them tried as an organized criminal group.  
The indictment names 62 fraud victims, many of them wealthy. The scam 
was supposedly developed while five of the charged individuals did time together 
at Bastøy, a prison facility outside Horten, and included identity theft. One of 
them was the alleged ringleader of the gang, Philip Holst-Cappelen (previously 
Andr Simjak and Philip Sigval Bergesen). With them was a young male who was 
later employed in the temp agency Adecco, through which he landed a job in the 
DnB NOR bank subsidiary Postbanken. From there he was instrumental in the 
scam. In 2002 Holst-Cappelen was sentenced to four and a half years in prison 
and fined NOK 21 million for a total of 120 criminal acts, among them fraud. 
(Jonassen, Magnussen and Dragland 2011) (NTB 2011) (Dugstad 2011c)  
 Holst-Cappelen is also suspected of blackmailing a millionaire in 
Stockholm and one in Gothenburg for a total of NOK 15.6 million. Swedish 
police instituted a search for him through Interpol, charging him with extortion. 
(NTB 2011) Holst-Cappelen was arrested in Spain in February 2011. The offences 
he has been charged with in Sweden are claimed to have occurred while he was a 
fugitive. (Dugstad 2011d)  
16 people were indicted for extensive fraud against DnB NOR of NOK 
12.5 million. The indictment also included attempted fraud of NOK 9 million. The 
frauds were committed by means of fake drivers licenses, credit cards and 
passports used to extract the assets of wealthy victims. (Hanssen 2010)  
 
The Olympia Case 
The Olympia case consists of complex dealings going back 11 years, of which 
former chairman of the board Haakon Korsgaard has been convicted. Disloyalty 
and breaches of the Assessment Act, the Accounting Act and the Companies Act 
are included. Korsgaard has throughout the process claimed his innocence, and he 
still does. (Berglihn 2011c) The Olympia group’s main business endeavor was the 
purchasing of defaulted loans and collecting the receivables. (Gimmestad 2003) 
Korsgaard was charged with disloyalty of NOK 70 million and tax fraud as well 
as violations of the Accounting Act and the Company Act. (NTB 2010)  
 The 2009 annual report was delivered eight months late, but the company 
auditor cannot make assurance that the report is sound. Following the financial 
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crisis of 2008, Olympia reached an annual deficit of nearly NOK 1 billion, and 
2009 was not all that much better. The company auditor clearly stated that due to 
the weak routines and internal controls it was not possible to follow through with 
the auditing procedures needed to provide a positive and clean auditing report and 
to provide assurance of company assets, debt and income statement items. The 
board of directors maintained that the accounts were correct and complete. 
(Berglihn 2011a)  
 Central to the case against Korsgaard was an unsecured loan of more than 
NOK 50 million that Olympia Holding provided for a company in Gibraltar by the 
name of Lloyds. The court concluded that this company was controlled by 
Korsgaard, and that the money was used to purchase stock in the Swedish 
company Cognition AB, controlled by financier Christen Ager-Hanssen. In the 
winter of 2003, following a falling out with Korsgaard, Ager-Hanssen blew the 
whistle and alerted Økokrim to the case. (Berglihn 2011c)  
 
The Hells Angels Case 
Police had for years sought to indict Leif Ivar Kristiansen, assumed leader of 
Hells Angels in Norway, according to the mafia paragraphs of the Norwegian 
penal code. In early 2011 police apprehended Kristiansen and subsequently raided 
three tattoo parlors in Lillehammer, Tromsø and Trondheim in addition to Hells 
Angel’s premises at Trolla. He was charged with handling stolen goods and 
breaches of the Assessment Act in connection with the tattoo businesses. The 
parlors ransacked are part of the Hells Angels system, but Kristiansen is the 
central figure of the case according to police superintendent Egil Gabrielsen in 
Sør-Trøndelag police district.  
 In late 2010 Kristiansen was again indicted according to the mafia 
paragraphs. The police this time focused on attempting to follow Kristiansen’s 
money trails. The case started out as a drug case in 2009 when Kristiansen 
allegedly had a 21 year old co-defendant transport 9.9 kg of hashish from Oslo to 
Trondheim. Kristiansen’s indictment also contained charges of robbery of NOK 
480,000, money he demanded as a replacement for the confiscated hashish. His 
defender, attorney Morten Furuholmen, says the case concerns economic issues 
such as accounts and ledgers and Kristiansen’s commercial activities. (Klungtveit 
and Thømt Ruud 2011) (Kristiansen 2009)  
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The Screen Communication Case 
Entrepreneur Svein Kvarving was accused of systematic corruption and disloyalty 
towards his own company, Screen Communication AS. Screen Communication 
sold airport advertising. The company sales director was indicted for similar 
offences in a case that includes several well-known businesses. The indictment 
describes a business culture where bribes were common, as was the use of goods 
and services rather than monetary compensation. Kvarving supposedly accepted 
engagement rings as payment for airport advertising sold by Screen 
Communication, and his sales director was accused of accepting laser eye surgery 
as compensation. The extensive indictment contains two main points. The first is 
the corruption charges, which include a number of profiled businesses. At least 
twelve Norwegian business leaders were under investigation for having accepted 
personal gifts from Kvarving and his sales director when airport advertising deals 
were made. The investigation unearthed that marketing managers were offered flat 
screen TVs and other equipment via e-mail in connection with business deals. The 
second point concerns disloyalty. The subsequent investigation concluded that 
Kvarving and the sales director had renowned firms pay in valuable goods for big 
screen commercials. The goods were kept by the two instead of being transferred 
back to Screen Communication. The accused allegedly secured NOK 3 million in 
this way.  
 Kvarving was also accused of violating the Accounting Act, the 
Assessment Act and for evading VAT. He confessed to some allegations, but 
firmly denied the charges of corruption. Prosecutor Susie Bergstrand maintains 
that the clients who accepted flat screen TVs are clearly guilty of corruption, and 
several court cases would follow in the wake of the Kvarving investigation. 
According to prosecutor Evy Bidtnes this form of payment is legal in essence, but 
that this form of settlement may have accounting consequences that warrant 
further investigation to ensure proper handling. (Kringstad 2007)  
 The final conviction of Kvarving contained charges of accounting fraud, 
disloyalty and 21 accounts of corruption as well as violations of VAT legislature 
and tax regulations. The offences took place between 1999 and 2006, and ten 
people have been found guilty of accepting bribes. In the district court hearings 
the judge was accompanied by two fellow judges with auditing expertise. (Laugen 
2009)  
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The Mjelde Case 
Perpetually bankrupt Per Harald Mjelde was sentenced to prison for 
embezzlement and disloyalty of approximately NOK 8 million in connection with 
Næringslivets Innkjøpsorganisasjon, a company that was one of the largest 
bankruptcies in Norway in 1996, the year it went under. Mjelde is behind more 
than a dozen bankruptcies and has previously been sentenced to two periods of 
disqualification. The appeal court concluded that Mjelde, through his dealings was 
proven unfit to engage in commercial activities. Mjelde was also sentenced to pay 
retribution to Stavanger Energi AS of NOK 3.5 million. (Farbrot 2002)  
 
The Jewel Case 
Diamond trader Ezra Murad was convicted of swindling Kreditkassen bank of 
NOK 21 million. By means of worthless gemstones several members of the Karoli 
family were able to withdraw more than NOK 20 million from the Norges Bank 
headquarters in 1989, but their fraud was exposed. Murad was found guilty as an 
accomplice (Jonassen 2006) for having issued the appraisal letters that enabled the 
fraudulent scheme (Heltne 1991) by acting as collateral for the withdrawals 
(NTBtekst 1991b). Murad claims that the stones he appraised to a total worth of 
NOK 149 million were not identical with those shown in court during the trial. 
These had been valued at some hundred thousand NOK by an independent 
appraiser. (Bøhm-Pedersen 1991)  
 The Karoli brothers Erik Jan ―Jannek‖ Karlsen and Jan Roger ―Dolla‖ 
Karlsen were designated as the principals behind the fraud. By means of void 
bank drafts and excessively appraised diamonds NOK 25.1 million was extracted 
from Kreditkassen and Norges Bank via four separate withdrawals. The mitigating 
circumstance that the fraud would not have been possible to pull off had the 
internal controls of Kreditkassen been satisfactory was pointed out in the verdict. 
(NTBtekst 1991a)  
 
The Lichtenstein Case 
Former police officer Jan Erik Nilsen was arrested in Switzerland and extradited 
to Norway for several accounts of fraud, threats and forgery of documents. The 
most severe of the accusations concerned an alleged fraud of Douglas D. Troxel. 
Troxel, an American investor, was misled into investing USD 10 million 
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(approximately NOK 65 million) in one of Nilsen’s companies, Valkyrien. The 
money was transferred to an account the company held in DnB bank. Nilsen is to 
have lured Troxel with a promised return of 300 percent. Without revealing that 
the deal was fictitious, Nilsen spent the invested money. (Veiby 2007) (Hultgren 
2005)  
Nilsen was also charged with swindling an older couple of NOK 3 million 
in the 1990s, and in 2003 an amount closer to NOK 14.5 million was transferred 
from Banco Adamas in Lugano to an account in Nilsen’s name. The money was 
assumed to be proceeds from criminal activity. The indictment was later extended 
to include a fraud of USD 2 million. From Nilsen’s various schemes tens of 
millions of NOK have disappeared. Of the NOK 67 million Økokrim found, 48 
million was confiscated by the Norwegian government. The remaining 19 million 
had been spent by Nilsen.  
Nilsen is to have used fictitious letters from Hypo Investment Bank in 
Lichtenstein to lure his investors. A fake document confirmed that Nilsen had an 
account in this bank containing USD 34.4 million. Fake transfers from Hypo 
Investment Bank to an account in Lichtenstein Global Trust Bank (LGT Bank) 
acted as part of the documentation. (Hultgren 2005)  
 
The Ugland Case 
In 2006 the Ugland group concludes a deal with Olympia Holding, owned by 
Haakon Korsgaard, concerning the shipping division of the Ugland group, for 
which Olympia Holding provided Ugland with a loan of USD 3.6 million. In 2007 
Korsgaard commences the process of selling off the shipping branch of their 
enterprise, and in January of 2008 Kjell Rune Staddeland signed on behalf of the 
Ugland group with Indian Siva Ventures. Ugland received USD 202 million, of 
which Staddeland was given a bonus of NOK 12.6 million, while partner and co-
owner Olympia Holding is to be given USD 39.45 million. This division of 
proceeds had been agreed upon before the deal was closed. The following month 
the balances are to be settled between Ugland and Olympia. Ugland pays Olympia 
NOK 39.45 million in addition to the USD 3.6 million loan, but have also agreed 
that USD 3.6 million was to be given back to Ugland as a commission. This part 
of the deal was kept from the board of directors. In March Olympia Holding is 
told that the commission is to be paid to two companies owned by CEO Kjell 
Rune Staddeland (USD 2.4 million) and CFO Jan Erik Tønnessen (USD 1.2 
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million). Staddeland claims that Johan Benad Ugland has given oral consent to 
this arrangement, something which Ugland later denied. In November Staddeland 
is fired, and in December the board of directors is made aware of the commission. 
Tønnessen pays back his USD 1.2 million to Ugland and board member and 
lawyer Tom B. Knudsen enters into negotiations with Staddeland, having been 
asked by the board of directors to investigate.  
When Siva bought the shipping division in 2008 they also paid USD 62 
million for Olympia’s rights to Ugland without Olympia being aware of this. 
Olympia was given only USD 39.45 million from Ugland, and demand that the 
difference of USD 22.55 million is paid back in full in addition to the USD 3.6 
million commission. In May 2009 Ugland files fraud charges against Staddeland, 
who in turn demands NOK 5 million as a final settlement and NOK 125 million as 
payment for stock Staddeland held in Ugland Holding. In July Ugland demand 
that Staddeland repay his bonus (NOK 12.6 million) and commission (USD 2.4 
million) and that his stock in the company is to be transferred to Johan Benad 
Ugland at cost less received dividends (approximately NOK 16 million). In 
December Kjell Rune Staddeland is found guilty of fraud and the above demands 
of Ugland are granted.  
Olympia and Ager-Hanssen also sued Ugland CFO Jan Erik Tønnessen for 
USD 3.6 million, the same money Kjell Rune Staddeland was convicted of 
stealing from Ugland, because they believed that Tønnessen was the architect 
behind the alleged swindling of Olympia. The Ugland system countered this move 
by in turn submitting a claim of USD 40 million against Olympia, claiming that 
Olympia never should have had a piece of the profits from the Indian sale in the 
first place. (Berglihn and Madsen 2011) (Berglihn 2011b) (Berglihn 2010)   
 Witnesses from the board of directors and management at Ugland, and 
police investigators agree that CFO Jan Erik Tønnessen was the instigator to an 
investigation. Tønnessen had received USD 1.2 million, but had not been given 
written consent to this transfer by Johan Benad Ugland. When Staddeland was 
fired, he went to Ugland’s son, Johan Martin Ugland, with this information, upon 
which Ugland senior was also informed. Tønnessen subsequently authored a 
notification letter on the matter and Ugland attorney Tom B. Knudsen was asked 
to initiate an investigation. (Berglihn and Madsen 2011) (Berglihn 2011b)  
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The Tjøntveit Case  
Thor Kristen Tjøntveit was suspected of VAT fraud from the sale of machinery 
between several of his own companies in 2002, but escaped, and then spent 
several years abroad on the run. In 2005 he turned himself in, and was convicted 
and given a prison sentence. The verdict is not final even though Tjøntveit has 
served his sentence. Tjøntveit has since the early 1970s been involved in a number 
of bankruptcies and lawsuits. (Sunnanå and Bakke Foss 2011)  
 
The Dønnum Case 
Used car salesman Tord Dønnum was convicted of extensive and cunning tax 
fraud for evasion of taxes and fees in connection with the sale and purchase of 
used cars through Bryn Bilforretning. Dønnum admits to leaving much of his 
business undeclared, utilizing double contracts and misleading accounting. 
Accounting practices were tailored to hide his offences. In the period covered by 
the indictment, 1999 to 2003, Dønnum confesses to having sold approximately 
590 cars without declaring the sales, amounting to a gross turnover of about NOK 
74 million. This means that the undeclared part of turnover in this period was 
about one third of total turnover, and that Dønnum evaded a total income of little 
less than NOK 13 million from taxation. Cash settlements and bank drafts were 
kept off the books, and in the cases where customers paid by bank transaction to 
the company account, potentially evaded car sales were made legal by recording 
previous sales at the same time as these. According to Dønnum’s statement he has 
run his business in this way since its start-up in 1986.  
The accounts were penned by Dønnum’s brother, who was acquitted as an 
accomplice in the evasion scheme but was convicted for violations of the 
Accounting Act. When the case emerged in 2007 the treasurer office contended 
that Dønnum had evaded sales proceeds of close to a quarter of NOK 1 billion, 
but the verdict states that the tax law and criminal law viewpoints are essentially 
different. Bryn Bilforretning was declared bankrupt by the treasurer office, and an 
investigation by The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway was commenced 
when it was alleged that auditors indirectly approved of tax evasions. It was 
claimed that the auditing function had performed below par in not recognizing the 
evasions. (Sæter 2011)  
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The Vest Tank Case 
On 24th of May in 2007 one of Vest Tank’s tanks exploded in Sløvåg, Norway. 
No one was harmed in the blast, but neighbors later complained of aftershocks 
from the emissions. Vest Tank was owned by Trond Emblem’s companies 
Emblem Holding AS and Emblem Eiendom AS, but was sold the day before the 
explosion to the Alexela group in Estonia, upon which the name of the company 
was changed to Alexela Sløvåg. Alexela sued Emblem’s companies and was 
granted retribution of more than NOK 100 million, and later also sued Emblem as 
chairman of the board and Jostein Berland, his general manager. (Solem 2011c)  
 Berland still maintains that the verdict convicting him is incorrect, and 
remains incredulous that it has been passed, in spite of the factual evidence and 
documentation presented during the trial that he feels mitigates his negative role 
in the case, such as risk analyses and action plans. Most were lost in the 
explosion, but some remain. He claims it has now been proven that Trafigura 
misled Vest Tank by delivering large quantities of toxic methanol in their waste 
liquid, and further that Vest Tank would not have accommodated Trafigura had 
they had information showing the actual contents they needed cleaned. (Berland 
2011)  
The appeal court verdict concludes that Vest Tank illegally received 
dangerous waste in the fall of 2006 and in the spring of 2007, and that the 
treatment of this waste led to the explosion. (NTBtekst 2011) A third employee 
was acquitted of his dealings with Vest Tank. He was employed temporarily as a 
consultant advising on the processes that led to the explosion without the proper 
qualifications, but was deemed peripheral to the case and subject to the mitigating 
circumstance of a highly unclear job description. (VestNytt 2011)  
 
The Restaurant Case 
After just seven months of business the debt collection requirements against 
Skovveien Restaurantdrift already abounded. According to Dun & Bradstreet at 
least 25 creditors announced their claims in the company, which in total amounted 
to about NOK 360,000. Norplan Storkjøkken filed a bankruptcy petition following 
an unpaid invoice of NOK 51,000, as did Åpent Bakeri following a somewhat 
smaller claim. General Manager of Skovveien Restaurantdrift, Johan Erkkilä, 
claimed not to be involved in financial matters, and referred instead to Knut 
Stundal, who was in charge of the finances of the company. Erkkilä is the listed 
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owner of the company along with Peter Olausson. Olausson, however, left the 
company in 2007. Skovveien Restaurantdrift attorney Harald Ciarlo informed that 
a deal was struck with Norplan concerning repayment, and that the bankruptcy 
petition would therefore be withdrawn. Ciarlo did not make additional statements 
as to the financial situation of his client company. (Stabæk 2007)  
The petition, however, was not withdrawn, and the company was declared 
bankrupt in 2007. Erkkilä and Olausson were given prison sentences for breaches 
of bookkeeping regulations, for having neglected to petition for the opening of 
debt negotiations with creditors following the declaration of bankruptcy, and for 
having given false statements to authorities. The court verdict described how 
Erkkilä and Olausson had listed themselves as owners of Skovveien 
Restaurantdrift when applying for their liquor license despite the fact that the 
company Metro Invest was the actual stock owner. Behind Metro Invest was  
Ole-Fredrik Jonsbråten, with four bankruptcies and two disqualifications to his 
name. (Gottschalk 2011a)  
 
The Insider Case 
Journalist Thomas Gulbrandsen was indicted by Økokrim for having shared inside 
information. In January of 2006 he had acquired knowledge that some colleagues 
were working on a piece on Det Norske Oljeselskap (DNO) and its relation to the 
government in Iraq. The information in the hands of the editorial staff was 
allegedly harmful to DNO, so much so that its release would send the stock prices 
down. Gulbrandsen was accused of sharing this information with his father and a 
broker at Pareto that the article would be published, and subsequently father and 
son supposedly sold enough DNO stocks to provide them with a profit of NOK 
3.4 million. Gulbrandsen’s father, Hallvard Gulbrandsen, supposedly repurchased 
his share after the price dip.  
During the court case Økokrim emphasized that it was not the contents of 
the article that was defined as inside information, but rather the knowledge that it 
would be published. This would mean that every member of the editorial staff had 
access to the inside information. TV 2 Nettavisen, in which Gulbrandsen was duty 
officer in 2006, did not have regulations forbidding staff from trading in stocks. 
Gulbrandsen was, however, bound by editorial ethics not to exploit his position to 
achieve private benefits and to avoid bindings that may lead to conflicts of 
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interest. The sale or purchase of stocks in companies the staff are covering, is in 
violation of these ethics and provisions. (Omdal 2009)  
In the wake of the indictment against Gulbrandsen, Økokrim and envoys 
from The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway raided Pareto offices 
following the accusation that Pareto broker Per-Robert Jacobsen was to have 
shared inside information with Gulbrandsen and clients of Pareto. (Jensen and 
Vanvik 2007)  
 
The Bank Case 
Hjelmeland Sparebank submitted retribution claims of NOK 90.5 million against 
the former head of the retail division, Ståle Halsne, who was charged with 
disloyalty against his former employer. He was charged with exceeding his credit 
facilities and authority, and with transferring NOK 63 million in loans and credits 
to thirteen companies investing in vacation apartments abroad in 2008. Most of 
these were bankrupt or under forced liquidation. Halsne did not object to having 
granted credit in the magnitude illustrated in the indictment, but denied having 
willingly swindled his employer or having done so with the purpose of profit, as is 
the condition for conviction of disloyalty. (Næss 2011b)  
Geir Underbakke was the chairman of the board and Kurt Svendheim was 
the general manager of all the companies included in the indictment. (Næss 
2011b) During the court case Halsne explained that he had been approached by 
Underbakke, who wished to set up a company that would invest in condos, sublet 
them and then sell them with a profit. Halsne was led to believe that they had 
received loan commitments from other banks but that they wished to keep parts of 
their business in a bank they had an established personal relationship with. 
Underbakke had an account in Hjelmeland Sparebank at the time. Halsne was told 
that they would be interjecting between NOK 2.2 and 2.4 million in share capital 
and that they would need a loan of an additional NOK 2.5 million. This was 
judged as a solid equity to debt ratio by Halsne. Soon after their first deal 
Underbakke wished to create company number two. Halsne was not done with the 
necessary paperwork for company number one, having made an initial mistake 
which needed time correcting. As still more companies were established, he had 
colleagues at the bank set up accounts for the payment of share capital, and in 
time lost his overview of the deals.  
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While on vacation Halsne was contacted by Underbakke informing him 
that they would be late with their down payments. At the same time the contractor 
warned him that construction work would be aborted unless payment was 
received. Halsne made sure the payments were made regardless of lacking 
incoming down payments from Underbakke. In addition, nine months passed from 
the granting of the loans and till the bail statements were signed, something which 
Halsne justified with an extraordinary work load. During questioning it became 
clear that Halsne had not performed credit checks of those providing surety. 
Underbakke’s word on the matter was trusted. (Næss 2011a)  
 
The Joker Case 
Merchant Sajid Hussain was accused of exploiting illegal immigrants, letting 
them work for pittance while living in a basement and eating the food he was 
unable to sell.  
The case was uncovered when a Nepalese woman reported one of 
Hussain’s Joker stores as her place of employment upon being apprehended in a 
ticket control post on the metro. Her identification papers were fakes. Police 
subsequently raided four Spar and Joker convenience stores run by Hussain and 
found illegally employed immigrants in all of them. Three individuals had 
submitted false work permits. Hussain admitted to letting a couple work for no 
pay against free lodgings in the basement, which in his eyes was a favor to the two 
and something his attorney therefore characterized as unintentional exploitation at 
worst. The court concluded that Hussain had exploited four immigrants by having 
them work 13 hour days for below tariff wages. He was sentenced to serve eight 
months in prison and to confiscation of NOK 700,000, which corresponded to the 
assumed economic gain of the scheme. (Solem 2011d)  
 
The Apartment Case 
Attorney Kenneth Jøranli was convicted of disloyalty towards a client and making 
a false statement to a public body. (Solem 2011b) He was acquitted of two other 
instances of document forgery. Jøranli was a partner in the law firm Advokat 
Direkte. Jøranli was engaged as attorney for an 83 year old woman in 2009 to 
assist in the planning of her funeral and inheritance settlement. Two months later 
the client’s apartment in Oslo was transferred to Jøranli for the price of NOK 1. 
(Solem 2011a)  
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The Martinsen Case 
Lars-Erik Martinsen, a bank teller at Nordea, confessed to draining the account of 
Block Watne widow Randi Nilsen, thereby cheating Nordea of nearly NOK 90 
million.  Police maintain that Martinsen was merely acting on behalf of others 
when swindling the bank. The five other individuals indicted for the same offence 
deny any association with the fraud. Martinsen was already indicted for a different 
case of fraud, to which he also confessed, when he was apprehended for the Block 
Watne offence. In 2009 he extracted NOK 4.7 million from the account of 
investor Eigil Stray Spetalen by use of fake identification papers. A fake letter of 
authority gave Martinsen the right of disposal of the account of Randi Nilsen. 
During the two weeks from July 20th to August 2nd Martinsen registered five 
transfer orders from Nilsen’s account in various Nordea branches. The amounts 
varied from NOK 12 to 27 million, and yet the scheme was not detected until two 
weeks later. At the last minute the final transaction of NOK 25.4 million was 
stopped. A total of NOK 93 million was extracted and sent to accounts in Dubai, 
some via Martinsen’s private account. NOK 60 million is still missing.  
Police found Martinsen through the trace he left when logging in to view 
Nilsen’s account details. He was thereafter suspected of being behind the false 
letter of authority giving him permission to manage the account. Via electronic 
traces and communication control the network Martinsen was a part of was 
uncovered, among them the 49 year old woman posing as Nilsen when the letter 
of authority was signed. All six members of the fraud team were indicted 
according to the mafia paragraph of the penal code, implying that the scheme was 
deemed well organized and conducted by a larger criminal group. Martinsen 
supposedly received NOK 380,000 as payment for participating in the fraud, and 
this modest amount was considered a mitigating circumstance in his sentencing. 
Nordea covered the loss following the fraud, making the bank the offended party 
in the case. (Dugstad 2011b) (Dugstad 2011a)  
 
The Mohr Case 
August Christian Wilhelm Mohr was sentenced to prison in 2002 for extensive 
fraud and attempted fraud of foreign investors amounting to several billion NOK. 
Mohr offered them high-yield securities that were not deemed feasible by the 
court. (Gedde-Dahl 2006) Mohr was also deprived of his right to run an 
independent business and to hold positions as general manager or inhabit a seat on 
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a board of directors. (Lynum 2005) In addition Mohr must pay retribution of NOK 
5.5 million to an American bank. He was acquitted of attempted fraud of DnB 
bank, a case of attempted fraud in South Africa, and document forgery. (Haugnes 
2004)  
 
The Nielsen Case 
Jan du Menil Nielsen, former partner in renowned law firm Hodneland, was 
accused of, through the means of a series of representation statements, helping a 
client withdraw approximately NOK 50 million from several lenders without the 
proper collateral. Six times between April of 2001 and early 2003, Nielsen 
transferred money to the account of the client in question without having fulfilled 
his duties concerning representation statements. A partner at the firm, Per 
Hodneland, stated that he believed Nielsen’s initial mistake, although probably 
unintentional and not punishable by law, increased in severity when he was 
unwilling to admit to it and instead sought to repair the damage through a series of 
new mistakes which no longer would pass as negligent. All partners of the firm 
suffered personal losses of more than NOK 1 million because of Nielsen’s 
improper handling of the matter.  
Nielsen had been a trusted partner for more than 10 years when a personal 
letter was sent to the home address of each partner containing disturbing news 
from a bank. Hodneland was at the time a partnership with limited liability 
according to the courts of Justice Act. Income was divided according to the 
income each partner contributed to the firm, and partners had little insight into the 
clients of other partners and their ongoing management of client bank accounts. 
This meant that Nielsen had access to manage assets on the client accounts he was 
in charge of, which is in accordance with lawyer regulations. When the firm was 
discontinued the trustee appointed by Hodneland and creditors added all 
Hodneland assets, including all outstanding invoiced fee claims and the hourly 
fees not yet invoiced. Approximately six months’ worth of turnover plus all office 
inventory and three cars went into the undertow and was paid to Nielsen’s 
creditors. Upon being alerted about the Nielsen case, Hodneland contacted 
Aftenposten to ensure that the media coverage would include all relevant 
information. (Johnsen 2006)  
The client Nielsen was indicted with was former police officer Sturle 
Sandnes. Through Nielsen Sandnes was given substantial loans without sufficient 
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collateral, and, according to Aftenposten, banks and investors were swindled of a 
total of at least NOK 104 million. Among the aggrieved lenders were Gjensidige 
NOR, Nordlandsbanken, Fokus Bank and investors Lars B. Gjerde, Roar 
Mortensen and Helge Gundersen. Following the indictment both the chairman of 
the board and the auditor of Sandnes’ firm Kapitalfinans AS withdrew from their 
offices. Sandnes claims he was not involved in those functions of his business that 
were included in the indictment because he did not feel competent enough to 
handle them, and so these functions were outsourced to consultants. Lawyers and 
accountants allegedly controlled most aspects of his firm, and Sandnes expressed 
surprise upon learning about the irregularities. Sandnes denies having pressured 
Nielsen into transferring the means for the client account. (Jensen 2003)  
Auditors in charge of the forced liquidation of Kapitalfinans AS followed 
the money trail in the hopes of recovering parts of the assets transferred, and 
reported that the company in the course of a three year period spent NOK 8.2 
million on consultants and advisors. Auditor Svein Korsgården and his company 
System-Revisjon AS received NOK 4.65 million, but in the annual reports of 
System-Revisjon their total income amounted to NOK 3.6 million – more than 
NOK 1 million less than the fees from Kapitalfinans AS alone. Korsgården 
explained to the newspaper Aftenposten that this was because the NOK 4.65 
million included not only consulting fees but also money that would be paid on to 
creditors. These amounts were therefore not entered into System-Revisjon 
accounts. Korsgården further claimed that the services they provided 
Kapitalfinans with were strictly consulting services, and that they in no way had 
been given auditing tasks.  
The auditors handling the Kapitalfinans bankruptcy further claimed that 
the company had never been fully solvent, but that expenses were covered by the 
continual uptake of new loans. Of the millions Nielsen helped transfer to 
Kapitalfinans AS, NOK 11.4 million was paid out to Sturle Sandnes personally by 
means of checks that fail to stipulate what the payments were for. Nielsen’s fees 
amounted to NOK 910,000. About Nielsen it was remarked that he in practice 
functioned as the Kapitalfinans finance division. In addition to fraud and 
embezzlement the auditors also concluded that Nielsen and Sandnes were guilty 
of Accounting Act and Companies Act violations. (Jensen 2004)  
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The Olsvik Case 
Olaf Olsvik had previous run-ins with the law prior to the case that involved 
Næringslivets Opplysningstjeneste. Examples include the companies Team 
Trading and Spol, which was forcibly dissolved for lack of assigned auditor. He 
was recruited to Næringslivets Opplysningstjeneste, a billing operation, by an 
acquaintance. Their business consisted of mailing invoices to companies, which in 
exchange would be registered in their company register. An account was created 
for incoming payments. This account was emptied regularly by Olsvik, who in 
return kept 10 percent of the money. Everything was based on the premise that 
companies lacked control over invoice payments, and to avoid being labeled as 
catalogue fraudsters, they invented a product to sell. This product was a 
subscription service in which member companies could call if they needed 
information. The chosen business segment was modestly sized companies across 
the country, especially those that were thought to have a lenient invoicing policy. 
Each invoice amount was relatively small.  
The verdict passed concludes that Næringslivets Opplysningstjeneste was 
responsible for gross fraud of more than NOK 28.6 million as well as the handling 
of stolen goods and grave accounting violations. (Jahr 2005)  
 
The Document Case 
FrP politician Viggo Amundsen and former policeman Tor Smestad were 
convicted of staging a cover-up in order to get a real estate purchase approved. 
Amundsen realized that he would most likely not be granted approval from public 
authorities, and so, along with the former local chief of police, he went about it 
with the help of an intermediary, a fictitious deed and purchase contract.  The 
intermediary was also convicted. Two purchase contracts were drawn up. One was 
signed by Amundsen and the seller and stipulated a sum of NOK 3.3 million as 
well as confidentiality for all involved parties. The other was written a few days 
later and contained the names of a young couple with scarce financial means in 
need of housing and stipulated a purchase sum of NOK 2.9 million. This last 
contract was to be the official one, and would be submitted to the authorities with 
the license application. (Nygaard 2011)  
The license application was approved, but in the fall of 2008 the 
relationship between Amundsen and his helpers went sour. The young couple 
used the purchased farm as collateral for their private debt, and in so doing 
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claimed the property as their own. Amundsen was forced to present the real 
contract and covert deals in order to settle the matter with the courts. Those 
involved were convicted for false statements or participation in giving such. 
(Nygaard 2011)  
 
The Fortuna Case 
Ole Z. Børresen, Frode Trollebø and Knut Stark-Johansen were indicted for fraud, 
money laundering and VAT fraud of nearly NOK 100 million. The three have 
been associated with several companies, Fortuna Management being one of them. 
They have been involved in more than 30 bankruptcies. Entering into a number of 
companies by taking on board memberships and management tasks, they gained 
access to company means, which were then used to cover personal expenses, cash 
withdrawals and travels as well as using company assets as collateral for personal 
loans. Among the companies involved are Gyda Shipping, the investment 
company Alf R. Bjerke & Co., luxury restaurant Acqua, supplement producer 
Aminotech and cellular operator Fix Telecom.  
Among the more severe cases the verdict from the Oslo district court 
emphasizes the swindling of Einar Nistad (78), a convenience store millionaire. 
The court base their ruling on the fact that Nistad’s impaired lucidity following a 
stroke made him particularly vulnerable, and that the fraud has had severe 
economic consequences for Nistad. During the trial it was established that the trio 
had misled Nistad into transferring NOK 15.6 million to companies controlled by 
Børresen, Trollebø and Stark-Johansen. Nistad thought he was investing in 
technology projects, but according to Økokrim the money was spent on private 
consumption and the settling of debts. (Dugstad and Flæte 2011)  
Among the companies subjected to this series of frauds was Aminotech 
(now Zymtech Productions). In December of 2006, Aminotech’s general manager 
and chairman of the board, William Gram, handed over a number of documents to 
Oslo police documenting how the trio had made a series of withdrawals from 
company accounts without having a claim to the money. Gram informs that the 
company had put substantial effort into preparing the information they handed 
over to the authorities. Police conducted an immediate raid of the offices of the 
trio, but nothing more happened. The case was dropped in September of 2007. 
Gram was disappointed, and thinks the complex case containing a vast amount of 
companies and transactions kept Oslo police from following through. However, 
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this was not the first time police had been alerted to the workings of the trio. 
Companies led by one or several of the indicted, had on numerous occasions 
reported suspicions of asset draining. All of the incidents were dropped before 
charges were filed.  
In October of 2007 Aminotech management went to Økokrim with their 
material, this time resulting in a full investigation. Lawyer Berit Reiss-Andersen, 
who helped Aminotech with their second filing of charges, expressed surprise 
about the Oslo police not forwarding the case to Økokrim on their own account. 
The fact that the case in the end led to such a severe conviction makes this rather 
unsettling. In April of 2008 Økokrim filed charges in the case, leading to 
sentences of six years’ imprisonment. Senior public prosecutor Bård Thorsen 
stated that the case had been a complex one to investigate, both in terms of time 
and resources. (Bjørklund and Dugstad 2011)  
 
The Tordenskjold Case 
The municipal court of Oslo contend that ship-owner Tor Johan Stuve, brother of 
the formerly mentioned Ragnhild Stuve of the Stuve case, tested the loyalty of 
employees and whether or not they would fit in an environment with a hostile 
attitude towards tax by paying them off the books (evading tax). Fraud of NOK 
150 million connected to sales and purchases of three ships and a pump were the 
central elements of the extensive criminal trial against Stuve. Among the 
violations he was convicted of is violation of the Assessment Act by not reporting 
NOK 600,000 of payments to employees to the tax authorities. His business 
partner, Petter Hellevik, was sentenced for embezzlement and fraud, and former 
Tordenskjold director Susann Kolbjørnsen was convicted of several violations of 
the Assessment Act, the Accounting Act and Norwegian penal code. In addition, 
former head of Storebrand Bank, Håkon Roska, was convicted for having taken 
bribes of NOK 150,000 from Stuve or companies controlled by Stuve, and for 
having transferred NOK 200,000 against the interests of the bank. The violations 
were uncovered in connection with the bankruptcy of shipping firm Tordenskjold 
in 2008. (Vanvik 2010)  
 
The BA-HR Case 
Kari Breirem, director of renowned law firm BA-HR, is asked to pay an invoice to 
Tønne Consult, a consulting firm owned and run by Tore Tønne. She is informed 
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that in reality, Aker RGI owes Tønne the money, but that it is to be paid by BA-
HR in order to hide disqualification on Tønne’s part. This supposed 
disqualification relates to Tønne’s role in the takeover of Kværner, and this 
solution is the brainchild of Anders Eckhoff of BA-HR. Tønne Consult is due 
NOK 1.5 million, but the internal invoice basis shows an effort on BA-HR’s part 
of only NOK 540,000. On the timesheet accompanying the invoice that is sent 
out, the fees per hour of effort are escalated in order for the total to reach NOK 1.5 
million. In other words, Tønne Consult has billed BA-HR NOK 1.5 million and 
BA-HR in turn have sought reimbursement by billing the real receiver of the 
invoice three times the normal rate for a given amount of effort. It therefore 
appears as if Tore Tønne was employed by BA-HR rather than Aker RGI. 
According to Breirem, this borders on money laundering and outright forgery. 
Tønne was a minister in Jens Stoltenberg’s first government. Was this a success 
fee for lobbying?  
 A memo clarifying the basis for the invoice from the viewpoint of BA-HR 
tells the following story: Up until November of 2001 Aker Maritime (AMA) were 
seeking to become majority owners of Kværner ASA (KVI). Besides acting as 
legal and strategic counsel for AMA, BA-HR also had a coordinating role in 
relation to other consultants. Tore Tønne was taken on to advise on the handling 
of the relationship towards the Norwegian government and to lobby against LO 
and other interest groups to ensure support for AMA becoming the majority 
owner of KVI. His fee was to depend on the extensiveness of his work and its 
outcome. As CEO of Norway Seafood ASA (NWS) Tore Tønne was granted a 
loan from parent company Aker RGI. When Tønne was selected as a board 
member of KVI, Kjell Inge Røkke informed BA-HR of the two unsettled balances 
with Tønne (the loan and the consulting fee). The legal opinion of BA-HR was 
that the two unsettled balances did not imply disqualification on Tønne’s part if he 
as a board member of KVI was to participate in issues relating to the relationship 
with Aker RGI. To avoid this even being seen as an issue, BA-HR recommended 
that the balances were settled, and the proposition was that Tønne would provide a 
down payment that equaled his consulting fee. Due to the scope of his efforts and 
the outcome for AMA, Tønne Consult was granted a remuneration of NOK 1.5 
million, and this payment was administered by BA-HR, partly due to BA-HR’s 
role as consulting coordinator and partly to ensure that the amount was utilized as 
a down payment. Aker RGI had in advance paid the NOK 1.5 million to BA-HR.  
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This would seem to imply that Tønne was indebted to Røkke during his 
time as a minister. According to Aftenposten, BA-HR later reproached themselves 
for sending an invoice that was unclear regarding the actual sender and receiver. 
On December 20th 2002 Økokrim informed Tønne’s lawyer, Olav Braaten, that 
Tønne would be indicted for involuntary fraud. The next day Tønne was reported 
dead, and the charges were subsequently dropped.  
A BA-HR employee (now a partner), Øyvind Eriksen, was fined NOK 
50,000 for the forged invoice. When this fine is left unpaid Økokrim indicted 
Eriksen, but in July it was decided that Eriksen would be allowed to pay the fine, 
and the case was dropped. Breirem learned she was given a leave of absence 
through a press release, and sued BA-HR for wrongful termination. She was later 
offered a settlement which she accepted. (Breirem 2008)  
Kjell Inge Røkke contests that Tønne had a loan in one of his companies 
during his period in the government. (Hippe 2003)  
The case was uncovered when Breirem refused to attest and pay the 
abovementioned invoice. She alerted the board of directors that BA-HR was about 
to commit a criminal offence, but was not met in the way she had expected. 
Rather than being credited with raising an important matter, she was interpreted as 
threatening the board of directors, and given a leave of absence. The board of 
directors expressed that they did not see any irregularity in the way the invoice 
was to be handled. Breirem also believes that this may have cost Tore Tønne his 
life. Further, she contends that knowledge of the invoice was limited to the 
partners Eckhoff, Eriksen and Reed besides the finance manager and herself, 
which means that BA-HR as such was not necessarily a part of the violation. 
However, she felt quite sure that an alert auditor would uncover such a forgery.  
(Breirem 2008)  
 
The Pension Case 
The court case against the two former members of parliament Anders Talleraas 
and Magnus Stangeland, was the first of its kind. The prosecution contended that 
they had received an excessive amount of pension. Among the called witnesses in 
the case were four former prime ministers and seven former ministers. The 
indictment against Talleraas states that he, over a period of seven years, received a 
total of NOK 2.7 million more in parliamentary pension than he was entitled to. 
This miscalculation allegedly stemmed from Talleraas not providing the 
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parliamentary pension board with correct information concerning his income from 
various directorships. Stangeland was to have received NOK 536,000 in excess 
over a three year period because he did not report his salary from Bergen Yards, 
directors’ fees and the free use of a company car. Both were therefore indicted 
according to the penal code clauses on inadvertent fraud.  
The pension plan they both received their payments from, was deemed to 
be lacking in provisions and implementation, which parliament is now working on 
correcting. Both Talleraas and Stangeland claimed to follow the guidelines they 
were provided with by parliament administration, but as former members of 
parliament with significant experience they would have been expected to take 
independent responsibility in considering the legitimacy and correctness of the 
pension payments they were bestowed. (Aftenposten 2010)  
The Office of the Auditor General of Norway concluded in 2008 that six 
former ministers had received pensions in violation of the income limit. The 
charged were dropped for four of the six accused, among them former Prime 
Ministers Kjell Magne Bondevik and Gro Harlem Brundtland. Both Talleraas and 
Stangeland were given prison sentences in the district court. (Grande 2011) 
According to Gunnar Magnus at Aftenposten this was the first involvement of the 
auditing function in this case. When the Auditor General issued a letter to 
Parliament about the matter, this issue subsequently received extensive media 
attention and led to Parliament initiating an investigation. This investigation made 
Økokrim file charges. However, the persons that received the most attention by 
the internal parliamentary investigation, were not concurrent with those the 
Auditor General had focused on. The Auditor General was subsequently criticized 
for their report, but Magnus believes that little doubt can exist regarding the fact 
that it was this report that instigated the entire investigation and the following 
indictments and convictions. The Auditor General had accounting and auditing 
professionals working on the case, and Magnus also finds it highly likely that such 
expertise was also included in the internal parliamentary investigation as well as 
in the Økokrim team that was involved at a later stage. However, the case was 
mostly concerned with legal interpretations of the regulations surrounding the 
pension in question, and not so much with financial dispositions uncovered by 
auditors. (Magnus 2011)  
Prosecutor Elisabeth Roscher maintained that the often lacking or absent 
internal controls are what lead to many of the frauds concerning public services, 
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claiming that this particular pension scheme was vulnerable because it was based 
on trust. The defense attorneys of Stangeland and Talleraas, on the other hand, 
claimed that the defendants merely received what was rightfully theirs. They were 
aware of the income limits associated with the pension scheme, but claimed not to 
know that sporadic income also was to be included rather than only fixed income.  
(Gunnar 2010)  
 
The Tromsdal Case 
Christer Tromsdal was, along with two others, accused of fraud amounting to 
NOK 34.5 million in connection with the sale of two hotels in Sweden. Økokrim 
maintained that Tromsdal willingly conned real estate investor Harald Lauritzen 
and his company Obbhult Invest into overpaying for Hotel Stavsjø and the 
company Fastningsstaden. Tromsdal supposedly manufactured documentation 
concerning assets and income to drive up the selling price. In reality the hotels 
were practically running at a deficit. The selling price of SEK 34.5 million was 
more than double of what the combined property values and incomes of the hotels 
amounted to. The performed valuations were false, the accounts inflated and 
confirmed by a fictitious auditor. In addition the sale was performed through an 
intermediary, leaving the buyer unaware that Tromsdal and his co-defendants 
were behind it. It was thought that this information might have substantially 
affected the purchasing decision. Tromsdal denied the charges. (Adresseavisen 
2010) (Agderposten 2010)  
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5. Findings and discussion 
5.1. Means of detection of white-collar crime 
After completion of the information collection on the cases included it became 
possible to map the various means of detection the cases displayed – for those 
cases where such information was available – and to count their prevalence. A 
histogram summarizing the findings this mapping unveiled, is shown below.  
 
 
 
In order to illustrate how this mapping was undertaken, some examples can be 
presented. Firstly, cases where enough information to draw conclusions on the 
detection mode were insufficient or absent have been left out. Out of an initial 
case body of 44 cases, 28 were deemed by raters to include sufficient information 
to draw conclusions regarding auditor involvement, and these provided the basis 
for the percentages shown above. A complete list of which cases were included 
and which were eliminated is included in the appendix. Secondly, in cases where 
several means of detection seemed to have operated in synergy, more than one 
mode was included in the counting in order to provide as much nuance as 
possible. For this reason the sum of percentages is not 100, and the calculation of 
percentages will only give a precise indication where one mode is indicated to 
have operated alone. However, they do give an accurate description of the 
prevalence of the respective modes of detection. For the purpose of answering the 
previously stated research questions our primary concern is with the detection 
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percentage of the auditing function category, which may be taken at face value 
since no other category was deemed to operate alongside it save for in one 
instance.  
The different categories of detection were introduced at an earlier point in 
the thesis, and will therefore not be repeated here. However, one important 
clarification should be noted: When an implicated party in the violation(s) is 
credited with alerting the media or authorities of the offence(s) (the Document 
case is an example) this is deemed to be an instance of whistle-blowing in the 
same way as when an outsider or colleague does the same.  
 Some reflections on the emerging patterns are in order. First of all, a 
detection percentage of roughly 11 percent for the auditing function category is 
substantially lower than the estimates given in extant literature and research 
(Albrecht, Albrecht and Dunn 2001) (Silverstone and Sheetz 2003), indicating 
that for Norwegian cases, auditing has an even less pronounced role in detection 
of white-collar crime than the measurements performed in the US, for example. 
Whether or not the result is significantly lower than hypothesized cannot be 
commented, as the study sample is neither complete nor random. Hypothesizing 
about why this may be so is left until an examination of auditor involvement by 
phase of the investigation process is analyzed.  
Second, a pattern of cooperation between the media and whistle-blowers 
emerged. In a number of cases where whistle-blowers are normally credited with 
the unravelling of a case, it seems as though these individuals were heard only 
after contacting the press. The Siemens and BA-HR cases are examples. Whether 
this is because forensic journalism was needed to further examine the incidents 
before the authorities had sufficient evidence to warrant investigation, or whether 
the attention given to a case following media coverage instigated a reaction by the 
authorities is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer. It does, however, seem as 
though this is a prevalent course of action, further establishing the important role 
of the media as societal watchdogs. Whether the media play a more significant 
detection role in Norway than in other countries is a question that cannot be 
answered by this study, but is nevertheless an interesting subject for further 
research.  
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5.2. Auditor involvement by phase of the investigative process 
Raters were asked to judge auditor involvement in the cases included on a scale 
from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates no involvement, neither positively nor negatively. 
As the purpose of this thesis is a purely descriptive mapping of auditor detection 
of white-collar crime, the normative approach of whether the auditing function 
was in some way involved negatively by being a part of, or facilitating, the 
criminal offence, is left untouched. So is the question of whether the auditing 
function could or should have done more to uncover the instances, as this also 
would require a normative approach as well as more detailed information on each 
case than what this 44 case study can accommodate.  
 The scale used in this ranking is an ordinal scale, as the rankings of 1 
through 5, as well as the indication of NA if information was deemed unavailable, 
can merely be ranked internally (Gripsrud, Olsson and Silkoset 2004). It is not 
possible to draw conclusions about the size of the intervals between the various 
rankings, and so the calculation of averages and mean values will make little 
sense. What is important is our ability to draw inferences about the prevalence of 
different rankings in the three phases in order to comment on the indications these 
rankings give on auditor involvement.  
 It is important to note that the prevalence of various rankings in any one 
phase should not be compared to the same prevalence in other phases, as the 
amount of available information on each case may differ with regards to in which 
phase(s) auditor involvement in detection could be described. The scarcity of 
available information in any one phase, for instance, should not necessarily be 
equated to low auditor involvement. Therefore, what is of real interest is not the 
number of various rankings within any one phase in isolation, but rather the 
picture drawn by comparing the prevalence of various ratings within a phase, as 
shown in the histograms provided. These histograms give important indications 
about auditor involvement, although firm conclusions are not possible to draw due 
to the innate characteristics of a case study.  
 Starting with auditor involvement in the suspicion phase, some indications 
are made quite clear from the histogram below. Firstly, raters were relatively 
unanimous in their judgments of auditor involvement in detection. All three 
judges (A, B and C) gave a majority rating of 1 in this phase, meaning that auditor 
involvement over all was deemed almost non-existent. Higher ratings were few, 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 89 
and several cases were marked NA (indicating information not available) due to 
insufficient or unavailable information.  
 
 
 
Moving on to the investigation phase, the same overall pattern can be observed, 
although with some minor differences. Grading in this phase is more evenly 
distributed, with a gradual decrease from the most prominent grade of 1 all the 
way down to 5. Raters seem to be in relative agreement on grading, with each 
rater represented in each grade category save for the highest one.  
 
 
 
Finally, the prosecution phase is in need of commenting. Much the same picture is 
painted here as in the preceding two phases, although no rater gave the highest 
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grade of 5 in this final phase. Raters differed more in their views of auditor 
involvement than in the investigation phase, also in terms of their perceived 
threshold of when information was deemed insufficient and not. However, in all 
three stages raters’ agreement was of an extent that provided some reassurance of 
the reliability of findings, leading the researcher to conclude about the adequacy 
of three independent raters. Had ratings been more divergent this might have 
meant that views of more raters should be sought in order to ensure the relative 
soundness of findings.  
 
 
 
The overall picture these three histograms give us of perceived auditor detection 
of white-collar crime is not the most favourable. However, the indication that the 
auditing function is not necessarily central in the detection of a large proportion of 
cases, should not automatically be construed as a sign of the redundancy of said 
function in this respect. It seems probable that the preventative role, as described 
by Drage and Olstad (2008), among others, may be more pronounced than the 
reactive detection role, although this is an aspect not covered by this study.  
 To elaborate further on the above point, the term preventative can mean 
both preventing potential criminals from intending to commit fraud, as well as 
preventing fraud – intentional and unintentional – by the auditor (having a history 
of) detecting and instigating corrective measures at the root, i.e. long before a 
―case‖ has evolved. By achieving the latter, which can be termed root corrections, 
auditors gain the respect of their clients and potential criminals become less prone 
to contemplate fraud. Such root corrective measures belong to the essence of good 
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auditing, they are an integral part of normal and sound auditor–client cooperation, 
taking place behind ―closed doors‖, and thus prevent potential fraud cases from 
even developing. Such factors have an obvious bearing on the percentage of fraud 
cases detected by auditors in this study. It is e.g. not possible to conclude that a 
low percentage of auditor detection is due to poorer auditing competence and 
practice, in fact, the opposite may be true: A low percentage may well mean better 
auditing practices preventing potential fraud cases from evolving. Such questions 
are, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Should a more visible detection role be deemed desirable and appropriate, 
both from the viewpoint of standard setters and others, a review and possible 
revision of the auditor role may be in order, especially if corroborating findings 
further establish this pattern.  
 
5.3. Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were listed above regarding the anticipated findings of 
this study. These hypotheses have in common a presumption that the auditing 
function makes a positive contribution to the detection of white-collar crime. 
Whether or not this coincides with findings based on contemporary Norwegian 
cases is what this thesis purports to examine. What follows is, therefore, a closer 
look at whether the findings indicate support for the stated hypotheses.  
 
Based on the estimations of Albrecht, Albrecht and Dunn (2001) and Silverstone 
and Sheetz (2003) the following is hypothesized:  
H1: Less than 20 % of white-collar crime is detected by the auditing function.  
 
The auditor detection rate indicated by the cases included in this study deviates 
from the detection rate of 15-20 % stated by much of the extant body of research 
in the literature review. Based on the table depicting means of detection at the 
beginning of this chapter, this rate is closer to 10 %, which should substantially 
lower our expectations of auditor detection of white-collar crime compared to 
what other studies have indicated. The findings thereby support hypothesis 1 in 
contending that less than 20 % of white-collar crime is detected by the auditing 
function. It should be stressed once more that this piece of research does not allow 
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definitive conclusions, and so findings should be viewed as possible scenarios 
warranting further investigation rather than as conclusive truths.  
 Should it be the case that the auditing function in practice can be credited 
with a lower percentage of detections of white-collar crime than was expected, 
some reflections on possible causes are in order. Firstly, a natural assumption 
would be that the framework governing the auditing function in Norway may lay 
different conditions for the types of, and extent to which, white-collar crime an 
auditor is able to detect using standard auditing procedures than what may be the 
case abroad. Confirming (or rejecting) this assumption requires a detailed, 
comparative examination of standard auditing procedures in a number of 
countries, a task too extensive for inclusion here.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that white-collar crime is a 
relatively newly identified phenomenon in Norway may also be partly to blame. 
Businesses and authorities alike are simply not as experienced in preventing, 
identifying and investigating financial crime as nations that have longer traditions 
of such criminality. This point was further emphasized by Siri Gedde-Dahl of 
Aftenposten. Gedde-Dahl noted in correspondence with the researcher that it 
seemed as though businesses she had been in touch with were not very in tune to 
warning signals of white-collar crime, and consequently were not adept at 
detection of such crime either.  
It may also be the case that the detection percentage indicated here is 
inaccurate, and that replication of this study or further examination of results 
utilizing other research designs results in a somewhat higher detection rate, closer 
to the 15 % indicated by literature.  
 
In accordance with Wells (2005) and Johnson and Rudesill (2001) the following 
hypothesis tests a possible discrepancy between expectations and what the 
auditing function is able to deliver:  
H2: There exists a gap between expectations towards auditors’ fraud 
detection and what the auditing function is able to deliver.  
 
This hypothesis includes many of the same arguments as hypothesis 1, simply 
reflecting a different viewpoint of the same question. As hypothesis 1 was deemed 
accurate for the Norwegian context in that less than 20 % of Norwegian cases of 
white-collar crime are detected by the auditing function, hypothesis 2, predicting 
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an expectation gap, thereby seems to be confirmed. The extant body of literature 
and research predicts an auditing detection rate of white-collar crime between 5 
and 10 percentage points higher than that indicated by this study, thereby 
suggesting higher expectations for auditor detection than there may be basis for. 
Bernardi (1994), who holds that ― the probability of detecting fraud is dependent 
upon time pressures, holding chargeable costs down, and client and public 
expectations that the auditor will detect any fraud‖, resulting in an ―expectation 
gap between auditors’ performance and what an audit implies to users‖, and 
Johnson and Rudesill (2001, 61-62), who state that ―differences in perception of 
responsibility and the public’s disenchantment with audits have been termed the 
expectations gap‖, are both examples of opinions in support of this. Again, this is 
a possibility that should be subjected to further examination.  
 
According to Gottschalk (2010b) and Silverstone and Sheetz (2003) some types of 
white-collar crime are difficult, if not impossible, to detect using normal auditing 
routines, such as so-called off-book frauds:  
H3: Some types of white-collar crime are more often discovered by auditors 
than others.  
 
As was touched upon in the literature review chapter, some types of white-collar 
crime are hard, if not impossible, to detect using normal auditing routines, and 
some are relatively in line with such routines. Examples of crime beyond the 
auditing framework are insider trading and cartel activities (Gottschalk 2010b, 
233) and so-called off-book frauds (i.e. bribery and kickbacks), ―which do not 
leave an audit trail and are often discovered by tip-offs‖ (Silverstone and Sheetz 
2003, 80). Were the above results in tune with what types of white-collar crime 
the literature predicts that auditing should and should not be able to detect?  
An example of a case involving bribery is the Ullevål case. This case was 
detected by whistle-blowing and subsequent media coverage and investigation, 
which indicates that such white-collar crimes are not within the auditing realm. 
Cases involving some form of accounting fraud, such as the Sponsor Service and 
Taxi cases, only partially corroborate this picture. Whereas the Sponsor Service 
case was detected through auditing and media collaboration, auditing was not 
involved in the unraveling of the Taxi case. In fact, accountant Henry Amundsen 
was the prime facilitator of the entire fraud. In this case, conscious efforts at 
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misleading probably must take some of the blame for the lack of auditor detection. 
However, there clearly exist deviations from literature predictions of auditor 
detection, warranting further and more detailed examination, but the fact that an 
accounting professional acted as instigator may indicate that the type of white-
collar crime this case depicts is, in fact, very much a part of the auditor reign. It 
will therefore be concluded that type of white-collar crime often does influence 
the likelihood of auditor detection, confirming the hypothesis that some types of 
white-collar crime are more often discovered by auditors than others.  
 
5.4. Methodological quality  
―There are two main questions about credibility of research. The first addresses 
whether we would get similar results if the study were repeated. The second 
question is more challenging: even if the same results were obtained, would they 
be right, i.e. have we actually measured what we needed to look at, in a way that 
accurately captures its characteristics? The first question is about reliability, the 
second about validity‖ (Payne and Payne 2004, 196). A discussion of both in 
relation to this specific piece of research will follow, making explicit the strengths 
and weaknesses of the chosen methodology and its implementation.  
 
5.4.1. Reliability  
Many researchers believe it inappropriate to focus on traditional measures of 
reliability in more qualitative lines of research, among them Wolcott (2005) and 
Lincoln and Guba (1985). ―The more important question for qualitative research 
is whether the results are consistent with the data collected. Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) were the first to conceptualize reliability in qualitative research as 
dependability or consistency. That is, rather than demanding that outsiders get the 
same results, a researcher wishes outsiders to concur that, given the data collected, 
the results make sense – they are consistent and dependable‖ (Merriam 2009, 
221). ―Strategies that a qualitative researcher can use to ensure for consistency 
and dependability or reliability are triangulation, peer examination, investigator’s 
position, and the audit trail‖, where the audit trail is defined in the following way: 
―Just as an auditor authenticates the accounts of a business, independent readers 
can authenticate the findings of a study by following the trail of the researcher‖, 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 95 
explaining how the results were achieved. (Merriam 2009, 222) This requires the 
study to describe in detail how data were collected, how categories were derived, 
and how decisions were made throughout the inquiry. To the extent possible these 
principles have been adhered to in the present research, hoping that a meaningful 
and sufficient concept of reliability has been applied and its criteria fulfilled.  
―Reliability pertains to the consistency and trustworthiness of research 
findings; it is often treated in relation to the issue of whether a finding is 
reproducible at other times and by other researchers.‖ When applied also to the 
various interviews conducted in the course of this research, ―this concerns 
whether the interview subjects will change their answers during an interview and 
whether they will give different replies to different interviewers‖. (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009, 245) The reliability of the factual interviews undertaken for this 
research project is for this reason deemed relatively high; factual information is 
not in need of interpretation and multiple researchers would likely be able to 
obtain the same information again from the same sources should the study be 
replicated. This is what is frequently referred to as external reliability, which deals 
with the likelihood of whether the results of one study will occur again.  
Adding to the credibility of findings is the significant expertise and 
knowledge of the interviewees, both in terms of academic and/or experiential 
knowledge of white-collar crime in general and case specific knowledge. In order 
to capture the complex reality of each case, contradictory, or at least varying, 
perceptions were collected and reported. (Rubin and Rubin 2005, 64-67) 
Interviewees are chosen on the basis of their ―direct access to the information 
requested‖ (Rubin and Rubin 2005, 72), adding to believability. To help in 
recognizing ―distortions, fabrications, and omissions‖, the same question was 
asked in different ways as well as to different sources in separate roles to check 
for consistency (Rubin and Rubin 2005, 73). Findings from interviews were 
checked for consistency with other sources such as newspapers or court 
depositions when possible.  
The concept of interrater (McNeill and Chapman 2005) or intercoder 
reliability (Neuman 2011), also called intersubjectivity (Grønmo 2004), is highly 
relevant for the case study at hand. The fact that three independent raters judged 
auditor involvement in the cases rather than one, should drastically increase the 
reliability of the findings. The converging judgments of two raters is considered 
adequate (McNeill and Chapman 2005); three is even better.  
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 Intersubjectivity is defined as ―a principle for evaluating empirical 
evidence in positivist social science stating that different people can agree on what 
is in the empirical world using the senses.‖ The basis for this contention is that 
―rational people who independently observe facts will agree on them 
subjectively‖. (Neuman 2011, 99) While intersubjectivity is most often applied in 
the context of content analysis, it is deemed equally applicable to a multiple case 
study. In the same way as the body of data to be coded is stable and identical for 
different coders in a content analysis, the case descriptions that raters based their 
judgments on where the same for all three individuals, and identical briefings 
regarding rating were given. This is thought to strengthen the internal reliability of 
the study, which pertains to whether researchers on the same project agree on 
interpretations.   
 
5.4.2. Validity and generalizability  
Even though a measure has high reliability, this does not necessarily mean it is 
also valid. We may measure something with a high degree of accuracy and 
precision, but this does not mean we are measuring what we set out to measure. It 
is also important to point out that what we are deeming valid or not is not a 
method of measuring or a test, but rather the interpretation of the data that emerge 
from a certain procedure. This interpretation may be highly valid for one purpose, 
and less valid or not valid at all for others. (Gripsrud, Olsson and Silkoset 2004) It 
therefore becomes imperative to discuss validity and generalizability as well.  
As this research does not make use of a probability sample, the question of 
how large a sample would be needed in order to be confident about findings, is 
not really a relevant one, but it is reassuring to know that for a thought universe of 
20 cases of white-collar crime (there are initially 44), a sample of 19 would be 
sufficient to ensure statistical generalizability (Payne and Payne 2004, 201-203). 
Although this is an important point, ―size is determined less by statistical principle 
than three other pragmatic considerations. These are: resources; planned analysis 
methods; and the variability of the universe from which a sample is being drawn‖ 
(Payne and Payne 2004, 205). In the case of this specific piece of research, the 
resources must be said to be limited. The timeframe is restrictive compared to that 
of many other types of research projects, as are the funds and methodological 
knowhow. The planned analysis method of a multiple case study sets important 
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guidelines on sample size; a relatively in-depth approach implies more time must 
be spent on each case, naturally limiting the number of cases it is possible to 
include. These two points advocate a limited number of cases for scrutiny. 
However, the a priori opinion of the researcher that there will naturally be some 
amount of variability between cases and their means of detection, and the 
contention that information on each case may be hard to come by, increases the 
ideal initial pool of cases to be included. All of these aspects and issues were 
weighed against each other when sample size was decided on.  
To the question of whether findings from such a multiple case study are 
generalizable – i.e. ―whether the results are primarily of local interest, or whether 
they may be transferable to other subjects and situations‖ – some distinctions must 
be made. Firstly, studies from which generalizations can be drawn, are not 
necessarily always the preferable mode of inquiry. ―Consistent demands for the 
social sciences to produce generalizable knowledge may involve an assumption of 
scientific knowledge as necessarily universal and valid for all places and times.‖ 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, 261)  
Findings may also be viewed strictly in their social and historical context, 
and still provide important insights. To the extent that generalization is desirable, 
Stake (Denzin and Lincoln 2005) introduces three kinds of case studies: The 
intrinsic case study, undertaken in order to better understand a particular case, the 
instrumental case study, where insight into more general issues is sought, and the 
multiple or collective case study, which is an instrumental case study extended to 
several cases. This thesis inhabits the characteristics of the latter, where a variety 
of cases of white-collar crime are studied for the purpose of deriving some general 
knowledge about the phenomenon. Because the cases included are a purposive or 
convenience sample, findings cannot be subject to statistical generalization (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2009, 262). However, some form of naturalistic generalization 
(which ―derives from tacit knowledge of how things are and leads to expectations 
rather than formal predictions‖) or analytical generalization (―by specifying the 
supporting evidence and making arguments explicit, the researcher can allow 
readers to judge the soundness of the generalization claim‖) may be possible 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, 262-263). Yin (2003, 46) indicates that collective 
case studies are often ―considered more compelling, and the overall study is 
therefore regarded as more robust‖. Merriam (2009, 49-50) concurs: ―The more 
cases included in a study, and the greater the variation across the cases, the more 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 98 
compelling an interpretation is likely to be. ... The inclusion of multiple cases is, 
in fact, a common strategy for enhancing the external validity or generalizability 
of your findings.‖ This bodes well for the research undertaken here, as an initial 
case portfolio of 44 may be viewed as substantial.  
Validity and generalizability therefore go hand in hand. ―External validity 
is concerned with the extent to which the findings of one study can be applied to 
other situations. That is, how generalizable are the results of a research study?‖ 
But, ―even to discuss the issue, the study must be internally valid, for there is no 
point in asking whether meaningless information has any general applicability.‖ 
(Merriam 2009, 223) In discussing generalizability in the case of a multiple case 
study such as this one, it should be noted that ―in qualitative research, a single 
case or small, non-random, purposeful sample is selected precisely because the 
researcher wishes to understand the particular in depth, not to find out what is 
generally true of the many‖ (Merriam 2009, 224). ―Probably the most common 
understanding of generalizability in qualitative research is to think in terms of the 
reader or user of the study. Reader or user generalizability involves leaving the 
extent to which a study’s findings apply to other situations up to the people in 
those situations. The person who reads the study decides whether the findings can 
apply to his or her particular situation.‖ This implies that ―the researcher has an 
obligation to provide enough detailed description of the study’s context to enable 
readers to compare the fit with their situations‖. (Merriam 2009, 226) This brings 
us back to the point made above, stating that ensuring adequate reliability in this 
case study also depends on the means of data collection, methodology and 
assumptions made being explicitly listed. The same can be said of validity.  
―There is clearly a scientific value to gain from investigating some single 
category of individual, group, or event simply to gain an understanding of that 
individual, group, or event. For those with a more positivist orientation who have 
concern about generalizing to similar types of individuals, groups, or events, case 
methods are still useful and to some extent generalizable. When case studies are 
properly undertaken, they should not only fit the specific individual, group, or 
event studied but also generally provide understanding about similar individuals, 
groups, and events.‖ (Berg 2007, 295) Merriam (2009, 51) contends that ―case 
study plays an important role in advancing a field’s knowledge base‖.  
―Most types of validity questions can be grouped under a measure’s 
internal or external validity. Internal validity deals with a study’s own logic: does 
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it achieve what it sets out to do? Its operational definitions must reflect a fully 
developed conceptual framework, and its conclusions must be plausibly 
defensible. If associations are claimed between phenomena, it should be clear that 
no unstudied phenomena intervened. External validity refers to the limits of 
generalization that operationalization imposes‖ (Payne and Payne 2004, 234).  
To ensure a nuanced representation of each case, different views have 
been sought in each instance. Information was collected from such sources as 
media records, academic literature, court verdicts and individuals involved in the 
cases in one way or another. However, obtaining more than one or two views on 
each case was not always possible. Neither was obtaining the information 
necessary to draw conclusions about auditor involvement, in some instances. 
Journalists, prosecutors, former colleagues and others were contacted, but were 
not always available for communication. Those views and opinions that were 
offered have been sought represented as unbiased as possible in the case 
presentations, and where interviewees were a part of the information base, these 
subjects were contacted to ensure their agreement on the final depiction of 
discussed issues. This brings up the issue of credibility or internal validity, which 
―deals with the question of how research findings match reality. Do the findings 
match what is really there? Are investigators observing or measuring what they 
think they are measuring? Are the findings credible given the data presented?‖ 
(Merriam 2009, 213)  
―Probably the most well known strategy to shore up the internal validity of 
a study is what is known as triangulation‖ (Merriam 2009, 215). Of the four types 
of triangulation proposed by Denzin (1978), this paper utilizes two. Firstly, the 
use of multiple sources of data should be mentioned. ―With regard to the use of 
multiple methods of data collection, for example, what someone tells you in an 
interview can be checked against what you read about in documents relevant to 
the phenomenon of interest‖ (Merriam 2009, 216). ―A second common strategy 
for ensuring internal validity or credibility is member checks. Also called 
respondent validation, the idea here is that you solicit feedback on your emerging 
findings from some of the people that you interviewed‖ (Merriam 2009, 217). 
This respondent validation is the technical term for the feedback sought from 
interviewees mentioned above.  
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, 248) advocate ―moving the emphasis from a 
final product validation to a continual process validation‖, which implies concerns 
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for validity at each stage of the research process, from thematizing and designing 
right through to the reporting of findings. This approach is specifically angled to 
dealing with a research design where interviews are a central part of information 
gathering, and adopting it for the research at hand involves reflections on validity 
in the following ways:  
1. Thematizing: The soundness of the theoretical framework on which the 
study is based, is judged as satisfactory since a representative 
collection of views and angles is included. The research question 
derived from this framework is thought to reflect an area of dispute in 
the extant literature, and is therefore a logical rationale for further 
investigation.  
2. Designing: The ―adequacy of the design and the methods used for the 
subject matter and purpose of the study‖ is judged significantly valid. 
Charting the various cases requires the piecing together of relevant 
information from the sources available, including interviews where 
other sources were not sufficient. The condition of beneficience – 
―producing knowledge beneficial to the human situation while 
minimizing harmful consequences‖ – is also thought to be fulfilled, as 
further insight into a topic such as white-collar crime is deemed both 
relevant and socially awarding.  
3. Interviewing: The trustworthiness of subjects’ reports is judged 
adequate. In each case where additional facts were needed, these were 
obtained from sources who had minimal or no interests in biasing 
information given or withholding important aspects. Sources are 
included in the presentation of each case.  
4. Reporting: The validity of the report given on the findings of this study 
is judged as sufficient. Findings of prior studies pointed in several 
directions, and although the picture provided from the findings is clear, 
the report also includes those cases that deviate from the majority, 
providing nuance.  
 
It is often argued that it is difficult to maintain objectivity during case study 
research, and that this should be viewed as a potential threat to knowledge 
generated in this way. However, one could argue that such objectivity may be 
equally challenged in any sort of research endeavour, as ―some subjective 
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decision regarding how the researcher should progress or how the study is 
designed‖ is almost always taken, regardless of whether research is quantitatively 
or qualitatively oriented (Berg 2007, 294). Merriam (2009, 53) maintains that 
―there is no greater bias in case study toward confirming preconceived notions 
than in other forms of research‖. Berg (Berg 2007, 295) agrees: ―As in any 
scientific research, findings from a single study are seldom accepted immediately 
without question and additional research investigations. In this light, case methods 
are as objective as any other data-collection and analysis strategies.‖  
As regards the number of cases included, the main consideration related to 
the a priori assumption that in many instances, relevant information regarding the 
involvement of the auditing function would be difficult or impossible to come by 
given the resources available. As anticipated, many of the cases where not judged 
to display adequate information by one or more of the raters, and therefore were 
unable to contribute to the overall findings. However, because the initial case pool 
of 44 was as extensive as it was, this is not deemed to have significant 
implications on study quality.  
The strengths and weaknesses of the various sources of evidence utilized 
should also be discussed. First of all, the complementary nature of many sources 
suggest that employing more than one or two takes advantage of possible synergy 
effects and mitigates the possible shortcomings of any one source. The main 
sources utilized here are documentation, archival records and interviews. The 
difficulties with retrievability of both documentation and the use of archival 
records was to some extent mitigated by the focused interviewing of individuals 
presumed to inhabit the information missing from the available written sources. 
Similarly, the possibly biased or inaccurate subjective opinions of interviewees 
were cross-checked whenever possible with collected documents and archival 
records. The stability of information available through documentation and 
archival records allow for repetition of the study and its findings, and the broad 
coverage several years back in time allowed for information collection about cases 
now several years old. However, the main problem of inaccessibility will most 
likely qualify as the primary weakness of this study. The fact that much of the 
case information needed in order to draw conclusions about auditor involvement 
proved impossible to come by, significantly reduced the number of cases the 
analysis could draw upon, although not in such a way that findings were in any 
way compromised. (Yin 2009)  
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The use of documents for research purposes has some other weaknesses 
that should be discussed. Because they are not necessarily produced for such use, 
―the information they offer may not be in a form that is useful (or understandable) 
to the investigator. Furthermore, such data may be incongruent with emerging 
findings based on observational or interview data.‖ This may prompt a challenge 
for the investigator in terms of interpretation and configuring the data into a 
suitable format. ―A third major problem with documentary materials is 
determining their authenticity and accuracy. Even public records that purport to be 
objective and accurate contain built-in biases that a researcher may not be aware 
of.‖ (Merriam 2009, 154) This necessitates applying a certain amount of 
scepticism to initial findings, always seeking corroboration – or rejection – 
elsewhere, whenever possible. This was not always feasible in the preceding 
research project due to limitations in available information, and so several 
instances exist where only one source was relied upon for facts about cases. 
However, because judgment in each case was based on an overall impression 
rather than isolated details, this is not thought to have a detrimental effect on 
validity.  
 ―Despite these limitations, documents are a good source of data for 
numerous reasons. To begin with, they may be the best source of data on a 
particular subject, better than observations or interviews. Many documents are 
easily accessible, free, and contain information that would take an investigator 
enormous time and effort to gather otherwise.‖ It is added further: ―One of the 
greatest advantages of using documentary material is its stability. Unlike 
interviewing and observation, the presence of the investigator does not alter what 
is being studied. Documentary data are objective sources of data compared to 
other forms. Such data have also been called unobtrusive.‖ (Merriam 2009, 155)  
A natural extension to discuss following the above argumentation relating 
to documentation and data sources, is that of construct or measurement validity. 
―This criterion applies primarily to quantitative research ... Essentially, it is to do 
with the question of whether a measure that is devised of a concept really does 
reflect the concept that it is supposed to be denoting‖ (Bryman and Bell 2003, 33). 
In ensuring adequate construct validity and reliability of case study evidence, Yin 
(2009, 114-118) suggests adhering to three principles of data collection. Firstly, 
the use of multiple sources of evidence is deemed especially important in case 
studies, as the nature of this design allows for the use of multiple sources and the 
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use of multiple sources ―allows an investigator to address a broader range‖ of 
issues due to the corroboratory mode of such triangulation.  
Patton (2002) distinguishes between several types of triangulation, of 
which two are particularly relevant to this piece of research. One relates to the 
triangulation of data sources, called data triangulation, in which ―the potential 
problems of construct validity also can be addressed because the multiple sources 
of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon‖ (Yin 
2009, 116-117). For this method of triangulation to be employed successfully 
there necessarily needs to exist several sources containing the same information. 
As finding relevant information has been a challenge in this study, the researcher 
has not always been able to meet this criterion, but it has nevertheless been strived 
for. The other relevant means of triangulation relates to incorporating the 
perspectives of different evaluators, called investigator triangulation. To 
strengthen the credibility of findings the task of judging auditor involvement in 
the various cases was left to three external raters rather than to the researcher 
alone, and the judgments were then combined to provide a basis for discussion. 
The rating forms of each rater as well as that with the combined results can be 
found in the appendix for those who wish to study them further.  
The other two principles of data collection relate to creating a case study 
database and maintaining a chain of evidence. Creating a database refers to a 
means of ―organizing and documenting the data collected for case studies‖ (Yin 
2009, 118). The point is to keep separate the data on which the study is based and 
the investigator’s research report on the findings in order to ease possible 
replications or separate, secondary analysis. As a case study database is thought to 
increase the reliability of the entire case study, the raw data on which the 
conclusions were based, have been introduced separately from the research report 
to the extent that such a separation was possible. Relevant collected material on 
each case is presented in narrative form, and may be reused for replication or 
other research aims covering the same topic. In addition, the independent rater 
response sheets are provided to make the basis for conclusions drawn as explicit 
as possible.  
Maintaining a chain of evidence relates to a similar issue, namely ―to 
allow an external observer – in this situation, the reader of the case study – to 
follow the derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to ultimate 
case study conclusions‖ (Yin 2009, 123). Achieving this objective is contended to 
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increase the construct validity, and thereby overall quality, of the case study. From 
the general topic to the research questions, collected literature and case 
information along with the judgments of the individual raters, such a chain of 
evidence should be relatively clear. Conclusions are discussed in light of the 
findings or literature that supports them, illustrating the train of thought. 
References on which argumentation is built, are consistently stated.  
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6. Conclusion 
6.1. Summary of findings 
In order to sum up the presentation of findings and discussion of these from the 
previous chapter, the main findings and their implications will be repeated 
summarily below.  
Regarding the means of detection, auditing was the means credited with 
the least amount of detections at 11 %. Then follow media detection and detection 
by some form of authority routine at 21 %. Whistle-blowing was the concrete 
category credited with the highest detection percentage at 32 %; a tie with the 
collection category comprising all other means of detection. Several points are 
important. First of all, a detection percentage of roughly 11 percent for the 
auditing function category is substantially lower than the estimates given in extant 
literature and research (Albrecht, Albrecht and Dunn 2001) (Silverstone and 
Sheetz 2003), indicating that for Norwegian cases, auditing has an even less 
pronounced role in detection of white-collar crime than the measurements 
performed in the US, for example.  
Second, a pattern of cooperation between the media and whistle-blowers 
emerged. In a number of cases where whistle-blowers are normally credited with 
the unravelling of a case, it seems as though these individuals were heard only 
after contacting the press. The Siemens and BA-HR cases are examples. Whether 
this is because forensic journalism was needed to further examine the incidents 
before the authorities had sufficient evidence to warrant investigation, or whether 
the attention given to a case following media coverage instigated a reaction by the 
authorities is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer. It does, however, seem as 
though this is a prevalent course of action, further establishing the important role 
of the media as societal watchdogs.  
Moving on to the mapping of auditor performance in the various phases of 
the detection process, raters were in relative agreement. Starting with auditor 
involvement in the suspicion phase, some indications were made quite clear. 
Firstly, raters were relatively unanimous in their judgments of auditor 
involvement in detection. All three judges (A, B and C) gave a majority rating of 
1 in this phase, meaning that auditor involvement over all was deemed almost 
non-existent. Higher ratings were few, and several cases were marked NA 
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(indicating information not available) due to insufficient or unavailable 
information.  
Moving on to the investigation phase, the same overall pattern was 
observed, although with some minor differences. Grading in this phase was more 
evenly distributed, with a gradual decrease from the most prominent grade of 1 all 
the way down to 5. Raters seemed to be in relative agreement on grading, with 
each rater represented in each grade category save for the highest one.  
Finally, much the same picture was painted in the prosecution phase as in 
the preceding two phases, although no rater gave the highest grade of 5 in this 
final phase. Raters differed more in their views of auditor involvement than in the 
investigation phase, also in terms of their perceived threshold of when information 
was deemed insufficient and not. However, in all three stages raters’ agreement 
was of an extent that provided some reassurance of the reliability of findings, 
leading the researcher to conclude about the adequacy of three independent raters. 
Had ratings been more divergent this might have meant that views of more raters 
should be sought in order to ensure the relative soundness of findings.  
The overall picture of perceived auditor detection of white-collar crime is 
not the most favourable. However, the indication that the auditing function is not 
necessarily central in the detection of a large proportion of cases, should not 
automatically be construed as a sign of the redundancy of said function in this 
respect. It seems probable that the preventative role, as described by Drage and 
Olstad (2008), among others, may be more pronounced than the reactive detection 
role, although this is an aspect not covered by this study.  
 Lastly, conclusions about the hypotheses presented in the first chapter will 
be given:  
 
H1: Less than 20 % of white-collar crime is detected by the auditing function.  
 
The auditor detection rate indicated by the cases included in this study deviates 
from the detection rate of 15-20 % stated by much of the extant body of research 
in the literature review. Based on the table depicting means of detection at the 
beginning of this chapter, this rate is closer to 10 %, which should substantially 
lower our expectations of auditor detection of white-collar crime compared to 
what other studies have indicated. The findings thereby support hypothesis 1 in 
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contending that less than 20 % of white-collar crime is detected by the auditing 
function. 
 
H2: There exists a gap between expectations towards auditors’ fraud 
detection and what the auditing function is able to deliver.  
 
This hypothesis includes many of the same arguments as hypothesis 1, simply 
reflecting a different viewpoint of the same question. As hypothesis 1 was deemed 
accurate for the Norwegian context in that less than 20 % of Norwegian cases of 
white-collar crime are detected by the auditing function, hypothesis 2, predicting 
an expectation gap, thereby seems to be confirmed. The extant body of literature 
and research predicts an auditing detection rate of white-collar crime between 5 
and 10 percentage points higher than that indicated by this study, thereby 
suggesting higher expectations for auditor detection than there may be basis for. 
Bernardi (1994), who holds that ― the probability of detecting fraud is dependent 
upon time pressures, holding chargeable costs down, and client and public 
expectations that the auditor will detect any fraud‖, resulting in an ―expectation 
gap between auditors’ performance and what an audit implies to users‖, and 
Johnson and Rudesill (2001, 61-62), who state that ―differences in perception of 
responsibility and the public’s disenchantment with audits have been termed the 
expectations gap‖, are both examples of opinions in support of this. Again, this is 
a possibility that should be subjected to further examination.  
 
H3: Some types of white-collar crime are more often discovered by auditors 
than others.  
 
As was touched upon in the literature review chapter, some types of white-collar 
crime are hard, if not impossible, to detect using normal auditing routines, and 
some are relatively in line with such routines. Examples of crime beyond the 
auditing framework are insider trading and cartel activities (Gottschalk 2010b, 
233) and so-called off-book frauds (i.e. bribery and kickbacks), ―which do not 
leave an audit trail and are often discovered by tip-offs‖ (Silverstone and Sheetz 
2003, 80). Were the above results in tune with what types of white-collar crime 
the literature predicts that auditing should and should not be able to detect?  
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An example of a case involving bribery is the Ullevål case. This case was 
detected by whistle-blowing and subsequent media coverage and investigation, 
which indicates that such white-collar crimes are not within the auditing realm. 
Cases involving some form of accounting fraud, such as the Sponsor Service and 
Taxi cases, only partially corroborate this picture. Whereas the Sponsor Service 
case was detected through auditing and media collaboration, auditing was not 
involved in the unraveling of the Taxi case. In fact, accountant Henry Amundsen 
was the prime facilitator of the entire fraud. In this case, conscious efforts at 
misleading probably must take some of the blame for the lack of auditor detection. 
However, there clearly exist deviations from literature predictions of auditor 
detection, warranting further and more detailed examination, but the fact that an 
accounting professional acted as instigator may indicate that the type of white-
collar crime this case depicts is, in fact, very much a part of the auditor reign. It 
will therefore be concluded that type of white-collar crime often does influence 
the likelihood of auditor detection, confirming the hypothesis that some types of 
white-collar crime are more often discovered by auditors than others.  
 
6.2. Suggestions for further research 
In any research project there will inevitably be questions left unanswered. No 
single research design can fathom all the various inquiries any given subject may 
elicit, and so clearly limiting the subject matter becomes vital if a certain level of 
validity and reliability is to be maintained. ―The scientific benefit of the case 
study method lies in its ability to open the way for discoveries. It can easily serve 
as the breeding ground for insights and even hypotheses that may be pursued in 
subsequent studies‖ (Berg 2007, 294). Throughout the paper questions that were 
impossible (or inadvisable) to incorporate into the study at hand have been 
pointed out, and as many of them are thought to have a certain scientific and 
social value, it seems appropriate to sum up by sorting through some of the 
recommendations for future research they imply.  
 First of all, it is made clear from the start that this paper will omit any 
possible normative considerations from the analysis. However, such a normative 
perspective may be an interesting basis for further scrutiny. Whether or not the 
auditing function was in some way involved negatively by being a part of, or 
facilitating, the criminal offence, could also be of considerable value to map. It 
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may be relevant to explore in which of the following categories the various cases 
best fit:  
 Cases where the auditing function cannot be blamed 
 Cases where the auditing function could have done more 
 Cases where the auditing function was an accomplice or implicated 
party  
 
The cases that are chosen for analysis may then be measured up against this 
framework in order to assess in which cases the auditor cannot be blamed, in 
which cases the auditor might have done more and in which cases the auditor was, 
knowingly or not, an implicated party in the offence. If the auditing function has 
done everything according to the established auditing procedure and cannot be 
blamed, but the offences still happen, might this have implications for the future 
structuring of standard auditing procedures?  
Secondly, the emerging pattern of cooperation between the media and 
whistle-blowers is of interest. Whether forensic journalism was needed to further 
examine the incidents before the authorities had sufficient evidence to warrant 
investigation, or whether the attention given to a case following media coverage 
instigated a reaction by authorities, was beyond the scope of this thesis to answer. 
It does, however, seem as though this is a prevalent course of action, further 
establishing the important role of the media as societal watchdogs. This role is in 
no way fully explored, but should probably be left to someone other than an 
economist. While on this subject, whether the media play a more significant 
detection role in Norway than in other countries, is also a question that cannot be 
answered by this study, but it is still deemed an interesting subject for further 
research.  
It will also be recommended that further investigation is undertaken of 
whether the type of white-collar crime predicted by the literature that auditing 
should and should not detect, coincides with the types of cases actually detected 
by auditing. This requires a larger sample than a case study allows, but could 
provide valuable input to the existing auditing framework. Investigating the role 
of the auditing function in those cases where the crime is of such a nature that the 
auditing function cannot be expected to be involved– in any stage – is not very 
relevant to the research question at hand. What is of primary interest is forming an 
idea of whether or not the auditing function has made a considerable contribution 
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to the detection of the type of white-collar crime in which it is reasonable to 
expect one, i.e. crime that takes place within the boundaries of the auditing 
framework. A natural precursor to such a research project would be a more 
detailed mapping of what types of white-collar crime this framework can be 
expected to include.  
This study indicates a lower detection rate for the auditing function than 
similar studies have done for other countries. What this may indicate – as well as 
whether or not this is in fact the case – is an important question to answer, or at 
least discuss, if the goal is increased auditing insight and an auditing function 
tailored to the demands of the Norwegian context.  Findings indicate that there 
may exist potential for the auditing function to do more. Perhaps new 
requirements and routines are called for that may enable the auditing community 
to play a more active role in the detection of white-collar crime. This is a subject 
somewhat in the periphery of the subsequent research, and one that is was not 
possible to answer fully within the constraints of this thesis. It is, however, a 
subject of sufficient interest to receive attention in future research projects.  
 
6.3. Final remarks 
Within the extant accounting and auditing research much attention is devoted to 
how the external auditor is a primary figure in detecting irregularities and 
corruption, and government and standard setters also stress the importance of the 
responsibilities of the auditing community in this respect (Olsen 2007) (Telberg 
2004). In connection with the literature review, the researcher uncovered limited 
faith in the auditing function among some for this specific purpose: Only in very 
few cases does auditing in some form seem to be responsible for the detection, 
unravelling and exposure of the offence (Ellingsen and Sky 2005). This opinion 
was backed by the work of Drage and Olstad (2008), who analyzed the role of the 
auditing function in relation to both preventing and detecting white-collar crime. 
Although their study included a look at the perceived preventative power of the 
auditing function as well as actual detection of criminal offences, their findings 
were consistent with the abovementioned hypothesis: Many of their interviewees 
were sceptical as to the auditing function having a central role in the detection of 
white-collar crime (Drage and Olstad 2008). It may seem as though the findings 
of this study provide further support for this contention, as the auditing function 
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was found to be a part of detection in approximately 10 % of included cases. 
Rendal and Westerby (2010) found evidence of unrealistic expectations regarding 
the extent to which the auditing function is capable of uncovering irregularities, a 
notion that also seems to be corroborated by these findings.  
As was mentioned in the opening chapters, this thesis is an inquisition into 
the workings of detection of financial crime in Norway today, undertaken for the 
partial purpose of uncovering possible areas of improvement regarding laws and 
standards that provide the framework for how the auditing function undertakes its 
duties. Perhaps future research may be able to reframe and rewrite how the auditor 
works, possibly increasing the contribution of the auditing function to the 
detection of white-collar crime. The secondary purpose of this thesis was to 
provide a more nuanced picture of the services to modern communities provided 
by the auditing function, in Norway especially, and to a certain extent to report fit 
the auditing function in general when it comes to the standard processes and 
routines they are governed by in their daily bout. It is hoped that the findings 
reported above will serve such a purpose in that it is made clearer the restrictions 
– not just guidelines – an auditor must submit to. It has been discussed how a 
standard audit, in most cases, is quite different from a fraud examination, and that 
the expectation gap arising from this lack of clarity regarding auditor detection 
seems to be rather widespread. Extant literature was found to be divided in its 
opinion of auditor ability to detect white-collar crime. This thesis provides 
indications that this ability, at least in Norway, is limited, perhaps prompting 
further inquiry or study replication for the sake of ever increasing insight.  
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 112 
Reference list 
Adresseavisen. 2010. Tromsdal tiltalt for million-bedrageri. Adresseavisen, 
28.05.2010. 
Aftenposten. 2010. Fra folkevalgte til tiltalte. Aftenposten, 09.11.2010. 
Agderposten. 2010. Tiltalt for hotell-bedrageri. Agderposten, 28.05.2010. 
Albrecht, Conan C., W. Steve  Albrecht and J. Gregory Dunn. 2001. Can Auditors 
Detect Fraud: A Review of the Research Evidence. Journal of Forensic 
Accounting II:1-12. 
Ashworth, Andrew and Mike Redmayne. 2010. The criminal process. Fourth 
edition ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Auestad, Sverre. 2011. Statutory audit.  Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of Public 
Accountants 
http://www.revisorforeningen.no/a9356013/English/Statutory-Audit. 
(accessed 14.01.2011 2011). 
Bakken, Bente. 2009. Far på godt og vondt. Dagbladet, 01.08.2009. 
Baldwin, F. N. 2006. Exposure of financial institutions to criminal liability. 
Journal of Financial Crime 13 (4):387-407. 
Baughn, Christopher, Nancy Bodie, Mark Buchanan and Michael Bixby. 2010. 
Bribery in International Business Transactions. Journal of Business Ethics 
92 (1):15-32. 
Beasley, Mark S. . 2003. SAS No. 99: A New Look at Auditor Detection of 
Fraud. Journal of Forensic Accounting IV:1-20. 
Berg, Bruce L. 2007. Qualitative research methods for the social sciences. 
Boston: Pearson. 
Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1988. Social construction of reality: a 
treatise in the sociology of knowledge: Irvington. 
Berglihn, Harald. 2010. Kjemper for frifinnelse. Dagens Næringsliv, 18.10.2010. 
———. 2011a. Bratt for Korsgaard. Dagens Næringsliv, 04.04.2011. 
———. 2011b. Kaller søksmål trakassering. Dagens Næringsliv, 10.02.2011. 
———. 2011c. Varsler omkamp. Dagens Næringsliv, 26.02.2011. 
Berglihn, Harald and Lars Backe Madsen. 2011. The good, the bad and Ugland. 
Dagens Næringsliv, 22.01.2011. 
Berland, Jostein. 2011. Rettferdig Vest Tank dom! . VestNytt, 18.06.2011. 
Bernardi, Richard A. 1994. Fraud Detection: The Effect of Client Integrity and 
Competence and Auditor Cognitive Style. Auditing 13 (1):68-84. 
Bjørklund, Ingrid and Line Dugstad. 2011. Politianmeldte flere ganger. Dagens 
Næringsliv, 23.03.2011. 
Bogen, Terje. 2008. Hvor var du. Oslo: Schibsted. 
Breirem, Kari. 2008. På BA-HR bakke: en varslers historie. Oslo: Bazar. 
Brightman, Hank J. 2009. Todays white collar crime: legal, investigative, and 
theoretical perspectives. New York: Routledge. 
Bryman, Alan and Emma Bell. 2003. Business research methods. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bråthen, Tore. 2008. Selskapsrett. Oslo: Focus. 
Bøhm-Pedersen, Karin. 1991. Ny strid om edelstener. Aftenposten, 20.02.1991. 
Champoux, Joseph E. 2006. Organizational behavior: integrating individuals, 
groups and organizations. Mason, Ohio: Thomson/South-Western. 
Dagbladet. 2008. CV: Bente Lyon. Dagbladet, 22.06.2008. 
Dalseide, Nils, Flemming Ruud, Einar Døssland, Siri Teigum, Inger Marie Sunde 
and Kristian Dahle  Trygstad. 2006. Rapport fra Granskningsutvalget for 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 113 
IKT-kontrakter i Forsvaret oppnevnt av Kongen i statsråd 6. januar 2006. 
Oslo. 
Davia, Howard R. 2000. Fraud 101: techniques and strategies for detection. New 
York: John Wiley. 
Denzin, Norman K. 1978. The research act: a theoretical introduction to 
sociological methods. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Denzin, Norman K. and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 2005. The Sage handbook of 
qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. 
Drage, Krister  and Thomas Olstad. 2008. Ekstern revisor og økonomisk 
kriminalitet - En analyse av revisors ansvar og brukernes forventninger 
Regnskap og revisjon, BI Norwegian School of Management, Oslo. 
Dugstad, Line. 2011a. Fikk 380.000 for svindel. Dagens Næringsliv, 31.03.2011. 
———. 2011b. Innrømmer bedrageriet. Dagens Næringsliv, 25.03.2011. 
———. 2011c. Storsvindler pågrepet i Spania. Dagens Næringsliv, 05.02.2011. 
———. 2011d. Ønsker bedrager i forvaring. Dagens Næringsliv, 14.03.2011. 
Dugstad, Line and Anne Flæte. 2011. Fortuna-trioen anker. Dagens Næringsliv, 
07.04.2011. 
Dugstad, Line and Vibeke Larsen. 2011. Skjulte penger kobles til Øye. Dagens 
Næringsliv, 19.02.2011. 
Ellingsen, Dag and Vibeke Sky. 2005. Virksomheter som ofre for økonomisk 
kriminalitet. Vol. 2005/14, Rapporter. Oslo: SSB. 
Elmholdt, Hans Erik. 2009. Nytt rettslig nederlag for Terje Bogen. Aftenposten, 
26.06.2009. 
Endresen, Rune. 2008. Forfølges for 73.000 kroner. Dagens Næringsliv, 
25.09.2008. 
Eriksen, Terje Strand. 2010. Arven etter Ole Christian Bach: et justismord. 
Porsgrunn: Norgesforl. 
Farbrot, Audun. 2002. Tre års fengsel for Konkurs-Mjelde. Økonomisk Rapport. 
Farrell, Barbara R.  and Patricia Healy. 2000. White Collar Crime: A Profile of 
the Perpetrator and an Evaluation of the Responsibilities for its Prevention 
and Detection. Journal of Forensic Accounting I:17-34. 
Gangdal, Jon. 1996. Balladen om Bach. Oslo: Pax. 
Gedde-Dahl, Siri. 2006. Startskudd for nye søksmål. Aftenposten, 04.08.2006. 
———. 2009. Entreprenøren betaler. Aftenposten, 14. October 2009. 
———. 2010a. Fratrer alle verv. Aftenposten, 13.10.2010. 
———. 2010b. Får ikke oppdrag av Oslo kommune. Aftenposten, 19.10.2010. 
———. 2011a. Dom: Saklig utkastelse. Aftenposten, 11 May 2011. 
———. 2011b. Siemens ble frifunnet. Aftenposten, 5. 
———. 2011c. Vannverket får tilbake alle pengene. Aftenposten, 14.06.11. 
Gedde-Dahl, Siri, Anne Hafstad and Alf Endre Magnussen. 2005. Risikerer 10 års 
fengsel for korrupsjon. Aftenposten, 31. August 2005. 
———. 2007. Revisoren lukket øynene. Aftenposten, 06.12.2007. 
———. 2008. Korrupsjon i Norge. Oslo: Kagge. 
Gedde-Dahl, Siri and Gunnar Kagge. 2009. Nye tiltaler for skolebyggkorrupsjon. 
Aftenposten, 5. March 2009. 
George, Jennifer M. and Gareth R. Jones. 2008. Understanding and managing 
organizational behavior. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall. 
Gimmestad, Johnny. 2003. Razzia mot inkassogigant. Aftenposten, 14.09.2003. 
Goldschmidt, Leo. 2004. The Role of Boards in Preventing Economic Crime. 
Journal of Financial Crime 11 (4):342-346. 
Gottschalk, Petter. 2008. Stages of financial crime by business organizations. 
Journal of Financial Crime 15 (1):38-48. 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 114 
———. 2010a. Categories of financial crime. Journal of Financial Crime 17:441-
458. 
———. 2010b. Ledelse og økonomisk kriminalitet: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag. 
———. 2010c. Theories of financial crime. Journal of Financial Crime 17 
(2):210-222. 
———. 2011a. Hvitsnippforbrytere i Norge. [Oslo]: Krutt forl. 
———. 2011b. White-collar crime: detection, prevention and strategy in business 
enterprises. Boca Raton, Fla.: Universal-publishers. 
Gottschalk, Petter and Hans Solli-Sæther. 2011. Financial crime in business 
organizations: an empirical study. Journal of Financial Crime 18:76-92. 
Grande, Arne. 2011. Nye runder om stortingspensjon. Dagens Næringsliv, 
26.05.2011. 
Greenberg, Jerald. 2011. Behavior in organizations. Boston: Pearson. 
Gripsrud, Geir, Ulf Henning Olsson and Ragnhild Silkoset. 2004. Metode og 
dataanalyse: med fokus på beslutninger i bedrifter. Kristiansand: 
Høyskoleforl. 
Grønmo, Sigmund. 2004. Samfunnsvitenskapelige metoder. Bergen: Fagbokforl. 
Gunnar, Magnus. 2010. Aktor: Tjente for mye hele tiden. Aftenposten, 
26.11.2010. 
Gyldenskog, Kristin. 2009. Nekter straffskyld. Dagens Næringsliv, 03.02.2009. 
Haakaas, Einar. 2008. Avdekker økt korrupsjon. Aftenposten, 09.10.2008. 
———. 2010. Opprydning i drosjejuks på stedet hvil. Aftenposten, 14.11.2010. 
———. 2011. Vil ha soningsavtale med Pakistan. Aftenposten, 18.03.11. 
Haakaas, Einar and Kjetil Sæter. 2010. Svindel uten grenser: en reise i svart 
drosjeøkonomi. Oslo: Aschehoug. 
Hanssen, Inge D. 2004a. Drev et lovlig bordell, ikke kokainsmugling. 
Aftenposten, 30.11.2004. 
———. 2004b. En profesjonell og kynisk organisasjon. Aftenposten, 16.12.2004. 
———. 2004c. Kvinne utpekes som hoved-"mann" i kokainsmuglingen. 
Aftenposten, 02.12.2004. 
———. 2004d. Smuglet på oppdrag fra Lyon. Aftenposten, 08.12.2004. 
———. 2008. Lå på stranden da dommen kom. Aftenposten, 12.03.2008. 
———. 2010. Cash is king. Aftenposten, 15.10.2010. 
Haugnes, Gunhild M. . 2004. Bedrageridømte Mohr tapte ankesak. Aftenposten, 
13.10.2004. 
Heltne, Olav. 1991. Tre dommer i Karolisaken ankes. Aftenposten, 06.11.1991. 
Henriksen, Øyvind. 2008. Bach-revisor dømt igjen. E24. 
———. 2010. Dømt til fengsel for datasvindel. E24. 
Heyerdahl, Nicolai  and Vibeke Buan. 2011. Furuholmen tapte i Høyesterett. 
Aftenposten, 06.01.2011. 
Hippe, Ivar. 2003. Mektig og avmektig: Tore Tønne, media og maktspillet bak 
kulissene. Oslo: Genesis. 
Hultgren, Gunnar. 2005. Eks-politimann siktet for 100 millioners-bedrageri. 
Dagbladet, 25.11.2005. 
Hustadnes, Halldor  and Tore Bergsaker. 2008. Konserndirektørens dobbeltliv. 
Dagbladet, 23.01.2008. 
Høgetveit, Einar. 2004. Økokrims strategi mot økonomisk kriminalitet. In 
Forskningskonferansen. Politihøgskolen i Oslo. 
Innes, Martin. 2007. Investigation order and major crime inquiries. In Handbook 
of criminal investigation, edited by T. Newburn, T. Williamson and A. 
Wright. Cullompton: Willan publishing. 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 115 
International Federation of Accountants. 2008. International Standard on 
Auditing 200, Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the 
Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with International Standards on 
Auditing.  http://web.ifac.org/download/a008-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-
200.pdf. (accessed 23 January 2011 2011). 
———. 2009. International Standard on Auditing 240, The Auditors' 
Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements 
http://web.ifac.org/download/a012-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-240.pdf. 
(accessed 23 January 2011 2011). 
Ivancevich, John M., Thomas N. Duening, Jacqueline A. Gilbert and Robert 
Konopaske. 2003. Deterring white-collar crime. In Academy of 
Management Executive: Academy of Management. 
Jahr, Bjørn Olav. 2005. Smarte skurker - grådige gubber: historien om Finance 
Credit. Oslo: Bojahr media. 
Jayasuriya, Dayanath. 2006. Auditors in a changing regulatory environment. 
Journal of Financial Crime 13 (1):51-55. 
Jensen, Sveinung W. 2004. Rådgiverfest på tvilsomme lån. Aftenposten, 
11.09.2004. 
Jensen, Sveinung W. . 2003. Bedragerisiktet hevder han skulle reddes av rike 
russere. Aftenposten, 23.10.2003. 
Jensen, Thor Chr. and Harald Vanvik. 2007. Mistenkes for å ha lekket info. 
Dagens Næringsliv, 12.01.2007. 
Johannessen, Janne. 2009. Gikk tomhendt fra Nav. Dagens Næringsliv, 
27.02.2009. 
Johansen, Per Ole. 2004. Den illegale spriten: fra forbudstid til polstreik. Oslo: 
Unipub. 
Johnsen, Aina. 2006. Krisen ga et løft. Advokatbladet, 03.03.2006. 
Johnson, Gary G. and Charryl L. Fludesill. 2001. An investigation into fraud 
prevention and detection of small businesses in the United States: 
responsibilities of auditors, managers, and business owners. Accounting 
Forum 25 (1):56. 
Johnson, Gary G. and Charryl L. Rudesill. 2001. An investigation into fraud 
prevention and detection of small businesses in the United States: 
responsibilities of auditors, managers, and business owners. Accounting 
Forum 25 (1):56. 
Jonassen, Arild M. 2006. Dømt for bedrageri - Håper på frifinnelse. Aftenposten, 
11.05.2006. 
Jonassen, Arild M., Alf Endre  Magnussen and Lene Li  Dragland. 2011. Tappet 
Norges rikeste. Aftenposten, 15.03.2011. 
Jones, Peter. 2004. Fraud and corruption in public services: a guide to risk and 
prevention. Aldershot: Gower. 
Jupp, Victor, Pamela Davies and Peter Francis. 2011. Doing criminological 
research. Los Angeles: Sage. 
Kayrak, Musa. 2008. Evolving challenges for supreme audit institutions in 
struggling with corruption. Journal of Financial Crime 15 (1):60-70. 
King, Michael R. and Maksym Padalko. 2007. OUTING Insiders. Canadian 
Investment Review 20 (1):16-23. 
Klungtveit, Harald S.  and Hans-Martin Thømt Ruud. 2011. HA-sjefen tatt igjen. 
Dagbladet, 09.03.2011. 
Kringstad, Hans. 2007. Søkkrikt ransoffer tiltalt for korrupsjon. VG, 15.06.2007. 
Kristiansen, Ole Martin. 2009. Norsk mafia: organisert kriminalitet i Norge. Oslo: 
Pantagruel. 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 116 
Kuykendall, Jack. 1982. The criminal investigative process: Toward a conceptual 
framework. Journal of Criminal Justice 10 (2):131-145. 
Kvale, Steinar and Svend Brinkmann. 2009. Interviews: learning the craft of 
qualitative research interviewing. Los Angeles, Calif.: Sage. 
Lagmannsretten. 2006. LB-2005-180893 - RG-2007-504 Oslo: Borgarting 
Lagmannsrett. 
———. 2011. LB-2009-100834 Oslo: Borgarting Lagmannsrett. 
Larsson, Paul. 2006. Developments in the regulation of economic crime in 
Norway. Journal of Financial Crime 13 (1):65-76. 
———. 2008. Organisert kriminalitet. Oslo: Pax. 
Laugen, Stig Tore. 2009. Kan takke varsom aktor. Dagens Næringsliv, 
08.12.2009. 
Lincoln, Yvonna S. and Egon G. Guba. 1985. Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills, 
Calif.: Sage. 
Lynum, Frank. 2005. Mohr-selskap konkurs. Aftenposten, 02.05.2005. 
Magnus, Gunnar. 2011. Masteroppgave om økonomisk kriminalitet. Oslo, 
16.06.11. 
McNeill, Patrick and Steve Chapman. 2005. Research methods. London: 
Routledge. 
Merriam, Sharan B. 2009. Qualitative research: a guide to design and 
implementation. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass. 
Misangyi, Vilmos F., Gary R. Weaver and Heather Elms. 2008. ENDING 
CORRUPTION: THE INTERPLAY AMONG INSTITUTIONAL 
LOGICS, RESOURCES, AND INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS. 
Academy of Management Review 33 (3):750-770. 
Molstad, Kristjan  and Hans O.  Torgersen. 2010. Kjent advokat dømt for heleri. 
Aftenposten, 21.05.2010. 
Monsen, Per-Yngve. 2008. Muldvarp i Siemens. Oslo: Spartacus. 
Moyes, Glen D.  and C. Richard Baker. 2003. Auditor's Beliefs about the Fraud 
Detection Effectiveness of Standard Audit Procedures. Journal of 
Forensic Accounting IV:199-216. 
Nadheim, Knut A. 2004. 70.000 taper pyramidefall. Romerikes Blad, 18.11.2004. 
Nardo, Massimo. 2004. Mapping the Trails of Financial Crime. Journal of 
Financial Crime 12 (2):139-143. 
Nedre Romerike Distriktsrevisjon. 2005. Statusrapport nr. 1 - Om 
granskningsoppdrag for styret i NRV (Nedre Romerike Vannverk) og 
Sentralrenseanlegget RA-2. 
Neuman, W. Lawrence. 2011. Social research methods: qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. Boston: Pearson. 
NTB. 2005. Terje Bogen blankt frifunnet. Aftenposten, 08.07.2005. 
———. 2006. Nye tiltaler i T5PC-saken. Aftenposten, 13.12.2006. 
———. 2007. Tamburstuen dømt til to års fengsel. Aftenposten, 30.05.2007. 
———. 2010. Fire års fengsel for grov utroskap. Aftenposten, 03.06.2010. 
———. 2011. Norsk svindelettersøkt pågrepet i Spania. Aftenposten, 04.02.2011. 
NTBtekst. 1991a. Karoli-brødre skyldig i grovt bedrageri. NTB, 06.09.1991. 
———. 1991b. Påstand om fengsel fra to til sju år i Karoli-saken. NTB, 
02.07.1991. 
———. 2011. Vest Tank-dom ankes til Høyesterett. NTB, 12.06.2011. 
Nygaard, Lars-Erik. 2011. Dømt for skjult kjøp. Dagens Næringsliv, 12.05.2011. 
Næss, Asgaut. 2011a. Et personlig nederlag. Dagens Næringsliv, 10.02.2011. 
———. 2011b. Kreves for 90,5 mill. Dagens Næringsliv, 09.02.2011. 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 117 
O'Gara, John D. 2004. Corporate fraud: case studies in detection and prevention. 
Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley. 
O'Hara, Charles E. 1956. Fundamentals of criminal investigation. Springfield, Ill.: 
Thomas. 
Olsen, Anders Berg. 2007. Økonomisk kriminalitet: avdekking, gransking og 
forebygging. Oslo: Universitetsforl. 
Omdal, Sven Egil. 2009. Økokrim på journalistjakt. Bergens Tidende, 27.06.2009. 
Patton, Michael Quinn. 2002. Qualitative research & evaluation methods. 
Payne, Geoff and Judy Payne. 2004. Key concepts in social research. London: 
SAGE. 
Pedhazur, Elazar J. and Liora Pedhazur Schmelkin. 1991. Measurement, design, 
and analysis: an integrated approach. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Pickett, K. H. Spencer. 2005. The essential handbook of internal auditing. 
Chichester: Wiley. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2009. The Global Economic Crime Survey. edited by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Oslo. 
Ragin, Charles C. and Howard S. Becker, eds. 1992. What is a case?: exploring 
the foundations of social inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Reichel, Philip, ed. 2005. Handbook of transnational crime and justice. Thousand 
Oaks, Calif.: Sage. 
Rendal, Stian and Tord Westerby. 2010. Hvilke forventninger har revisor i forhold 
til brukere avfinansiell informasjon når det gjelder revisors plikter til 
forebygging og avdekking av misligheter?, [S. Rendal], Oslo. 
Rubin, Herbert J. and Irene Rubin. 2005. Qualitative interviewing: the art of 
hearing data. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. 
Silverman, David. 2005. Doing qualitative research : a practical handbook. 2nd 
ed. London: Sage. 
Silverstone, Howard and Michael Sheetz. 2003. Forensic accounting and fraud 
investigation for non-experts. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley. 
Skaar, Marthe. 2007. Brynhildsen må i fengsel. E24. 
Soanes, Catherine and Angus Stevenson. 2006. Concise Oxford English 
dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Solem, Lars Kristian. 2011a. Advokat dømt for utroskap. Dagens Næringsliv, 
10.05.2011. 
———. 2011b. Advokat suspendert. Dagens Næringsliv, 18.05.2011. 
———. 2011c. Blir stilt personlig ansvarlig. Dagens Næringsliv, 28.04.2011. 
———. 2011d. Fikk jobbe for luselønn og brødmat. Dagens Næringsliv, 
05.05.2011. 
Stabæk, Christel Marie. 2007. Pengetrøbbel på No. 15. Dagens Næringsliv, 
16.03.2007. 
Stelfox, Peter. 2009. Criminal investigation: an introduction to principles and 
practice. Cullompton: Willan Publ. 
Stoltenberg, Kristin. 2009. Dømt og fordømt. Aftenposten, 20.03.2009. 
Sun, Lianju and Luyan Peng. 2011. Game Theory Analysis of the Bribery 
Behavior. International Journal of Business & Social Science 2 (8):104-
107. 
Sunnanå, Lars Magne. 2006. Bach-revisor tapte. E24. 
Sunnanå, Lars Magne and Andreas Bakke Foss. 2011. Kan bli kastet ut av Norge. 
Aftenposten, 28 April 2011, 2-3. 
Sæter, Embret. 2011. Bruktbilhandler solgte 590 biler svart. Dagens Næringsliv, 
10.05.2011. 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 118 
Søreide, Tina. 2006. Corruption in international business transactions: the 
perspective of Norwegian firms. In International handbook on the 
economics of corruption, edited by S. Rose-Ackerman. Cheltenham: Elgar. 
Telberg, Rick. 2004. A Joint Effort to Fight Corporate Fraud. Journal of 
Accountancy 197 (4):53-56. 
The Ministry of Justice and the Police and The Ministry of Finance. 2004. The 
Norwegian Government's Action Plan for Combating Economic Crime.  
Oslo: The Norwegian Government 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/jd/rap/2004/0035/DDD/PDFV/24
7688-action_plan_for_combating_economic_crime.pdf. (accessed 12.01. 
2011). 
Vanvik, Harald. 2010. Nesten to år i fengsel. Dagens Næringsliv, 30.01.2010. 
Veiby, Gry Elisabeth. 2007. Tidligere politimann dømt. Nettavisen. 
VestNytt. 2011. Emblem-rettssak i januar. VestNytt, 04.06.2011. 
Vestvik, Einar and Harald Nordbakken. 2009. Delegerte forretningsdriften til 
andre. Haugesunds Avis. 
Waal, Frank. 2010. Står på sin forklaring. Haugesunds Avis. 
Wallace, Wanda A. 1995. Auditing. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western College 
Publishing. 
Wells, Joseph T. 2005. Principles of fraud examination. Hoboken, N.J.: John 
Wiley. 
Williams, Howard E. 2006. Investigating white-collar crime: embezzlement and 
financial fraud. Springfield, Ill.: C.C. Thomas. 
Wolcott, Harry F. 2005. The art of fieldwork. Walnut Creek, Calif.: Altamira 
Press. 
Yin, Robert K. 2003. Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: Sage. 
———. 2009. Case study research: design and methods. Los Angeles: Sage. 
Økokrim. 2005. 60 dagers betinget fengsel for økonomiansatte i Finance Credit. 
Økokrim. 
———. 2007. Dom mot regnskapsfører i T5PC. Økokrim. 
———. 2011. Vannverkssaken. Økokrim. 
 
 
GRA 19003 Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 119 
Appendix 
List of cases with page numbers 
The Henriksen Case 43
The Finance Credit Case 46
The Murud Case 48
The Ullevål Case 49
The Red Cross Case 51
The Siemens Case 51
The Sponsor Service Case 53
The Brynhildsen Woldsdal Case 55
The Software Innovation Case 56
The Lyon Case 56
The Karlsen Case 57
The Stuve Case 58
The WorldCom Case 59
The T5PC Case 60
The Øye Case 61
The Taxi Case 62
The Bach Case 63
The Furuholmen Case 64
The Plastic Fantastic Case 64
The Olympia Case 65
The Hells Angels Case 66
The Screen Communication Case 67
The Mjelde Case 68
The Jewel Case 68
The Lichtenstein Case 68
The Ugland Case 69
The Tjøntveit Case 71
The Dønnum Case 71
The Vest Tank Case 72
The Restaurant Case 72
The Insider Case 73
The Bank Case 74
The Joker Case 74
The Apartment Case 75
The Martinsen Case 76
The Mohr Case 76
The Nielsen Case 77
The Olsvik Case 79
The Document Case 79
The Fortuna Case 80
The Tordenskjold Case 81
The BA-HR Case 81
The Pension Case 83
The Tromsdal Case 85
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Cases not included in the analysis  
The Brynhildsen Woldsdal Case 
The Karlsen Case 
The Bach Case 
The Furuholmen Case 
The Plastic Fantastic Case 
The Screen Communication Case 
The Mjelde Case 
The Jewel Case 
The Lichtenstein Case 
The Tjøntveit Case 
The Insider Case 
The Bank Case 
The Apartment Case 
The Mohr Case 
The Olsvik Case 
The Tromsdal Case 
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Means of detection 
 Auditing Media Whistle-
blowing 
Authority 
routine 
Other 
means 
The Henriksen Case      
The Finance Credit Case      
The Murud Case      
The Ullevål Case      
The Red Cross Case      
The Siemens Case      
The Sponsor Service Case      
The Software Innovation Case      
The Lyon Case      
The Stuve Case      
The WorldCom Case      
The T5PC Case      
The Øye Case      
The Taxi Case      
The Olympia Case      
The Hells Angels Case      
The Ugland Case      
The Dønnum Case      
The Vest Tank Case      
The Restaurant Case      
The Joker Case      
The Martinsen Case      
The Nielsen Case      
The Document Case      
The Fortuna Case      
The Tordenskjold Case      
The BA-HR Case      
The Pension Case      
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Rating sheets 
Rater A
Age: 28
Sex: Female
Education: MSc in Strategic Marketing Management
Suspicion (1-5) Investigation (1-5) Prosecution (1-5)
1 5 NA
2 5 3
1 5 1
1 2 2
1 1 NA
2 2 2
1 4 2
NA NA NA
5 4 NA
1 1 1
2 NA 3
2 2 NA
NA NA NA
4 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
2 3 3
1 1 1
1 1 1
2 2 1
1 1 1
NA NA 4
NA NA NA
4 2 2
NA 3 2
1 2 2
1 1 3
1 3 2
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 2
1 NA NA
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 3 3
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 2
2 2 1
1 1 1
4 4 4
NA NA NA
The BA-HR Case
The Pension Case
The Tromsdal Case
The Mohr Case
The Nielsen Case
The Olsvik Case
The Document Case
The Fortuna Case
The Tordenskjold Case
The Restaurant Case
The Insider Case
The Bank Case
The Joker Case
The Apartment Case
The Martinsen Case
The Jewel Case
The Lichtenstein Case
The Ugland Case
The Tjøntveit Case
The Dønnum Case
The Vest Tank Case
The Furuholmen Case
The Plastic Fantastic Case
The Olympia Case
The Hells Angels Case
The Screen Communication Case
The Mjelde Case
The Stuve Case
The WorldCom Case
The T5PC Case
The Øye Case
The Taxi Case
The Bach Case
The Siemens Case
The Sponsor Service Case
The Brynhildsen Woldsdal Case
The Software Innovation Case
The Lyon Case
The Karlsen Case
The Henriksen Case
The Finance Credit Case
The Murud Case
The Ullevål Case
The Red Cross Case
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Rater B
Age: 30
Sex: Male
Education: MSc in Economics and Business Administration
Suspicion (1-5) Investigation (1-5) Prosecution (1-5)
1 4 2
2 4 1
1 2 1
1 2 NA
1 1 NA
1 3 NA
4 3 1
NA NA NA
4 3 1
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
1 1 NA
NA NA NA
3 1 1
NA NA NA
1 1 NA
1 1 NA
1 NA 1
NA NA NA
4 1 1
1 1 NA
NA NA 4
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA 1 NA
1 1 NA
1 1 NA
1 1 NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
1 1 NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
1 1 NA
NA NA NA
NA 3 3
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
1 1 NA
NA NA NA
1 1 NA
NA 3 4
NA NA NA
The BA-HR Case
The Pension Case
The Tromsdal Case
The Mohr Case
The Nielsen Case
The Olsvik Case
The Document Case
The Fortuna Case
The Tordenskjold Case
The Restaurant Case
The Insider Case
The Bank Case
The Joker Case
The Apartment Case
The Martinsen Case
The Jewel Case
The Lichtenstein Case
The Ugland Case
The Tjøntveit Case
The Dønnum Case
The Vest Tank Case
The Furuholmen Case
The Plastic Fantastic Case
The Olympia Case
The Hells Angels Case
The Screen Communication Case
The Mjelde Case
The Stuve Case
The WorldCom Case
The T5PC Case
The Øye Case
The Taxi Case
The Bach Case
The Siemens Case
The Sponsor Service Case
The Brynhildsen Woldsdal Case
The Software Innovation Case
The Lyon Case
The Karlsen Case
The Henriksen Case
The Finance Credit Case
The Murud Case
The Ullevål Case
The Red Cross Case
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Rater C
Age: 28
Sex: Male
Education: Master of Professional Accountancy
Suspicion (1-5) Investigation (1-5) Prosecution (1-5)
1 2 1
2 2 2
2 2 2
1 3 1
1 NA NA
1 2 1
1 2 1
NA NA NA
4 3 3
1 2 1
2 2 2
1 1 1
1 1 1
3 2 2
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
3 2 2
1 1 1
1 2 2
1 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
2 3 3
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 1
1 2 1
5 3 3
1 1 1
The BA-HR Case
The Pension Case
The Tromsdal Case
The Mohr Case
The Nielsen Case
The Olsvik Case
The Document Case
The Fortuna Case
The Tordenskjold Case
The Restaurant Case
The Insider Case
The Bank Case
The Joker Case
The Apartment Case
The Martinsen Case
The Jewel Case
The Lichtenstein Case
The Ugland Case
The Tjøntveit Case
The Dønnum Case
The Vest Tank Case
The Furuholmen Case
The Plastic Fantastic Case
The Olympia Case
The Hells Angels Case
The Screen Communication Case
The Mjelde Case
The Stuve Case
The WorldCom Case
The T5PC Case
The Øye Case
The Taxi Case
The Bach Case
The Siemens Case
The Sponsor Service Case
The Brynhildsen Woldsdal Case
The Software Innovation Case
The Lyon Case
The Karlsen Case
The Henriksen Case
The Finance Credit Case
The Murud Case
The Ullevål Case
The Red Cross Case
 
 
